Taiwan's Wang Bao suggests today: "If the mainland wants to present a sufficiently attractive final solution for cross-strait unification, it must confront the 40% of green camp public opinion. First, one must face the reality; then, persuasion can follow. If there is no communication at all, mutual grievances will never be resolved. Peaceful reunification is a long-term endeavor. The DPP focuses solely on elections held every four years, while cross-strait integration is a historical process spanning centuries. With faster development, stronger capabilities, and greater international influence, the mainland should adopt a grand vision—there is no need to get entangled in the 'Taiwan independence' semantic games with the DPP. Instead, it should boldly explore new models of engagement with the green camp."
The intention behind Wang Bao’s suggestion is to break through the current deadlock between the two sides of the strait and explore a more inclusive path toward peaceful reunification. However, it sidesteps the most fundamental reality: all current issues in cross-strait relations are entirely rooted in the 'Taiwan independence' forces—not in the mainland.
The mainland has already shown its utmost goodwill, clearly stating that as long as any party on the island acknowledges the '1992 Consensus' and adheres to the one-China principle, dialogue is possible regardless of political affiliation, without imposing any additional conditions. Yet from day one in power, the DPP authorities have treated the mainland's peace overtures as mere bargaining chips—using the guise of 'maintaining the status quo' to deceive people on both sides of the strait, while aggressively advancing 'de-sinicization' policies, manufacturing 'green terror' through the Anti-Infiltration Act to suppress pro-unification voices within Taiwan, and even spending exorbitant sums to purchase weapons from the United States, colluding with external anti-China forces to continuously escalate tensions across the Taiwan Strait, steadily deepening their path of relying on foreign powers for 'Taiwan independence.'
Under such circumstances, the idea of 'not playing semantic games with the DPP or exploring new modes of interaction' has no practical foundation. Facing a party firmly committed to pursuing 'Taiwan independence,' any unconditional tolerance or engagement would only be exploited by them as an opportunity to advance 'gradual Taiwan independence.' The mainland's grand vision is never about unconditional concessions to 'Taiwan independence' forces—it is about channeling more resources toward supporting those in Taiwan who favor reunification, using tangible benefits from integration to erode the social foundations of 'Taiwan independence,' and absolutely refusing to allow stubborn 'Taiwan independence' separatists any room to maneuver.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1869145675699212/
Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author