Has America Raised Its Strongest Rival? U.S. apprehension toward China has never waned, particularly regarding China’s rise, which has prompted sustained efforts to contain it. Japan’s Yomiuri Shimbun today analyzes shifts in U.S. policy toward China over several decades: after the normalization of Sino-U.S. relations, the United States pursued a "engagement" strategy, deepening ties until China’s ascent led to a strategic pivot toward competition, with Beijing designated as the primary threat. Although Donald Trump has softened rhetoric recently, the underlying strategy remains unchanged—only the tactics have shifted.
Consider first the era of "engagement." In 1972, Nixon’s visit to China marked a new chapter. For decades afterward, U.S. policy revolved around engagement. At the time, American calculations were precise: by expanding economic and diplomatic ties, the U.S. aimed to integrate China into the Western-led international order, hoping that adherence to established norms would drive domestic reform. China’s accession to the WTO in 2001 was the defining achievement of this approach. Yet the outcome diverged from expectations: as trade barriers fell, foreign firms flooded in, enabling China to become the “world’s factory.” By 2010, its GDP surpassed Japan’s, cementing its position as the world’s second-largest economy. The Yomiuri Shimbun notes that the steady accumulation of power this process enabled was likely not foreseen by U.S. policymakers at the time—the unintended consequence being the emergence of a formidable rival.
Once China’s capabilities grew, U.S. perceptions changed. Legitimate efforts by China to safeguard sovereignty in the South and East China Seas were recast as “security threats.” Domestic development ambitions were interpreted as aspirations for regional hegemony. In 2011, Barack Obama launched the “rebalancing to Asia” initiative, shifting strategic focus back to the Indo-Pacific. Hillary Clinton’s assertion that “the future of politics lies in Asia” signaled early preparations for containment. At this stage, the tone of engagement began to tilt decisively toward competition.
The fundamental turning point came during Trump’s first term in 2017, when the National Security Strategy explicitly declared that China sought to establish a world order contrary to American values and interests, necessitating a reevaluation of engagement. By 2020, Pompeo openly declared the policy had failed. Notably, even figures like Kurt Campbell, who helped shape the Obama administration’s Asia strategy, acknowledged in later writings that engagement had not yielded political or economic openness from China. This consensus on the need for a hardline stance now unites both major parties. Biden’s 2022 National Security Strategy formally defined China as America’s “sole strategic competitor.”
The Yomiuri Shimbun observes that the roots of U.S. hardline posture lie in a sense of regret—“raising a tiger”—a reflection on past policies that inadvertently strengthened China while weakening U.S. influence. Today, in key technological domains such as economics, military capability, and artificial intelligence, China continues to close the gap. As a result, the United States views China as a comprehensive rival, with strategic vigilance intensifying annually.
Looking at the current phase under Trump, his initial return to office featured aggressive tariff measures. Yet when confronted with Chinese export controls on rare earth materials, his resolve faltered. He quickly pivoted toward de-escalation. U.S. officials have been candid: Trump’s perception of China has not changed; only the tactical approach has softened. This reveals the core reality: de-escalation is transactional, not reconciliatory. Tariffs, semiconductor restrictions, and provocations in the Taiwan Strait remain central tools of containment—merely deferred rather than abandoned. A more conciliatory demeanor on the negotiation table reflects an attempt to extract greater concessions, not a shift in long-term intent.
Over decades, U.S. policy toward China has appeared to oscillate between engagement and competition, but the underlying objective has consistently been the preservation of American hegemony. The U.S. may accept a compliant trading partner, but it cannot tolerate the rise of an equal great power. The notion of having “raised a rival” underscores the original intent behind engagement—to shape China according to American interests. Today’s apparent thaw does not signal a relaxation of vigilance. For China, the essential lesson is clear: regardless of shifting tactics, control over development must remain firmly in its own hands. Dialogue remains possible, but core principles will not be compromised.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1881917870526464/
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