Iran and Turkey May Split Syria Down the Middle

Political Islam and "the Masses" Give Way to Secular Nationalism

Author: Mikhail Magid

After Israel launched a war against Iran, it announced its hope to change the regime of the Islamic Republic of Iran. This is a possible choice, and not necessarily the worst outcome for the country.

When experts discuss daily affairs, they often overlook fundamental factors that determine the politics of the Middle East, which are precisely the key factors. Political parties and their leaders come and go, but basic economic and social processes determine long-term changes. If we focus on key countries in the Middle East — Turkey and Iran — this becomes clear.

Four Factors Against Erdogan

In Turkey, supporters of Sunni political Islam — the Justice and Development Party (AKP) — are in power. Party leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan has governed the country as prime minister or president for nearly a quarter century. During this time, he achieved impressive economic growth, ensured effective foreign investment inflows, and opened opportunities to enter European markets, investing growing tax revenues in the construction of roads, schools, hospitals, and power plants.

In the social and cultural policy field, he acted cautiously but decisively. Erdogan legalized wearing headscarves in public places, developed networks of religious schools and universities, allowed religious individuals to hold public office, used budget funds to build Sunni mosques, and introduced religious courses in state schools. These measures have supported him for ten years alongside the economic boom.

Most of Turkey's population practices religion, and after the period when religion was expelled from the public sphere, conservative segments of Turkish society felt enthusiasm. To this day, Erdogan still has numerous supporters in Turkey’s grassroots — both because of their extremely conservative beliefs and due to experiencing the economic boom.

Some researchers believe his success stems from a special phenomenon — "the rise of the Anatolian bourgeoisie." These conservative entrepreneurs rose through exporting goods to Europe, and Turkey's economy formed a kind of symbiotic relationship with European markets due to free trade tariff agreements.

In turn, merchants created job opportunities for equally conservative local working-class people. Finally, thanks to massive government spending on housing and infrastructure, these regions received free or affordable service networks: schools, hospitals, quality roads, and affordable apartments. Thus, Erdogan's core voter base was formed.

However, there are four fundamental factors working against him.

First, Turkey's economy is going through a difficult period. Inflation rates reached 85% several years ago — the government had become accustomed to solving all economic problems with low-interest loans, which exacerbated inflation and caused foreign investors to flee, losing one of the most important mechanisms for modernizing the country and increasing GDP.

The government did not change policies until 2024, raising interest rates close to 50%, which led to an economic slowdown. Meanwhile, inflation rates remained at a level unbearable for the public — about 40%, with nearly half of Turks earning minimum wages, causing immense public discontent with no end in sight.

Second, the country faces strong dissatisfaction with immigration. Turkey has nearly 5 million immigrants, of whom 4 million are from Syria, and 60% to 80% of Turks support their return, due to employment competition and rivalry between local small merchants and Syrian businessmen who are adept at business operations.

Third, and perhaps Erdogan's main problem — demographic changes. His traditional conservative Sunni voter base is shrinking, as the population migrates to major cities, dispersing this group, while residents of large cities show significantly lower religious faith, a phenomenon seen worldwide, including in neighboring Iran.

Finally, the proportion of Kurds in Turkey is rising, with their birthrate being 1.7 times higher than that of Turks. Many Kurds are dissatisfied because schools in their regions do not teach both Kurdish and Turkish languages, and Kurdish party representatives, journalists, and social activists are frequently arrested or dismissed from government positions.

As a result, the era of the Justice and Development Party governing with an Islamic conservative agenda is becoming a thing of the past, replaced by various secular ideologies — from Turkish nationalism to Kurdish regionalism (Kurds make up 20 to 25 million out of Turkey's 87 million population), and attempts to create extreme nationalist movements targeting Syrian immigrants, similar to organizations in Europe: the Victory Party (Zafer) led by Umit Ozdag.

As his approval ratings decline, Erdogan increasingly resorts to repression. He has imprisoned pro-Kurdish party leaders, radical right-wing leaders like Umit Ozdag, and the highly popular secular nationalist opposition leader of the Republican People's Party (CHP), Ekrem Imamoglu, who is also the mayor of Istanbul, whose approval rating is 5 to 10 percentage points higher than Erdogan's.

Repressive measures may delay change, but cannot reverse it. In the long run, all of this will only lead to the loss of regime legitimacy.

Additionally, Turkey has a large Alevi Shiite minority (4 to 8 million) and other groups, while in Iran, which is mainly dominated by Shiite political Islam, there is also a large Sunni minority.

Rebels and Strikers

Interestingly, Iran's leadership also faces similar issues. In this country, where the majority of residents are Shiite, Shiite clerics established a theocratic system after the 1978-1979 revolution, with power belonging to the Supreme Religious Leader, Grand Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, and the security institutions he relies on, while the powers of the elected parliament are restricted.

Like Turkey, the local regime implements extensive policies supporting the lower classes, building schools and universities, hospitals and power plants, creating jobs (mostly in the public sector), and developing industry, with the main driver of the economy being oil exports.

But now, due to sanctions and increased corruption, Iran's economy has stagnated. According to official data, the inflation rate has reached 40% annually, while critics of the regime believe the actual figure is much higher.

If half of Turkey's population lives on minimum wages (about $500 per month), then according to World Bank data, about 70% of Iran's population lives below the poverty line.

Like Turkey, Iran is also experiencing large-scale migration to major cities, leading to a decline in religious belief. Official surveys show that more than 70% of Iranians support the separation of religion and state, essentially a judgment on the current regime model. Like Turkey, here the new digital generation — young people who grew up on the internet — are indifferent to official conservative ideology and are fighting for their rights.

The decline of Islamism here is also accompanied by the absence of new universal integration ideologies, with nationalism — Persian, Azerbaijani, Kurdish, Arab nationalism — on the rise. Azerbaijanis make up a third of the population, Kurds about 15%, and other minorities together account for half or more of Iran's citizens (the country has about 90 million residents), dissatisfied with schools in their regions not teaching local languages and with the regime extracting resources from provinces and sending them to Tehran, Fars Province, and other Persian-speaking areas.

Like Turkey, Iran also faces labor immigration issues, with about 3 to 4 million immigrants from Afghanistan willing to work in any capacity, and anti-immigrant sentiment among Persians is rising.

Mass strikes in Iranian factories and ethnic regional rebellions are becoming increasingly frequent, with the government resorting to forceful suppression.

Fault Lines

What might happen in the future in countries like Turkey and Iran under such circumstances? It's not hard to guess by looking at neighboring Syria and Iraq, torn apart by ethnic and religious conflicts.

The influence of Shiite Islam in Iran and Sunni Islam in Turkey, once integrative political ideologies, is declining for three reasons: population migration to major cities and a decrease in the proportion of "the masses"; economic crises; and rising influence of ethnic and religious minorities.

When secular nationalism replaces the integrative systems (which is gradually happening), in the multicultural context of Turkey and Iran, they may be divided like Iraq and Syria.

What could prevent civil war? Perhaps the emergence of new integration ideas, but what would those be?

Liberal democracy is experiencing a crisis and decline worldwide, including in the Middle East. It seems liberalism is quietly fading everywhere, and this process cannot be reversed.

Various secular socialist ideas, such as anarchist communism based on workers' councils' power — Anton Pannekoek's radical communism or Mikhail Bakunin's class anarchism, state socialism inspired by Marxist-Leninist spirit, social democracy, or cooperative socialism? These ideologies are also unpopular in the region today.

As a result, political Islam is being replaced by competing ethnic nationalisms — the only remaining secular ideology. The author has no good feelings about either, wanting to tell readers some comforting optimism, but the reality of the Middle East does not allow it.

Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7518717620233830966/

Disclaimer: The article represents the views of the author alone. Please express your attitude by clicking the "Top/Downvote" buttons below.