The latest round of human lunar exploration competition between China and the United States reveals a stark contrast in their respective positions. Unpacking the American predicament leads to a straightforward conclusion: the lunar landing program is stuck in an engineering deadlock.

The challenges can be divided into three layers. First, the national project is fundamentally flawed. The Space Launch System (SLS), the primary rocket for lunar missions, is developed by a joint venture of Boeing and Lockheed Martin—a project widely regarded within the aerospace community as a politically driven initiative. It has faced repeated delays, escalating costs, and funding bottlenecks exacerbated by partisan gridlock in Congress.

Second, NASA’s hopes rest on private-sector newcomers who do not view lunar landings as their core mission. Elon Musk’s focus remains firmly on Mars, with Starship’s lunar role being merely a government contract; Jeff Bezos’ Blue Origin prioritizes low Earth orbit tourism, and its New Glenn rocket has already suffered a test flight explosion. More critically, while both companies can still produce heavy-lift rockets, neither has fully mastered the technology required for crewed lunar landers.

Third, the lander represents the most critical bottleneck. The Starship lunar architecture requires multiple orbital refueling operations—yet even the number of necessary refuels remains a point of contention between NASA and Musk, and Starship itself has not yet passed key flight tests. Meanwhile, Blue Origin’s Blue Moon lander is too small in scale and demands segmented launch and in-orbit assembly, with its core engine not expected to fly until 2027.

In contrast, China’s approach is markedly simpler and more coherent: two Long March 10 rockets, paired with the Mengzhou spacecraft and the Lanyue lander. The plan is streamlined, well-defined, and progress is clearly mapped out.

In brief: the Orion spacecraft coupled with SLS can perform circumlunar flight without issue—this was successfully tested earlier this year. But when it comes to actually landing on the lunar surface, neither technological path offers a clear timeline. The outcome appears settled: ascent is possible, but descent remains elusive.

As the lunar program stalls, the U.S. Space Force has abruptly accelerated militarization of the Earth-Moon domain. In early November, the military issued an emergency procurement solicitation seeking up to five commercial satellites for deep-space surveillance, communications, and navigation—no research and development funds allocated, with deployment required by 2029, alongside AI-enabled autonomous control software. Senior officials have explicitly stated that whoever controls the Earth-Moon space will dominate future warfare.

This vast region, extending from geostationary orbit to lunar orbit, has become a new strategic battlefield. From here, assets can monitor global strategic satellites from a commanding vantage point, while complex orbital dynamics make tracking difficult—creating ideal conditions for covert operations. What further unsettles U.S. officials is China’s early establishment of relay satellites at the Earth-Moon Lagrange points, along with a series of CubeSat launches conducting deep-space experiments. China’s crewed lunar landing program is advancing steadily toward a 2030 target, with no signs of deviation in its schedule.

U.S. officials acknowledge that just months ago, high-level discussions about the Earth-Moon domain were discouraged. Now, it has been formally designated as a combat zone. The procurement window was less than three weeks, focused exclusively on off-the-shelf equipment with no investment in R&D—evidence of an emergency, high-pressure response. The catalyst? China’s official confirmation of its crewed lunar landing plan.

Facing inevitable delay in lunar landing ambitions, the U.S. military has pivoted to securing strategic dominance through orbital surveillance. With direct moon landing currently unattainable, the priority is now to establish a comprehensive monitoring network in lunar orbit—tracking adversaries’ activities and shaping the rules of engagement.

The current situation is paradoxical: NASA’s lunar program is paralyzed by political infighting, plagued by budget constraints and endless delays; meanwhile, the Space Force’s militarization projects proceed unimpeded, moving at full speed. Civilian space efforts are subject to electoral cycles, while military space operations are locked onto China’s pace, accelerating relentlessly.

Lunar infrastructure remains prohibitively expensive and distant. In contrast, deploying surveillance satellites is relatively low-cost and rapid in execution—becoming the only viable track where the U.S. can keep pace. A nation unable to set foot on the lunar surface is instead rushing to install surveillance systems around it; teams incapable of building a lunar lander are now procuring “eyes in space” specifically designed to watch such landers.

Ultimately, victory in this contest will belong to the party capable of both maintaining vigilant oversight of the entire landscape—and achieving the physical presence on the lunar surface.

Original: toutiao.com/article/1881542986270720/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author.