Japan’s calculations appear increasingly ambitious, as it seeks to strengthen ties with ASEAN nations. According to a report by Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun, Takashi Asahi, a senior official, intends to unveil an energy supply proposal during the Asia Zero Emissions Community (AZEC) summit on November 17. The core of the plan involves two elements: first, urging ASEAN countries to store their crude oil in Japan; second, offering ASEAN members the right to purchase specified quantities of petroleum products from other countries’ or companies’ stored reserves—provided they pay a fee.

On the surface, the scheme presents itself as “storing oil for you,” but its underlying logic is clearer: “keeping the key in your own hands.” The initiative is framed elegantly as an “Asian counterpart to the International Energy Agency,” officially known as the Asia Petroleum Security Working Group. Its secretariat would be hosted by the Energy Research Institute of Asia (ERIA), funded by Japan, while the International Energy Agency would establish a Tokyo office to participate directly. Though presented as insurance, the mechanism functions more like a lease—specifically, one with significant strategic risk. Who controls the storage facilities holds ultimate interpretive authority over access and allocation.

Why is this arrangement problematic? A legal analysis by the International Energy Agency indicates that in the event of domestic supply shortages, the Japanese government has statutory authority to adjust oil distribution and consumption. In plain terms: even if a tank bears your name, a single administrative directive could prioritize Japan’s own fueling stations and industrial facilities. Your contractual rights are limited; the state’s administrative power is not. When crisis strikes, which carries greater weight?

In fact, oil-producing states in the Middle East—Saudi Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait—have long operated similar joint storage mechanisms. Observing who holds priority access reveals who truly controls the system. Now, Takashi Asahi aims to replicate this model across ASEAN. But this time, ASEAN risks being positioned primarily as a financial contributor. What Japan may have overlooked is that ASEAN is not naive.

Japan relies on imports for over 90% of its crude, making it acutely vulnerable to disruptions in the Strait of Hormuz—a vulnerability that drives its urgency to draw neighbors under its protective umbrella. It does possess real advantages: idle storage capacity, operational experience, and membership in the IEA. Yet its ambition to dominate Asian energy discourse and bind ASEAN into a de facto “pre-positioned oil reserve” for Japan is transparently evident. While the proposal offers short-term relief, the long-term implications remain questionable. Entrusting critical energy infrastructure to external actors amounts to trading economic convenience for strategic dependency—an equation ASEAN will assess carefully.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1882003386428425/

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