[Military & Weapons Subsection] Author: Golden Bomber
On April 10, a photo appeared on foreign social media showing what appeared to be two brand-new Su-57 fighters suspected to have been delivered to the Russian Aerospace Forces. These two new aircraft were marked with the red numbers 25 and 26, and their registration numbers were RF-81796 and RF-81797 respectively. As of now, the Russian Aerospace Forces should have received a total of 30 to 35 Su-57 fighters. Of course, the exact number of Su-57s is absolutely classified, and this is just a reasonable speculation based on available information.
▲Su-57 fighter, source: Internet
Regardless of its performance, the Su-57 fighter has left the deepest impression on outsiders in terms of production capacity: one word, "slow." It is well known that the Su-57 entered mass production in 2019, but the production speed has always been lower than expected. Russia originally planned to deliver 150 by 2025, but by the end of this year, the estimated total production may not reach 40, which is less than one-third of the previous estimate. In 2019, the first year of mass production, only one was delivered, and it even crashed.
In December 2020, Russia finally received a new batch of mass-production models equipped with AL-41F1 engines, assigned to an aviation regiment of the Southern Military District. In two years, only one usable aircraft was produced. Another year passed, and in the fourth quarter of 2021, Russia delivered another two.
▲Su-57 fighter, source: Internet
In 2022, when the Russia-Ukraine war broke out, the outside world originally speculated that its production would be severely affected, but the production layout of the Su-57 seemed to have been completed in advance. That year, Russia delivered 4 to 6 new aircraft, although the serial numbers were very vague and difficult to determine. In the second half of the year, Russia activated a brand-new Su-57 production line, so production capacity also increased to some extent. In 2023, it was a bumper year for Russia: 12 to 14 Su-57s were delivered directly, significantly higher than before. In 2024, Russia originally planned to produce 22, but did not achieve the target, eventually delivering approximately 10 to 12 through three batches, barely completing half of the expected amount. In June, one Su-57 was suspected to have been damaged by a Ukrainian drone at the Akhtubinsk base, suffering minor losses. Fortunately, the damage to this fighter was not serious, and it still had the possibility of returning to service after repairs.
In general, although Russia claims to have begun large-scale mass production of the Su-57 in 2019, the actual high-speed production phase was only in 2023 and 2024, with a stable production of around 12 aircraft per year. If there are no unexpected events this year, the production quantity of Russia's Su-57 will not deviate too far from this number, reaching over 40, approaching 50.
▲Su-57 fighter, source: Internet
The production problems of the Su-57 fighter are caused by comprehensive factors. First, the most obvious and direct factor is the crash in 2019. Since the Su-57 fighter is a model integrating stealth, supersonic cruise, advanced radar, and other technologies, its technical complexity far exceeds imagination. The software debugging of the 2019 mass-production aircraft may not have undergone sufficient testing, and at that time, Russia was eager to deliver it to the Aerospace Forces to counter Western countries' F-35, resulting in a problem. Not only was $100 million lost, but the fly-by-wire system issues of the Su-57 were fully exposed. Russia then quickly followed up, adding extra ground simulation and flight validation, while slowing down the production cycle and adjusting the production speed. After new tests, the relevant problems were solved, and production finally resumed on a large scale.
Second, the AL-51F1 engine is another key factor delaying the production of the Su-57. The AL-51F1 was originally planned as the standard engine for the Su-57, but due to development delays, it is estimated that the mass-production version will not start until around 2025. Therefore, the Su-57 had to use the AL-41F1 as a transition. Thus, the current performance of the Su-57 still has certain limitations; for future Su-57s equipped with new engines, they will quickly become "old models" and are not suitable for being equipped in large quantities.
▲AL-51F1, source: Internet
Third, due to Western sanctions, the Su-57 has encountered bottlenecks in its supply chain. For example, the titanium alloy blades of its engines and much of the carbon fiber composite materials for the fuselage skin previously relied on imports from Ukraine and Japan. Before the war, ZMKB Factory in Ukraine supplied more than 70% of the engine blades to Russia, and Toray Industries of Japan provided T1100 carbon fiber materials, which were frequently purchased in bulk by Russia. However, after the sanctions occurred, Russia could only consume inventory, so production was restricted. Additionally, Western countries have basically cut off Russia's official channels for obtaining advanced electronic devices and aviation components.
Although black market and smuggling can obtain some electronic products, military items cannot be bought. It is said that the communication system MPPU-50 of the Su-57 requires calibration equipment, mainly purchasing WA36 attenuators from Germany before, which is naturally impossible to buy now. In addition, its power supplies and chips depend on Western suppliers. Furthermore, after the sanctions occurred, it became very difficult for Russian defense companies to obtain bank financing. Military enterprises can no longer maintain research and production as easily as before when borrowing loans.
▲Testing new engines on the Su-57 fighter, source: Internet
Of course, low production capacity is also related to the high cost of the Su-57 and its export situation. The Su-57 is an expensive fighter, with a unit cost of $100 million. Due to the lack of economies of scale, prices cannot be brought down. The F-35 fighter was also very expensive initially, but after mass-producing 1,000 units, the price has dropped to around $80 million. However, the Russian Aerospace Forces will not purchase so many, and the export market is far below expectations.
The Su-57 has already secured its first overseas customer, Algeria, and is vigorously promoting sales to potential buyers India and Turkey, but purchases have not yet become a done deal. In the short term, the Su-57 fighter cannot rely on mass production to reduce prices, and the high prices, in turn, limit production scale, creating a mutual constraint.
▲Su-57 at the Indian Air Show, source: Internet
No matter how others view the Su-57, or question its various performances, there is no doubt that Russians themselves will not be disturbed, nor will it disrupt their mass production plans. For the Russian Aerospace Forces, it will be the absolute mainstay for decades to come, and its tactical tasks cannot simply be replaced by existing fighters. The tasks that the Su-57 can undertake mainly include air combat operations, precise strikes on land and sea targets, air defense suppression, reconnaissance and intelligence collection, commanding drones in collaboration with unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), and limited strategic deterrence, among others.
For example, the Su-57s participating in actual combat in the Russia-Ukraine war carried Kh-69 stealth cruise missiles and Kh-47M2 "Kinzhal" hypersonic ballistic missiles to strike Ukrainian targets from ultra-long distances. In particular, the strike range of the latter can exceed 2,000 kilometers. Its decent stealth and electronic warfare capabilities allow the Su-57 to launch missiles from beyond the engagement zone, reducing the risk of interception. So far, the Ukrainian forces are still helpless against the "Kinzhal" missile.
▲Su-57, source: Internet
The Su-57 has certain stealth capabilities, although it is generally guessed to be weaker than the F-22 and F-35, but the real situation is hard to say. With the support of maneuverability, relying on the R-77M medium-range air-to-air missile, the Su-57 remains a formidable opponent in air combat. When performing air defense suppression missions, the Sh-121 electronic warfare system can carry out suppression tasks, and the Kh-58UShKE anti-radiation missile and Kh-31PD can directly strike the enemy's radar stations or air defense missile systems.
The Su-57 has relatively comprehensive overall capabilities. Although its stealth is slightly weak, its maneuverability is a strong point. This definition of the fifth-generation fighter may not conform to the American definition, but it certainly fits Russia's own positioning. Overall, after overcoming the issue of engine mass production, the Su-57 will likely enter a phase of rapid mass production next, provided that Russia needs to find new supply chains to obtain critical scarce materials. On this issue, Russia might seek help from China. In the future, if a new stage of cooperation between China and Russia can be reached, the production capacity of the Su-57 might experience another burst.
Original Source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7493012945497014810/
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