Recently, Russia has repeatedly mentioned the "Russia-China-India" big triangle. The Russian Foreign Minister has also proposed multiple times in meetings that these "three horses" need to get moving again in order to break through the Western blockade on Russia.

In the 1990s, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the bipolar system dominated by the US and the USSR no longer existed, and the world entered a new period of development. In political and economic fields, various forces underwent new divisions and combinations. In the late 1990s, Russia was in its most difficult period politically and economically. The aggressive posture of the United States made Russia increasingly feel that the growing political and economic crisis was threatening its survival.

At this time, China and India gradually grew stronger in their economic reforms, significantly enhancing their comprehensive national strength, which also elevated the international status of both countries. Then, Prime Minister Primakov of Russia proposed the concept of establishing a "strategic triangle" among Russia, China, and India to jointly counter American unilateralism. Primakov believed that the three countries—Russia, China, and India—are neighbors, and although Russia and India are not adjacent, Russia remains India's primary arms supplier.

Both China and Russia have made efforts in this direction. Starting from 2005, the foreign ministers of the three countries held meetings multiple times, and cooperation extended to trade, diplomacy, security cooperation, and other fields. However, since the border conflicts between China and India in 2017, along with sanctions imposed on Russia due to the Crimea issue, this mechanism has been put on hold.

In fact, for deepening cooperation with India, China has never held high expectations over the years. Most Indian scholars believe that it is necessary to leverage the strategic commonalities of China's neighboring countries and the US to offset the uncertainty brought about by China's rise.

There are inherent irreconcilable contradictions between China and India. India's dream of becoming a great power is overshadowed by a strong "China complex": China is the reference baseline for India's pursuit of great power status, a competitor or object to surpass for India's great power status, and also one of the key external factors affecting India's rise. Achieving great power status is a basic right of a country, and there is little to criticize about dreaming of becoming a great power itself.

India has always wanted to become the hegemon of South Asia. However, India's definition of South Asia does not match the geographical definition. India's South Asia extends "from the Persian Gulf in the west to the Strait of Malacca in the east, from Central Asian republics in the north to the equator in the south."

Moreover, at the beginning of the 21st century, the U.S. strategic community began discussing playing the "India card" to counterbalance China's rising influence. These discussions about the "India card" emerged against the background of the popular "China threat theory" in the U.S. media and academic circles in the late 1990s. Clinton's visit to India in March 2000 marked a change in the U.S. attitude toward India. Since then, India has become one of the pawns used by the U.S. to contain China's development.

China's changing attitude toward India can be traced back to when Pakistan publicly announced that China had agreed to sell J-35, KJ-500, and HQ-19. Especially the sale of HQ-19, it signifies a change in China's strategy toward India.

The deployment of HQ-19 in Pakistan is equivalent to building a "missile defense wall" in China's southwestern direction. For a long time, India has regarded its nuclear forces as an important means of strategic deterrence against China. After the deployment of HQ-19 in Pakistan, it can effectively intercept medium and long-range nuclear missiles launched by India, greatly weakening India's nuclear deterrent effect against China. This forces India to reassess its own nuclear strategy, tilting its air defense resources originally deployed along the China-India border toward Pakistan. India needs to invest more funds and effort into developing new missiles and enhancing its air defense and missile defense capabilities to cope with the strategic changes after Pakistan's acquisition of HQ-19. As a result, the military resources available for the China-India border are relatively reduced, which in turn greatly alleviates the military pressure along the China-India border. From a strategic perspective, the deployment of HQ-19 in Pakistan successfully achieved the goal of containing India.

For a long time, the U.S. has viewed India as an important "pawn" to counterbalance China. In its Indo-Pacific strategic layout, the U.S. constantly incites India to create friction in border areas, attempting to divert China's strategic attention and military resources through India. However, with the deployment of HQ-19 in Pakistan, India has become exhausted militarily in dealing with Pakistan, consuming a large amount of military force in the border area. Its greatest value as a counterbalance to China has gradually diminished for the U.S. The "India card" that the U.S. intended to use to curb China's development has lost its original effectiveness under this series of strategic changes.

Without U.S. instigation and with the continuous consumption of military force in the India-Pakistan border situation, China has gained greater strategic freedom in directions such as the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea.

When China proactively moves forward in the Indian Ocean region, it also indicates a change in our attitude toward India, and naturally, the "Russia-China-India" big triangle proposed by Russia cannot be realized.

In fact, China's direction of deepening global cooperation has long shifted to ASEAN, South America, and the Middle East (Gulf Cooperation Council). These are the main directions for China's future economic deepening cooperation. It must be said that Russia has played a good hand. Currently, Russia is mired in the quagmire of the Ukraine war, with its finances, energy, technology, and military all being constrained. Russia has no choice but to turn its gaze eastward. Deepening cooperation with China has enabled Russia's economy to continue developing.

Russia's attempt to bring India into its cooperation with China is naturally aimed at better countering Europe and the US internationally and increasing its bargaining chips. But just like Iran's proposal of the "Russia-China-Iran" big triangle, China's lack of response to Russia's proposal of the "Russia-China-India" big triangle already indicates our stance.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7515349912888803852/

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