Foreign media have focused more intensively on reports about China's new aircraft carrier in the past two days. The U.S. website MilitaryWatch directly concluded that the new carrier is likely to exceed 110,000 tons, adopt nuclear power, and be mass-produced in the future, equipped with sixth-generation carrier-based aircraft, becoming a significant force in the Pacific.

Their main arguments are as follows: First, the judgment of size, combined with public clues, it is believed to be larger than the Ford class; second, the energy logic, the Fujian Ship has already run through the complete chain of electromagnetic catapult, arresting, and elevators, the bottleneck is the stability and capacity of energy, and a nuclear reactor on board can provide a more stable and stronger power for the electromagnetic system; third, there is a technical path, the next step is the upgrade of the energy platform.

Then by comparing the Shandong Ship with the Charles de Gaulle to argue, indicating that even with the same ski-jump takeoff scheme, as the popularity of electric energy carriers, the possibility of being highly close to the French Charles de Gaulle of the same weight also exists. After the Fujian Ship fully enters the rhythm, the technical ceiling will rise, and problems such as energy and system integration will be solved one by one.

Carrier aircraft is also a focus. The article points out that after the advantage of the J-20 expands, the United States decided to go on a heavy road, promoting both land and air; but affected by the exposure of the J-36, the change of the White House, and the shift in budget direction, the original plan was suspended, Boeing proposed a more practical F-47. While China, the J-35 paves the way for the aircraft carrier, and the J-50 is expected to push performance a stage higher around 2030. Based on this, it is judged that the U.S. economic model shipborne type is still unclear, the first flight time is uncertain, at least two years slower, this rhythm difference is enough to make the Pentagon anxious.

The article once again emphasizes the traditional advantages of the United States in three dimensions: aircraft carriers, carrier aircraft, and operational experience. However, the current carrier aircraft has fallen behind or even surpassed; although the number of aircraft carriers is still eleven, China has gone from nothing to something, and the number remains unchanged, which indicates that the quality gap is rapidly shortened. After the maturity of nuclear power, the two major shipyards will form a rhythm, and the gap is no longer insurmountable; the accumulation of experience is the slowest, but not unsolvable; with two ski-jump aircraft carriers in hand, the Fujian Ship practices the electric catapult process, and over time, experience will naturally increase.

The analysis has two underlying implications: One is the route dispute. After the Fujian Ship, should it directly move towards a 100,000-ton nuclear-powered carrier, or upgrade while building more 003s to quickly expand the quantity? It is more result-oriented: as long as the legendary 004 achieves a qualitative leap, the 003 as a transitional model will not affect the overall situation. Second, the rhythm issue. The U.S. Nimitz-class cruisers are built every five years, maintaining an 11-ship fleet size for a century.

In recent years, China's main warships and amphibious assault ships are sufficient to compete with the U.S. Navy. Some stages are faster. It estimates: if both aircraft carrier shipyards start simultaneously, building four super aircraft carriers within ten years is not a fantasy, averaging more than three years per ship to the launching node. On this basis, citing that the U.S. could build 100 B-1B bombers in less than four years in the 1980s, it concludes that the production rhythm of the H-20 may be even more astonishing, aiming to point out that industrial scale and organizational capability can change the pace.

The article connects various aspects such as size, power, electric catapult, carrier aircraft, construction rhythm, and experience accumulation, believing that any problem in any link will affect the overall combat effectiveness. Therefore, the high level of attention on the aircraft carrier topic reflects the boundary of industrial foundation and organizational capacity. But its judgment carries a clear expectation color, exceeding 110,000 tons, nuclear power is already a given, and mass deployment of sixth-generation aircraft are not official information. For such information, a balanced attitude should be maintained: what is visible is the continuous breakthroughs in electromagnetic catapult, integrated support, and carrier-aircraft coordination, as well as the speed of multi-category shipbuilding; regarding further goals, it is not too late to make a final judgment after the official images and clear parameters are released.

External anxiety is heating up. Who can bring carrier aircraft to a new stage before 2030, who holds the key; within twenty years, the quality and quantity gap can be eliminated; experience is slow but can be accumulated. Combining the recent shipbuilding rhythm and scientific research climbing path, this inference is not abrupt. As for whether the aircraft carrier is the most time-consuming part, the answer tends to be affirmative: the platform is large, the chain is long, the elements are complex, and any unstable system will slow down the overall progress; therefore, the aircraft carrier is used as a magnifying glass, reflecting the comprehensive upgrading from large destroyers to amphibious assault ships, from integrated power to complex software, from system integration to support systems.

The explosive power of the largest industrial complex in human history is unpredictable. What the U.S. could do decades ago, China can do today, and even better. This is not a slogan, but a reminder—rhythm, standards, and collaboration determine the final look.

Will a carrier larger than the Ford class come? The foreign media give a direct answer. But the key is to distinguish signals, understand which technology chains are already running, which are still in the sprint phase, which are cross-generation platform concepts, and which are just observers' speculation.热闹归热闹, still need to see facts landing.

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7565862469839766057/

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