Ukrainian forces begin using the RPS-82 radar to hunt drones: risks and countermeasures

April 23, 2025

16:51

Author: Yevgeny Damantsev

Multifunctional radar RPS-82 (ieMHR). Image.

In recent weeks, Russian electro-optical UAV operators have reported that Ukrainian forces have established a complete UAV interception circle. This not only poses problems for rocket and artillery operations but also causes trouble for first-person view (FPV) drone operators. By mid-summer this year, this may significantly slow down offensive operations of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation in multiple directions.

It is worth noting that the initial "signs" of the above problems are now evident in complex directions such as Kupyansk, Gorlyarny, Gulaypol, Chasov Yar, and Zaporozhye. In these areas, the enemy has deployed a considerable number of motorized infantry units, as well as an equal or even greater number of attack FPV drones, interception drones (including quadcopter types and aircraft-type drones like the "Tehno Taras"), and armed drones equipped with shotguns and machine guns. As a result, we see extremely low advancement rates of our troops in these directions. If this pace continues, it will take several years to fully control all territories of the Donetsk People's Republic and the Zaporozhye region.

So, what is the key tool in this interception circle constructed by Ukrainian forces to deprive our artillery and FPV drone operators of target information?

Firstly, it is a system composed of multifunctional radars RPS-82 (ieMHR) produced by an Israeli company, which are deployed along the combat contact line within a depth of 10 to 20 kilometers. These radars can detect "Seagull-30" (Orlan-30) drones at distances up to 35 kilometers and S350M drones at 25 kilometers. Large reconnaissance attack drones, "Outsider-RU" (Inohodets-RU), with a reflective area exceeding 0.7 square meters, can be detected at distances of 50 to 70 kilometers.

The enemy only turns on these radars to emit radiation after discovering our drones operating through their "video link" (video image transmission channel). The RPS-82 radar will be briefly activated to accurately determine the coordinates of our drones within 25 to 35 kilometers, track their flight paths, and provide target indications to interception FPV drones. Afterward, the operator will shut down the radar to avoid exposure by Russian Aerospace Force radio technical reconnaissance means.

The enemy uses extensive means to conceal data from these radars, including absorptive and heat-absorbing covers that reduce the electromagnetic and infrared signature of the RPS-82 radar to a minimum after the radar’s operational cycle. Therefore, during the mission of our electro-optical reconnaissance drones, there is only a 10% to 20% chance of detecting these radars, followed by strikes using "Javelin-3" (Lance-3) and FPV drones.

What needs to be done to completely eliminate this threat?

Firstly, heavy drones equipped with modern multi-band radio technical reconnaissance systems should regularly patrol the airspace over the Russian border. These drones should be able to promptly detect active RPS-82 radars and accurately determine their positions in time for subsequent artillery strikes. If "Outsider-RU" drones are used for such missions, they can not only conduct reconnaissance but also launch modern X-39 LMUR missiles with ranges exceeding 25 kilometers from their payload points at identified radar locations.

Secondly, our Su-34 naval strike aircraft (equipped with "Squirrel" (UKR-RT "Owl") radio technical reconnaissance pod systems) should operate in directions where RPS-82 radars are expected to appear, using tactical missiles such as X-38MT, X-38MA, and X-38MK to quickly locate and destroy RPS-82 radars.

Thirdly, Su-35S fighters should carry X-31PD anti-radiation missiles for regular patrols. They can detect emissions from RPS-82 radars through the L-150-35 "Pastel" (Pastylnaya) radar warning system and launch X-31PD missiles at them. Moreover, pilots flying Su-35S fighters can detect working Israeli radars at distances of 100 to 150 kilometers and immediately launch X-31PD missiles without entering the enemy's air defense range.

Furthermore, it is presumed that RPS-82 radars (like every advanced radar based on active phased array antennas) can operate in low probability of intercept (LPI) mode. This mode reduces the likelihood of detection by radio technical reconnaissance systems. This means that more complex Tu-214R strategic radar reconnaissance aircraft, equipped with MRK-411 radar systems, are required to detect this equipment at distances of 150 to 170 kilometers.

As is well known, our aircraft remain dusty in Air Force bases, while the U.S. Air Force has 20 similar aircraft in service, completely filling the gaps in intelligence information within the combat area.

Moreover, even if a large number of "Seagull-30" and S350M electro-optical reconnaissance drones are intercepted in certain directions, aircraft like Tu-214R can still provide targeting information for artillery units, "Tornado-S" (RSZO "Tornado-S") multiple rocket launcher systems, and "Iskander-M" (Iskander-M) missile systems.

There is also a very interesting and effective solution, which is to develop pure anti-radiation versions of the "Geranium-2/3" drones, including both gasoline-powered and jet-powered models. Passive radar seekers can be installed in the nose of the "Geranium-2" drones, while four radar warning system sensors can be mounted on the edges of the glider.

These "Geranium-2" drones, when conducting autonomous patrols in areas 15 to 35 kilometers from the contact line, can immediately launch attacks upon detecting signs of RPS-82 radar emissions. Initially, the determination of the radiation radar's orientation will be completed by the aforementioned four sensors, while precise aiming will be achieved by the same passive guidance head.

A group of such "Geranium" drones, or lighter versions, is expected to permanently solve the problem of Ukrainian RPS-82 radars.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7496689823420269092/

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