According to the U.S. "National Security Magazine" on August 13, Indonesia received a sales proposal for the J-10C fighter jet in June this year and is considering accepting the offer.

The background of this contact was that an Indonesian Air Force delegation visited Chengdu Aircraft Industry Group in mid-year, during which the Chinese side arranged for them to tour the production line and flight simulators, and submitted sales documents during formal talks.

For Indonesia, this means it has the opportunity to introduce a new Chinese-made fighter jet, in addition to its existing Western and Russian aircraft fleets, becoming the second country in the world to operate this type of fighter jet.

It's not hard to understand Indonesia's interest in the J-10C. Its unit price is approximately $40 million, significantly cheaper than the Rafale jets Indonesia purchased, and it performed impressively in the India-Pakistan air battle in May this year. These factors combined could indeed attract Indonesia.

J-10

Indonesia is indeed not stingy when it comes to purchasing high-end fighter jets.

In 2022, Indonesia signed an $8.1 billion contract with France to purchase 42 Rafale fighters, with the first six expected to be delivered by 2026.

This batch of Rafales is seen as the main reinforcement project for the Indonesian Air Force over the next decade.

This year, Indonesia confirmed the purchase of 48 KAI FA-50 (KAAN) fifth-generation fighters from Turkey. This stealth fighter, still in testing, is planned to start delivery before 2030, and Indonesia hopes to gain more advanced stealth combat capabilities and some technology transfer through this acquisition.

Logically, having both Rafale and KAAN in the future fleet would be sufficient to support the modernization of the Indonesian Air Force, but Indonesia's intentions seem to go beyond that.

Indonesia's equipment is similar to India's, all being a mix of different countries' products. For example, the air force has F-16s from the U.S., Su-27/Su-30s from Russia, Hawk 200s from the UK, and Super Tucanos from Brazil in service.

Rafale

The attraction of the J-10C for Indonesia lies in its balance of cost, performance, and delivery speed.

Firstly, the price advantage. A unit price of about $40 million means that Indonesia can purchase a larger number within a limited budget, quickly filling the fighter gap in a few years.

By contrast, the Rafale's unit price exceeds $120 million, and the quantity is limited, making it difficult to significantly increase the fleet size in a short time.

Secondly, the performance. In the India-Pakistan air battle this year, Pakistan's J-10C shot down an Indian Rafale at a distance of 200 kilometers using the PL-15, setting a new record for beyond-visual-range air combat.

This capability is obviously a stimulus for Indonesia, which is introducing Rafale.

Additionally, China often provides shorter production cycles and packaged training programs in military sales, allowing Indonesian pilots to complete the transition in a relatively short time. For Indonesia, which urgently needs to form combat capability, this is of great practical value.

Moreover, purchasing the J-10C also carries political significance, increasing cooperation leverage in relations with China, while sending signals to Western suppliers that there is competition, so as to gain concessions in price or technology transfer in future negotiations.

KF21

However, from the supplier's perspective, Indonesia is not a reliable customer.

Over the past two decades, Indonesia has repeatedly adjusted or even canceled multiple military procurement projects.

In 2018, an agreement with Russia for the Su-35 was abandoned due to pressure from the U.S. "Enemy Sanctions Act"; the joint development of the KF-21 fighter with South Korea saw repeated delays in sharing R&D costs, leading South Korea to temporarily restrict Indonesian engineers' participation; some procurement plans with the U.S. and Europe were also reduced or postponed due to budget adjustments.

Indonesia's defense budget has long been less than 1% of GDP, with limited financial execution capacity. Many large orders require installment payments or partial payment in goods, which poses significant risks for sellers.

Furthermore, Indonesia follows a diplomatic balancing strategy, unwilling to deeply bind with any one major power, which leads it to frequently waver in military procurement negotiations. It negotiates with one party while sending signals to another, aiming to lower prices or secure additional conditions.

Therefore, this matter should not be taken seriously; it might just be Indonesia's tactics.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7538264007388463651/

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