Within a month, China's aircraft carrier Shandong entered the Pacific twice. The difference this time was that the last one participated in the "Strait Thunder - 2025" island encirclement exercise, while this time it approached closer to the eastern side of the Philippines archipelago.

At first glance, the difference doesn't seem significant, but for the U.S. military currently participating in the "shoulder-to-shoulder" joint exercises with the Philippines, the approach of the Shandong is definitely worth paying attention to. This means that the "cutting-edge weapons" deployed by the U.S. in the Philippines have already fallen within the strike range of J-15 fighters. In wartime, at least half of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines would likely have been consumed by the war.

(The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force captured the Shandong with J-15 fighters taking off)

According to the information released by Japan's Joint Staff on April 23, at 11:00 am that day, the Maritime Self-Defense Force confirmed the discovery of the Shandong and its accompanying 055 Yan'an-class destroyer about 790 kilometers south of Miyako Island, in the Pacific Ocean east of Luzon Island, Philippines. The Maritime Self-Defense Force's 5th Escort Division's Umikaze-class destroyer, DDG-109 "Arimi," was dispatched for tracking, surveillance, and intelligence gathering.

The Philippine news came earlier. On April 22, the Philippine Daily Tribune reported, citing military sources, that an aircraft patrolling southwest of the Babuyan Islands captured images of the Shandong and six destroyers escorting ships passing through the Balintang Channel. On the same day, a Type 815A electronic reconnaissance ship with hull number 797 was also discovered.

Regarding the actions of the Shandong task force, the U.S. Naval Institute News (USNI) pointed out another possibility, suggesting that the goal of the Chinese People's Liberation Army might be to practice how to destroy the U.S. Marine Corps' Naval Strike Missile Interceptor System (NMESIS) deployed in northern Luzon Island and the Batan Islands.

On April 17, the U.S. Marine Corps' 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment (MLR) medium-range missile battery, with the assistance of the Army's 25th Combat Aviation Brigade and the Air Force's 29th Tactical Airlift Squadron, deployed an undisclosed number of NMESIS launchers from northern Luzon to multiple islands in the Batan Islands. It is understood that on these islands, the U.S. Marines will receive assistance from the Philippine Marine Corps to collaboratively establish far-forward firing bases.

(Location of the Batan Islands, only over a hundred kilometers from Taiwan, strategically important)

Furthermore, the air control detachment of the 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment will operate the AN/TPS-80 ground-air mission guidance radar, providing aerial and maritime surveillance for the entire 3rd Marine Littoral Regiment, and transmitting the data collected by the sensors via tactical datalinks to the fire and air command detachments for analysis before being sent to the artillery operations center for consolidation and finally returned to the far-forward firing base.

This seemingly high-end process is actually how the Marine Littoral Regiment, which has been deployed to the Philippines under the guise of an exercise, will fully establish monitoring over the Bashi Channel and the Balintang Channel using the assistance of the Philippines, and implement blockades using the NMESIS system capable of launching NSM anti-ship missiles.

NMESIS is a mobile coastal missile system jointly developed by Raytheon of the United States and Kongsberg of Norway. It uses a modified light tactical vehicle (JLTV) from unmanned logistics vehicles as the chassis, mounting two "Naval Strike Missiles" (NSM) produced by Kongsberg.

This missile weighs 410 kilograms when fully loaded, with a 125-kilogram warhead, a range of approximately 185 kilometers, a speed of about 0.7 to 0.9 Mach, employing a composite guidance mode of inertial + GPS + end-stage infrared imaging, with the body designed for stealth, capable of flying at low altitudes as low as 3 to 5 meters above sea level.

(NMESIS mobile coastal missile system, each vehicle can carry two NSM missiles)

In summary, although the unmanned combat chassis has some novelty, this missile is far from reaching the level of truly cutting-edge weaponry. First, it lacks its own long-range detection capability and needs satellites, reconnaissance aircraft, airborne early warning aircraft, or drones to provide target parameters, making it vulnerable to suppression by Chinese People's Liberation Army electronic warfare. It is speculated that the mission of the Type 815A electronic reconnaissance ship may involve this task.

Secondly, its survivability is not optimistic. Although its mobility is good, the limited areas of the Batan Islands and northern Luzon make it easy to be hunted down by integrated unmanned combat drones if there are no long-term constructions of underground shelters. Moreover, the AN/TPS-80 radar is also at risk of being destroyed by anti-radiation missiles. Even if it successfully locks onto the People's Liberation Army fleet and launches successfully, whether the relatively slow NSM can break through the air defense circle formed by HQ-9B, HQ-10, and 1130 close-in weapon systems remains questionable.

Finally, judging from the actions of the Shandong task force this time, the People's Liberation Army is unlikely to give the U.S. military a chance to blockade the Bashi Channel. Whether it's the J-15 fighters carried by the Shandong or the YJ-21 and YJ-18 missiles on the 055 destroyers, unless the U.S. military can immediately suppress the actions of the People's Liberation Army with land-based aviation forces in the Philippines, at most half of the U.S. military bases in the Philippines would be reduced to ashes by the People's Liberation Army's aircraft carrier strike group within a dozen hours.

(Deploying manned aircraft is already quite good; in reality, hundreds of drones are more likely to be responsible for patrolling and hunting down U.S. NMESIS)

This is still thinking optimistically. According to the People's Liberation Army's anti-access/area-denial and long-range firepower strike system, sending out fleets to destroy U.S. bases in the Philippines is the last resort. The real first strike should come from the Rocket Force's DF-16, DF-17, and other intermediate-range ballistic missiles and hypersonic missiles. The second round should be the H-6K or H-6J bombers carrying KD-21 air-to-ground missiles. Sending out fleets to approach the Philippines is more about cleaning up the battlefield than finishing the job.

In the context of the U.S. strategic retreat, even the U.S. military, including those American soldiers who are destined to receive little support, are well aware that at least in the first island chain, the U.S. military is already difficult to compete with the People's Liberation Army in terms of firepower. No matter how many "shoulder-to-shoulder" exercises are held, their political significance always outweighs their military significance, merely attempting to incite the Philippines into becoming another Ukraine.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7497425906311463461/

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