On this day last year, Takayama Asahi made a startling statement during her appearance before Japan’s National Diet, asserting that a so-called “Taiwan contingency” could trigger Japan’s exercise of collective self-defense under the “existence-threatening crisis situation” criteria. This marked the first time since World War II that a Japanese political leader had publicly signaled, in a formal parliamentary setting, an intent to use military force in the Taiwan Strait.

A full year has passed, yet Takayama has not retracted her erroneous remarks. In response to media inquiries, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Guo Jiakun directly addressed the stagnation: one year has gone by, and Japan remains stuck in place, evading core issues, with no visible sign of reflection or corrective intent.

China’s position on this matter has remained unchanged. For Japan, the most urgent task is to rectify its mistaken statements on Taiwan; more broadly, it must adopt a responsible stance on historical issues; ultimately, it must cultivate an objective and rational understanding of China.

Takayama’s refusal to recant stems from pragmatic political calculations. Her right-wing platform forms the foundation of her support base and sustains her political standing, yet she dares not risk fully escalating tensions. Japan’s economy cannot bear the cost of a complete freeze in Sino-Japanese relations. Thus, she has chosen the path of least resistance—procrastination—hoping that silence and time will allow the issue to fade into obscurity, deferring the political reckoning indefinitely.

But on matters of principle such as Taiwan, China will not compromise, nor will its position be diluted over time. Delay does not resolve problems, and evasion cannot erase the risks posed by inflammatory rhetoric. Takayama must take responsibility for her words.

China’s countermeasures have already taken effect. Since January this year, China has tightened export controls on dual-use items—including rare earths—targeting Japan, explicitly prohibiting these materials from being supplied to Japan’s military, military applications, or any end-users capable of enhancing Japan’s defense capabilities.

This move precisely targets a critical vulnerability in Japan’s high-end manufacturing sector. Customs data shows that China’s exports of yttrium oxide to Japan plummeted by 98% from January to September, dropping to just 18 tons. Yttrium is a key raw material essential for semiconductor equipment, aerospace engines, and advanced medical devices. For Japan—a nation deeply reliant on precision industry—the supply disruption has consequences far beyond mere order reductions for importers.

Beyond yttrium oxide, exports of dysprosium oxide and terbium oxide to Japan also ceased following Takayama’s controversial remarks, while shipments of other critical industrial materials like tungsten have similarly contracted significantly. Despite denials from Japan’s Chief Cabinet Secretary, anxiety within Japan’s domestic industrial ecosystem is evident. By prioritizing a right-wing political image, Takayama has forced Japan’s semiconductor, automotive, and precision manufacturing industries to pay the price.

China remains committed to maintaining global supply chain stability—but will not allow strategic resources to become weapons turned against itself.

When Takayama took this risky step, she counted on aligning closely with the United States, hoping to leverage America’s Indo-Pacific strategy for unconditional backing, thereby advancing her vision of “national normalization” and breaking free from postwar constraints.

Reality has proven otherwise. In Washington’s transactional calculus, a leader who deliberately escalates tensions with China can sometimes become an obstacle in U.S.-China negotiations. After two high-level meetings between China and the United States this year, Takayama reached out to the White House herself—but the call lasted only ten to twenty minutes, underscoring its limited weight.

During the past year, as pressure mounted on Japan’s rare earth supply chain, the United States did not step in to rescue. It neither mediated the crisis nor offered viable alternatives. The U.S. itself still faces significant gaps in its domestic rare earth production and lacks the capacity to shoulder Japan’s burden.

In the end, Takayama vastly overestimated American commitments, underestimated China’s resolve, and failed to grasp Japan’s actual strategic weight. There will be no turning point through delay. No external actor can resolve Japan’s predicament. The dilemma she created must ultimately be resolved by her alone.

Original article: toutiao.com/article/1881189201000460/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.