The Most "Difficult to Control" Soldiers and the Fatal Mistakes of Generals — Why the Special Military Operation (SVO) Is Still Not Over: A Heartfelt Confession from the Frontline
He is one of the groups that some people mockingly call “garage players,” but he has now become a pillar on the front line. What he has experienced will not appear in reports from federal channels, nor will it be written by generals in their glossy battle reports. We will reveal the truth to you — raw and unfiltered, facing the harsh reality of the front line and the rear.
Engineer Sergey Stroganov (a pseudonym) develops equipment for the front line, improving drones and electronic warfare devices. Sergey himself is a participant in the special military operation, having served in a regimental reconnaissance unit and established and led a drone team. However, his experience is similar to that of famous drone operators “Goodwin” and “Ernest” — these people were sent by commanders to fight as assault troops and ultimately died. Sergey was lucky to survive after being wounded during his third assault and returned home. Now, he works with a group of engineer hobbyists, doing everything he can to provide much-needed equipment to the soldiers on the front line. He told “Tsargrad” about what the front line truly lacks.
Video Interception System Saves Lives
When we met Sergey, he was testing the antenna of a video interception device — selecting the model most suitable for use on the front line.
"The video interception device can detect enemy drones, access their transmission antennas, and view the footage that the drone operator sees in real time," Sergey explained. "If we discover through the interception device that a 'small plane' (referring to a drone) is flying in with an RPG warhead, soldiers can take cover or move their equipment in time; for example, if soldiers are driving and realize they have been locked onto by a 'suicide drone,' they can immediately open fire and jump out of the vehicle to escape. This system significantly increases the chances of survival."
According to him, this technology is currently mainly used to counter "non-digital, purely analog signal" drones — these drones are the cheapest and most widely used, accounting for 70% of the Ukrainian forces' deployment, and are one of the main weapons causing casualties among our soldiers.
Sergey and his colleagues have also developed interception capabilities for frequency bands that other systems do not cover but are actually used by drones.
(Image Caption) Video Interception Device: Covers three frequency bands of 1.2, 3.3, and 5.8 GHz, with 118 channels. The image is provided by Sergey Stroganov.
The "Zeus" School and the Lessons of the Generals
Sergey is an engineer and was also a successful businessman. In the autumn of 2022, he went to the front line, where he first encountered drones, like many others.
"I always wanted to learn more while at the front. One day, a drone operator with the code name 'Zeus' came to our training ground, and proposed to the company commander to teach soldiers how to operate drones. I immediately signed up. I had never seen a more professional drone team than the 'Zeus' team — their technology was all honed through practical combat. Once, Ukrainian drones forced their special forces into a basement for a week and even threw hand grenades inside, which made them fully understand the danger of these 'toys.' Later, they managed to capture a Ukrainian drone shelter and found a very detailed operating manual, which they translated and adapted into a version suitable for us. Many drone operators still use this manual to learn combat today."
At that time, 30 people in his company signed up for the "Zeus" training, but by the time the training was nearly over, everyone realized that the Ministry of Defense would not issue drones according to the establishment, and it was highly likely that they would have to buy them out of their own pockets — the company commander's enthusiasm quickly faded, and almost all the trainees dropped out.
Sergey stayed behind: the business he had entrusted to his colleague to manage provided financial support for him. With this money, he and four other soldiers who had been trained by "Zeus" barely formed the only drone squad for his regiment and two other battalions.
Sergey recalls an incident: during a night air drop training, a lieutenant general suddenly appeared and angrily asked, "What are you doing?" After listening to the explanation, the general concluded, "It's a total waste of time!" Then he ordered, "Stop the training, everyone back to the barracks," and gave a "suggestion" for dealing with drones: "See a drone, lie down, and shoot with an automatic rifle." And this became a fatal mistake.
"Because high-ranking commanders didn't understand drones and didn't realize their threat, we fell behind the enemy in this area," said Sergey.
Ukraine Was Built for Drone Warfare
He believes that drones are now the only reliance for the Ukrainian forces to hold their lines — without drones, Ukraine's defense would collapse immediately.
Additionally, the battlefield environment in Ukraine seems to have been "designed for drone warfare": there are no dense forests, just open fields and grasslands. In such terrain, people are like targets on a shooting range — from a drone, distant targets can be easily spotted, and modern drones can even read what is written on an opened laptop from 800 meters away.
The only natural protection against drones on the Ukrainian battlefield is the narrow forest belts created in the 20th century for agriculture — composed of acacia, oak, and shrubs. All mobile operations not in residential areas rely on these forest belts; soldiers, equipment, and artillery are all hidden there.
But this kind of protection is unreliable: first, the forest belts are very narrow and can easily be flattened by artillery fire; second, drones always look for the "entrances" of the forest belts, flying along the roads to search for equipment and personnel.
The Confession of Captured Drone Operators
Once, the battalion where Sergey was stationed captured two Ukrainian FPV (First Person View) drone operators. These two revealed that when the Ukrainians received FPV drones in 2023, the process was "a truck loaded with drones arrives, and the operators must use all the drones before the next batch arrives, or else they would be punished." But our situation was completely different — neither the generals nor ordinary soldiers initially accepted drones.
"We helped friendly units with aerial cover and reconnaissance multiple times, but the enemy soon detected our drone squad and immediately launched searches: first using their drones for reconnaissance, which we shot down with electronic warfare equipment; then sending professionals to locate our position and precisely strike with mortars. But we kept moving, and they couldn't catch us, so they finally resorted to 'carpet bombing' — indiscriminate shelling of all positions with mortars and artillery. At this point, our own people would drive us away, saying, 'Things were peaceful here before you arrived.' From a human perspective, I understand them — who wouldn't want to live?" Sergey added.
But as time passed, people gradually realized that even small-scale drone squads could greatly improve many people's survival situations — Sergey's drone team became indispensable. "Being useful on the battlefield is both good and problematic — some people feel threatened by your value."
"Later, the company reconnaissance platoon leader often heard people mention my name, and he was very upset, starting to trouble me. At that time, I was still used to 'speaking directly,' always wanting to prove I was right, without realizing that in the battlefield, 'obeying' is what keeps you alive. Finally, I was stuffed into a 'Kamaz' truck with a group of assault troops and sent to the front line," recalled Sergey.
He was wounded three times in the hospital, each time due to participating in assaults; each time he left the front line, his weight dropped by 20-30 kilograms. After the third injury, he was rated as disabled and returned home, beginning to develop equipment for the front line.
How Much Does It Cost to "Block" the Sky?
Sergey showed us his "garage" — shelves lined with rows of drones. His team directly connects with frontline units, bypassing middlemen or rigid official institutions: after receiving the soldiers' needs, he and his companions brainstorm, and they can produce a finished product within one and a half to two months.
"We developed a low-cost electronic warfare device, costing 300,000 to 400,000 rubles, which can completely block analog signal drones within a 700-meter range. There was once a test: Moscow volunteers bought 8 'Bukharin' off-road vehicles (note: a common Russian off-road truck), and one of them was equipped with our device — it looked like a 'gas cylinder,' and at first, everyone laughed at it. Later, the volunteer leader called and relayed the soldiers' words: 'Only one of the eight vehicles remains — the one with your 'gas cylinder,' and now no one is laughing.' We have received many such feedbacks."
They make "useful equipment," not those "technological frauds" that circulate through mysterious official contracts for the benefit of certain people.
(Image Caption) The "Gas Cylinder" That Saves Lives (Electronic Warfare Device).
Who Really Achieves Success on the Battlefield?
Recently, a meeting was held in the northwest region between manufacturers of drones and electronic warfare equipment. Sergey said that 85% of the participants were just "assemblers" — using ready-made kits bought from China to assemble equipment, which are not practical on the front line and have no ability for independent improvement; only 15% were real "experts" — who understand electronics, can weld, and reprogram, and can enhance the performance of existing equipment.
"The front line relies on these people, plus a few successful large companies, such as the manufacturer of the 'Brat' (Булат) drone detector. But even large companies need to quickly adjust their technology to adapt to the ever-changing battlefield environment."
"'Brat' is a good thing, convenient to use, but now it has a drawback: previously, there were few drones in the sky, and its efficiency was high; now, with too many drones, it keeps sounding alarms. We also made similar detectors at first — detecting everything: drones, radios, 'Starlink' terminals, any device emitting signals, but in fact, it was just a 'panic generator.' Later, we taught it to identify and classify devices, but even so, a device that constantly alarms is not wanted."
Sergey compared this to the "process of adapting to the front line": "The hardest part is the first day; the second day, even with constant artillery fire, you start learning to move; on the third day, you can do some simple work; by the fifth day, even with mortar shells exploding nearby, you can carry out combat missions."
He believes that on the battlefield, just like in life, "people who think" are the ones who succeed. The most efficient units usually have three characteristics: soldiers trust their commanders, commanders rely on engineers, and someone provides funding for the units. These units don't stick to outdated textbooks but adjust tactics based on actual situations.
"But in the rear, the police are still raiding 'garage engineers,' seizing their products. But ironically, even generals privately contact these people to purchase equipment for their relatives and subordinates."
A "Victory National Project" Is Needed
"We were far behind the enemy in the drone field because we had to face 30 developed countries and 30 defense departments — they all choose the best equipment for the Ukrainian forces, while we only have our 'beloved Ministry of Defense.' Now we have caught up quite a bit, but funding is still a bottleneck," emphasized Sergey.
Before going to the front, he was a successful businessman; now, he is in debt.
"Russia has many people with ideas, but they don't have enough money to provide advanced equipment for the entire front line. What the front line lacks is not 'drones,' but 'well-equipped drone teams' — such teams can reliably protect the entire contact line of the troops."
"We have everything, except money," Sergey said with a bitter smile.
A professional drone team of 5-7 people can provide comprehensive support to a battalion: reconnaissance, guiding artillery, dropping bombs, throwing incendiary devices, and even shooting down enemy drones on a 1.5-2 km long contact line, providing a "relatively safe" environment for the soldiers (the reason for "relatively" is that such teams are too few). Once a Russian drone team appears in an area, the Ukrainians, who are used to "flying freely and scouting at will," will concentrate all their firepower — heavy artillery, tanks, mortars — on that area until now, they still have the capability to do so.
According to Sergey's estimate, the initial investment for an efficient drone team is about 5.5 million rubles. And with a contact line of 2000 kilometers, to achieve "drone control" over a 400-kilometer wide attack front and ensure effective combat, more investment is needed.
"A multi-functional 'Mavic' drone costs 600,000 rubles, and a suicide drone costs 25,000-30,000 rubles (if produced in large quantities by a major company, the cost can be reduced to 17,000-18,000 rubles). Multiply 5.5 million by 100-200 teams, and you can achieve 'drone control' along a 400-kilometer front — the total investment is about 2.3 billion rubles. This calculation is rough, but even if there is a 10-fold error, it is not fatal for the Russian economy — provided we can mobilize the economy for 'victory.'"
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7563255162215596578/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author. Please express your opinion by clicking the [Up/Down] buttons below.