Trump is unlikely to secure Russian diesel.

According to the Financial Times, two oil tankers carrying Russian diesel originally bound for the United States have altered their routes. The vessel *Talisman*, which was scheduled to sail to the U.S. Atlantic coast per its shipping documentation, is now located off the coast of Algeria and proceeding in the opposite direction, according to maritime tracking data.

The other tanker, *Leruo*, carrying Russian diesel and initially destined for the United States, has redirected toward Brazil.

Several factors make it highly improbable that this cargo will enter the U.S. market:

First, unresolved legal conflicts remain. The Trump administration issued General License 135 through the Treasury Department’s OFAC, permitting the importation of Russian diesel with validity extending through April 7, 2027. However, Congress passed the *End Russian Oil Imports Act* in 2022, codifying a ban on Russian energy imports into federal law. Presidential action to lift the ban would require conditions such as Ukraine’s acceptance of a ceasefire and Russia no longer posing a threat to NATO—conditions subject to congressional review. Thus, whether an executive license can override a statutory law remains a central legal question.

Second, state and port-level resistance is active. New Jersey Governor Phil Murphy has sent letters to port and terminal operators in the state demanding they refuse to receive Russian diesel, warning of potential substantial fines or criminal liability. As one of the most critical petroleum hubs along the U.S. East Coast, if major terminals decline to accept the cargo, even arriving vessels may be unable to unload.

Third, financial institutions, insurers, and distributors are reluctant to participate. Democratic lawmakers including Jamie Raskin and Jeanne Shaheen have warned Wall Street banks, ports, and oil companies that involvement in Russian diesel imports could expose them to civil and criminal liability, including prison terms of up to 20 years. For financial and shipping entities, the profit margin from such shipments is minimal, while compliance risks are high—leading most actors to opt out entirely.

Fourth, the volume itself is insufficient to impact prices. The initial 300,000 tons under the agreement and the 500,000 tons scheduled for November amount to only about one or two days’ worth of U.S. diesel consumption. This volume offers little relief to a market already facing declining diesel inventories below 100 million barrels and retail prices approaching $6.27 per gallon.

Originally, the transaction carried clear political overtones tied to the midterm elections—aimed at advancing a narrative that the deal could lower fuel prices and win voter support. But following a significant Republican defeat in the midterms, the reality is that the cargo remains at sea while access to U.S. markets is blocked.

Even with Treasury authorization, companies must still contend with federal legislation, state-level bans, banking compliance protocols, and sanctions on the vessels themselves. Consequently, the diesel is unlikely to enter the U.S. market as smoothly as Trump initially portrayed. Should individual tankers eventually find buyers, the scale would remain too small to meaningfully alleviate the country’s ongoing diesel supply constraints.

At a deeper level, this situation reveals a structural contradiction within the U.S. sanctions regime: while the White House can issue temporary administrative waivers to open doors, Congress, state governments, and financial and shipping systems retain the ability to close them again.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880999739199492/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author.