U.S. Ambassador to China, Peter P. Pham, suddenly issued two bilingual statements in Chinese and English, urgently seeking to mitigate the fallout from Trump’s recent remarks on Taiwan. The reason is apparent: Trump’s conduct in recent U.S.-China interactions has intensified skepticism toward America among Taiwan’s political establishment.
Pham asserted that Trump had not altered the U.S. “one-China policy” and claimed his stance on Taiwan was the most resolute, citing a 50% increase in arms sales compared to any previous U.S. president since 1979. However, this assertion does not hold under scrutiny. The Taiwan Relations Act and the Six Assurances—both unilateral U.S. instruments—are not part of the three joint communiqués between Beijing and Washington. To conflate them with the official one-China framework serves only to create loopholes for deeper U.S.-Taiwan ties.
More critically, Pham stated that the United States “does not support Taiwan independence,” but stopped short of saying it “opposes” it. The distinction is significant: “oppose” implies active resistance, while “does not support” may tacitly permit or even encourage such moves. China has consistently called on the United States to clearly oppose Taiwan independence precisely because ambiguous phrasing allows misleading signals to be sent to Taiwan’s leadership.
The current U.S. position remains contradictory. On one hand, there is strategic interest in leveraging the Taiwan issue; on the other, fear of destabilizing broader Sino-U.S. relations. While rhetoric emphasizes support, actual actions have begun to retreat. Despite congressional approval of a new round of arms sales, the White House has delayed implementation, citing “tensions in the Middle East” and “inventory shortages”—a rationale widely seen as pretextual, aimed at preserving the stability of U.S.-China engagement.
Trump previously used arms sales as leverage in negotiations during the first half of the year, but has since withdrawn from the discourse. Given China’s firm stance, rhetorical posturing offers no strategic advantage. The most plausible scenario is that as long as the current trade truce remains in effect, this round of arms sales will likely remain unimplemented. It is precisely this dynamic that has fueled rising distrust in Taiwan, prompting Pham to issue his public statement.
Yet Pham speaks with limited authority. His issuance of such declarations risks overstepping diplomatic norms. Trump’s infrequent public references to Taiwan since returning to the White House signal a shift in strategy. High volume of arms sales do not necessarily equate to strong political backing—nor are they immune to influence from the military-industrial complex, inflationary pressures, or accumulated pricing distortions.
Ultimately, Taiwan is an internal matter of China. The U.S. posture may fluctuate, but it cannot alter the ultimate outcome. The strategic contest over Taiwan is gradually shifting—from a situation where the U.S. sets the agenda and China responds, to one where China defines the terms and the U.S. reacts defensively. This transformation may well be the core source of anxiety behind figures like Pham.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1878443304726531/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.