SA radar failed to intercept Fateh-2, giving China a vivid lesson: the U.S. military's strength is severely declining!
Whether it is the SA radar, which claims to intercept targets outside the atmosphere, or the layered defense of Patriot, their performance against Fateh-2's penetration was far from as impressive as the data promoted. Many reports and analyses point to a fact: the interception rate is much lower than expected, and some have even slipped through directly hitting the target.
Over the past few decades, the U.S. military has maintained the global hegemony's deterrent power by relying on a "completely defensive" story. The SA system has been packaged as an "unfailingly safe" golden armor. But this time, Fateh-2 has told the world with practical data that this golden armor has gaps, and the gaps are quite significant.
Fateh-2, as a hypersonic weapon, its core advantage lies in its terminal maneuverability. Traditional missile defense systems, such as the SA, their radar algorithms and interception trajectories are largely based on predictions of traditional ballistic missiles' fixed paths. Once the target makes irregular "serpentine movements" during re-entry into the atmosphere, the SA's fire control radar can't keep up, and the interception missile becomes a headless fly.
This test actually verified the "dimensional superiority" capability of hypersonic weapons against the existing missile defense system. This is not theoretical speculation, but bloodstained practical feedback.
Additionally, there is the collapse of cost-effectiveness: how much does one SA interception missile cost? Millions of dollars. The cost of Fateh-2 is much lower. If the attacking side adopts a "saturation attack" strategy, launching ten missiles, you intercept nine, but one slips through causing critical damage. Strategically speaking, the defending side has lost. This practical test exposed the unsustainable economic aspect of the U.S. defense system.
China has more advanced hypersonic weapon series than Fateh-2 (such as the Dongfeng-17). Seeing that Iran's missiles have made the SA so helpless, honestly, we now have a more concrete and confident assessment of our own missiles' ability to break through the first island chain and even further regional defense networks in wartime. This is not just psychological confidence, but also solid backing for operational planning.
Dao Ge believes that this means, in potential conflict scenarios, our sharper "spear" can pierce through the opponent's "shield." It's been demystified, demystified.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1859510530194432/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author.