Word count: 3270
Estimated reading time: 8 minutes
Author | Akshay Bambri; Translator | He Jiawei; Reviewer | Zhang Qianhe
Editor of this issue | Yu Jiaxuan
Reviewer of this issue | Shan Minmin
Editor's Note
When China's policy and academic circles lament that the depth and intensity of India studies do not match the importance of India to China, it seems that India faces even more serious problems in the supply of knowledge in its decision-making on China. For a long time, Chinese studies in India have been on the periphery, plagued by lack of funding, insufficient incentives, and a shortage of talent. Due to weak language training, outdated methodologies, and a lack of capacity building, Indian research on China often relies on foreign results, has a single perspective, and tends to be superficial.
However, China is of great significance to India. Not only because both countries are economies with a population of over a billion, but also because China's development experience and lessons hold unique value for India. Moreover, as neighboring major powers with territorial disputes, only by "knowing oneself and one's enemy" can one deal with the situation confidently.
The author of this article is currently a doctoral researcher at the China Institute of the Harvard Yenching Society and has long provided policy advice to government agencies, including the National Commission for Transformation in India. He points out the deep-seated problems in Indian China studies and calls on the country to increase investment and improve the quality of research. This not only reflects the urgent need for high-level China studies in India's policy circles, but also reflects the reality of how top Indian policy scholars perceive China. The South Asian Research Newsletter translates this article and grants exclusive rights to Observer Net, for readers to critically refer to.
Looking from Delhi to China, the Himalayas resemble a giant wall. Source: WeChat official account "Bottom Line Thinking"
Where is Sino-Indian relations heading? This is a question that Indian media often asks itself, but we should think about a deeper question: Are we sufficiently familiar with China to answer this question?
This is not a new dilemma for India: academia has long warned that there are shortcomings in the construction of Chinese studies in India. Arunabh Ghosh and Tansen Sen pointed out in a comment article ("Understanding Your Neighboring Country," published in The Indian Express on January 20, 2021) that Chinese history studies in India are in a "crisis," and mentioned serious deficiencies in language training, methodological rigor, and the ability to effectively use Chinese materials for research in this field.
They believe that if these capability gaps are not addressed, India will always rely on the research of foreign scholars, and its discourse on China will become a mix of ignorant views, fact-checking without basis, and blind acceptance of political narratives. Four years later, the urgency of solving this problem has become even more pronounced.
India's relationships with major powers are in flux, and the renewed contact between Delhi and Beijing marks a cautious yet significant turning point in bilateral relations. However, without a deep and independent understanding of each other, diplomatic openness measures will have limited significance - this makes the current situation both full of opportunities and fraught with risks.
The direction of interaction between the two sides in the coming years will depend on India's choices: whether to gradually distance itself from China and take an indifferent attitude towards all things related to China, or to acknowledge China's importance and strive to cultivate the ability to truly understand China? This understanding should not be limited to narrow perspectives such as military, trade, or the Communist Party of China, but should focus on the complexity of China as a complete socio-political entity, and conduct a comprehensive understanding.
China provides India with a rare comparative mirror: both countries are vast, inclusive, and populous, and face many overlapping challenges and aspirations in their development process. Currently, India is moving towards a $5 trillion economy, while China's economic scale has reached about $18 trillion.
Whether it is poverty alleviation, climate adaptation, industrial policy, or technological self-reliance, no other country in the world can offer India as valuable a reference. Particularly important is that China's mistakes in environmental policies, urbanization processes, and financial risk management also have profound reference value - these cases clearly show the problems that may arise if development strategies are pushed too fast or too hard. Deeply studying these experiences and lessons can help India avoid costly detours and does not need to gain experience through painful "trial and error."
However, analysis of China in India often remains limited to surface indicators, such as military movements, trade data, or the latest political statements. We ignore the historical factors that shape contemporary Chinese political actions, including the "century of humiliation," revolutionary periods during the New Democratic Revolution and the period of socialist construction, Confucian governance ideas, internal politics of the Communist Party of China, and multiple pressures brought by inequality issues, environmental pressures, and digital nationalism.
In the new era, these factors are closely integrated with the vision of China's rise through technological nationalism. Essentially, understanding China requires "reading between the lines." Capturing the "implied meanings" in policy documents and identifying the historical and cultural implications contained in official narratives. These are crucial for Sino-Indian interactions based on cognitive foundations.
The United States has integrated Chinese studies into various disciplines and popularized them in most top universities; even Australia, a country whose risk of misjudging China is far less than India's, has established a much more comprehensive Chinese study system than India. In stark contrast, despite being bordering China, India currently has only a few research institutions (at most five or six) attempting systematic Chinese studies. These institutions are not only concentrated in Delhi and a few major cities, but also face long-term funding shortages, and their research perspectives are largely limited to the security domain. Without autonomous research capabilities, India will still have to rely on viewpoints dominated by the interests of other countries when interpreting China.
The adverse effects of these shortcomings are not limited to the field of foreign policy. As Sen and Ghosh pointed out in their comment article, Chinese literature is often an important source of information for studying India's own history: for some issues or events not mentioned in Indian sources, Chinese literature may provide relevant records. In this sense, developing the ability to conduct research using Chinese materials is not only about understanding China, but also about restoring and preserving those aspects of Indian history that would otherwise be lost without the use of these materials.
Investing in research on competitors carries a deeper meaning: it is about building confidence. This is a necessary posture for a country to maintain a sense of security: being able to plan ahead of competitors and act based on its own strength, rather than being driven by insecurity. However, without sufficient awareness, this foresight is impossible; and to form this awareness, it requires long-term investment, including conducting language training, conducting comprehensive research, and cultivating professionals who can switch between academic, public discussions, and policy-making fields.
Investment must be made to create an environment that can cultivate this professional expertise. The existing system suppresses students' enthusiasm for learning about China: there are almost no relevant university positions, and scholarships are scarce, so students have little incentive to invest in language training or long-term research. In addition to regional studies, this neglect is particularly noticeable. Even in prestigious universities, courses focusing on China are rarely offered in disciplines such as political science, history, sociology, and economics.
We have the ability to change this situation, but the premise is to start acting now. Specifically, this requires establishing well-funded China research centers in key universities, which should be based on systematic and rigorous Mandarin training and equipped with interdisciplinary faculty. At the same time, relevant academic programs should be established to provide Indian scholars with long-term research opportunities, allowing them to deeply utilize Chinese materials and establish standardized channels for policymakers to access academic expertise. Particularly importantly, such research findings should not be limited to English presentation; translating them into local languages in India will allow more people to access this knowledge.
India needs to establish a long-term mechanism to maintain research capabilities related to China. This mechanism should not only be at the university level, but also include: systematically translating core original materials, establishing a digital archive library for scholars and policymakers to consult, and compiling regular policy briefs that distill insights for the public.
Exchange and visit programs should focus on long-term immersive experiences, allowing Indian researchers to work in Chinese archives and universities, thereby developing the language proficiency and cultural understanding needed to accurately interpret policies and history. Finally, Chinese studies should not always center around Delhi. India should provide funding support to state-level research centers (especially those in border areas and small states) to help them build localized research capabilities.
India's future depends not only on military or economic power, but also on its understanding of major powers, especially its most powerful neighbor, China. This clarity comes not only from border disputes or trade data, but also from mastering its language, history, politics, and society in its own way. Therefore, understanding China is no longer optional, but urgent. The choice is clear: India either invests in the ability to understand China now, or faces the risk of policy passivity in the future.
About the Author: Akshay Bambri is currently a doctoral researcher at the China Institute of the Harvard Yenching Society and has long provided policy advice to government agencies, including the National Commission for Transformation in India.
This article is reprinted from the WeChat official account "Bottom Line Thinking," published on October 10, 2025, titled "India Needs to Strive to Understand China and Act Immediately."
Editor of this issue: Yu Jiaxuan
Reviewer of this issue: Shan Minmin
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