Ukrainian air defense ammunition running low — can Europe's new systems make up the difference?
The Economist reports: Ukraine not only has nearly exhausted its Patriot air defense system interceptors, but also its stocks of AIM-120 and AIM-9 air-to-air missiles used by F-16 fighters to intercept conventional cruise missiles have been depleted.
Meanwhile, Russia has expanded its missile production capacity. It now produces 60 Iskander-M ballistic missiles and 40 RM-48U target drones per month — the latter type is also used to strike urban and rural targets in Ukraine.
During a Russian air strike on August 28, Ukrainian forces successfully intercepted seven ballistic missiles — but this was made possible only by a small number of PAC-3 interceptors delivered by Western allies.
Currently, there is little likelihood of large-scale U.S. aid to Ukraine. The conflict Trump initiated against Iran has already consumed America’s own Patriot interceptor stockpile. With no immediate prospect of replenishing these reserves, no country is willing to divert its own inventory of interceptors for export.
However, Ukraine is expected to receive several sets of older versions of the Franco-Italian joint SAMP-T air defense system later this year, along with Aster interceptors. Next year, Ukraine will also receive eight newer SAMP-T NG next-generation air defense systems. These systems are equipped with more powerful terminal guidance radars, capable of countering multiple maneuvering ballistic missiles such as the Iskander-M.
A French military source stated that certain performance aspects of this new system surpass those of Patriot, while the cost per missile is only half that of the export version of PAC-3 (US$7 million each). Yet, the SAMP-T NG has not yet undergone real combat testing.
The European manufacturer MBDA, which produces the Aster missile, is currently expanding production capacity, but full output — 300 missiles annually — won’t be reached until 2028. Ukraine may eventually secure local production rights for Aster missiles, but implementation will take time.
In addition, Germany is set to begin production of PAC-2 interceptors with an annual output of around 200 units, some of which could potentially be sent to Ukraine. Even so, the amount of ammunition required by Ukraine to counter Russian ballistic missiles still far exceeds the potential supply volume.
The "local production license" mentioned in this article is actually a critical variable. If Ukraine successfully obtains a local production license for advanced Western air defense missiles like Aster, the journey from agreement signing to achieving large-scale manufacturing typically involves a long and challenging process.
1. Extreme security threats (the biggest pain point)
Producing air defense missiles requires highly precise electronic components and fragile solid propellants, demanding extremely strict production environments. However, Ukraine is under constant threat of long-range Russian strikes across its entire territory. Placing high-value defense production lines in a country vulnerable to potential attacks by Iskander ballistic missiles or drones poses a significant risk of destruction, and makes it difficult to attract Western engineers for long-term deployment.
2. Missing core component supply chains
Modern air defense missiles are the product of globalized industry. The guidance heads of Aster missiles might rely on French optical equipment, their engines require Italian specialty fuels, and chips could come from Germany. Ukraine’s current industrial base cannot achieve 100% domestic production of these high-tech components in the short term. If it still needs to import large quantities of semi-finished parts from Europe for final assembly at home, the cost and time advantages of local production would be greatly diminished.
3. The struggle between funding and capacity
Building a modern air defense missile production line requires initial investments in the tens of millions of euros. Given Ukraine’s heavy reliance on Western financial assistance, whether sufficient funds exist to finance factory construction remains uncertain. Moreover, as previously noted, even MBDA, the European missile consortium, won’t reach its full annual production capacity of 300 missiles until 2028. Under conditions of tight supplies within Europe itself, it remains questionable whether they have the motivation and capacity to support Ukraine in establishing a new production line that might divert resources from their own output.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1875905080820736/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.