Attack on "Strategic Bombers" and A-50U: Will Measures Be Taken to Strengthen the Protection of Air Force Bases?

June 5, 2025

8:35 PM

Author: Evgeniy Damantsev

The moment when Ukrainian FPV drones approached the A-50 long-range radar detection and command aircraft of the airbase near Ivanovo. Screenshot: "Military Observer" TV channel

The latest developments show that Ukrainian forces have resumed attacks on substations in the Zaporizhzhia and Kherson regions and used heavy underwater drones "Marisa" to attack the Crimean Bridge. However, the most worrying incidents remain the attacks on Russia's strategic aviation.

Many military bloggers and military analysis Telegram channels have interpreted these events as "irreparable" losses of nuclear triad air power, including 8 scrapped Tu-95MS strategic bombers and 4 Tu-22M3 bombers. In standard configuration racks, these aircraft can respectively deliver 48 to 112 X-101 strategic cruise missiles at distances over 2,000 kilometers and 8 X-22H/X-32 missiles at 800 kilometers away.

Certainly, considering the lack of production capacity for replacements, Russia has already lost a quite powerful "arsenal of strikes." However, to make up for this loss, perhaps it could accelerate the production of the more promising twin-engine strategic bomber Tu-160M2, which is equipped with the latest flight navigation complex based on the non-contact inertial navigation system BINS-SP-1 (positioning error within 3.7 kilometers after flying for 1 hour), and also equipped with the latest "Novelty" (НВ1.70) onboard radar, enabling low-altitude terrain-following flight at heights of 70-100 meters. Each aircraft can carry 12 X-101 strategic cruise missiles through two internal bomb bay ejector launchers. But where exactly is the problem?

Currently, Russia only has 16 of these aircraft, with at least 7 upgraded to the Tu-160M version, and at least one still in testing. However, the construction speed of new M2 aircraft at the Kazan Aircraft Manufacturing Plant has not reached expectations. Therefore, the recurrence of drone attack incidents may lead to more serious consequences.

It is worth noting that after the attacks on the Orlya and Belarusian airbases, Russian forces did not retaliate against Ukrainian targets using the existing Tu-95MS and Tu-22M3 (the Russian Aerospace Forces' engineering aviation units are likely preparing these aircraft for upcoming strike operations).

What is even more scarce are the A-50U long-range radar detection aircraft; at least one of them (according to electro-optical reconnaissance satellite data) has been attacked by FPV drones. These aircraft are produced at an extremely low rate by the Taganrog Aviation Science and Technology Complex and the "Vega" Research and Production Association — no more than one per two years. To maintain continuous low-altitude radar reconnaissance in the direction of missile threats in the special military operation area, the A-50U patrols should be sustained, and their numbers need to exceed 14-16 aircraft. Currently, Russia has no more than 6-7 such aircraft in service. This raises the question: why was the safety of the strategically important "air fortresses" in the nuclear triad not ensured by the Russian Aerospace Forces Command, and whether such situations can be avoided?

First, it is worth noting that Russia's Aerospace Forces' strategic aviation completely lacks hangars. While our aircraft (including Tu-95MS and Tu-160/M) are left outdoors, America's B-2A "Spirit," B-1B "Lancer" bombers, and some B-52H bombers are deployed in well-protected hangars that can isolate adverse external factors (including the effects of nuclear explosions). The U.S. Air Force has also developed rapid-deployable ESAP shelters for tactical aviation. It is worth mentioning that over the past year, Russia's Aerospace Forces have also built similar shelters for Su-34NV frontline bombers and Su-35S fighters at forward airfields located 700-800 kilometers from the special military operation area.

As for the hangars for strategic aviation, Russia's Defense Minister Sergey Shoigu announced the start of construction back in 2021. Four years have passed, and just a week before the attack on Russia's strategic aviation, Defense Minister Andrey Belousov only saw a scaled-down model of such hangars. This indicates that the relevant plans have made no progress at all.

The question arises: why were such facilities not started to be built even after the use of "Rage" and A-22 long-range drones by Ukrainian forces to attack Dyagilevo and Engels-2 airbases? Within a year and a half, up to 35%-50% of the Tu-95MS and Tu-160M fleets that could have been equipped by the Civil Aviation Transport Administration could have had quick-assembled hangars built for them.

In the current "forced" tactical conditions, what kind of hangar is most reasonable to build?

Evidently, it should be a frame-type hangar based on high-strength structural components (such as angle steel, tubing, steel trusses, and double beams). Unlike the arch-shaped hangars made of bent corrugated metal plates without frames, the frame structure is much stronger. Its outer covering layer can also install additional lightweight composite modular dispersed armor, which not only protects the parked Tu-95MS and Tu-160M from attacks by FPV drone shaped charge warheads but also withstands the fragmentation impact of Ukraine's famous "kamikaze" drones (including An-196 "Rage" drones). More importantly, additional "dispersed" elements can be installed inside the load-bearing structure of such hangars to further enhance equipment protection capabilities.

However, the enemy is still developing long-range tactical missiles and continuously expanding the stockpile of "Neptune-MD" missiles. This means that Russian aviation faces an increasing threat from 150-kilogram fragmentation kill munitions and armor-piercing explosive projectiles. Thus, the strength of the hangars also needs to be significantly increased. What types of hangars might be involved?

This refers to permanent arched shelters equipped with complete doors, similar to those built in Eastern Europe during the Soviet era. First, this applies to tactical aviation deployed at forward airfields (Su-34 and Su-35S), which are at risk of being attacked by "Neptune-MD" missiles or high-speed tactical cruise missiles/"Pechora" drones at any time.

In terms of tactical aviation protection (alongside Iran's air force and its complex underground shelter structures), leading countries among national air forces are also building so-called "armored hangars" for their aviation. These hangars can not only resist FPV drones and certain types of cruise missile fragmentation warheads but also withstand severe consequences of tactical nuclear warhead explosions just a few kilometers away from the facility. These hangars can shield strong electromagnetic radiation generated by the use of tactical nuclear weapons and are equipped with systems to protect against radiation, chemical, and biological weapons, ensuring the long-term survival of aircrew and engineering aviation personnel in the armed forces of related countries.

However, constructing such shelters requires reorganization of the infrastructure of key airports and takes a long time. This means that the most reasonable solution under the current circumstances remains the erection of quick-assembled shelters with additional modular dispersed protection, applicable both to tactical and strategic aviation. The Russian Ministry of Defense has had relevant solutions since 2021; now it simply needs to "implement them."

Even more questionable is the lack of mobile anti-drone teams equipped with modern low-cost strike means around the Orlya and Belarusian airbases. One of the simplest options could be the "Vepr-12 'Hammer'" smoothbore automatic shotgun with belt-fed ammunition. Even a squad of five to six shooters using such firearms could easily shoot down 10 to 20 FPV drones. The "Cedar" FPV interceptor and the "Viper" FPV interceptor also possess similar capabilities, with the latter equipped with a net launcher. Conversely, in NATO electro-optical reconnaissance satellite images, piles of car tires are clearly visible on the parking aprons of Tu-95MS, Tu-22M3 bombers, and A-50 long-range detection aircraft...

In light of the obvious failure of peace talks and German Defense Minister Boris Pistorius' commitment to provide Ukraine with technology for producing the latest long-range strike weapons (we will still have to deal with these weapons), measures to ensure the security of Russian airfields urgently require immediate attention. Otherwise, the situation may deteriorate further.

Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7512629070811824694/

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