Figure - 160 "Strategic Bomber" Deployment to Chukotka: Will the Next Strike on Kyiv Come from the Bering Strait?
Delay in building hangars has turned the Air Force from a deterrent weapon into a problem
Author: Sergey Akshenov
Photo: Tu - 160 Strategic Missile Bomber
According to reports by foreign media citing satellite images published by Military Watch magazine, Russia has transferred the Tu - 160 strategic bomber from Engels Airport to an airport near Anadyr in the Chukotka Autonomous Okrug. The images clearly show the outlines of two "strategic bombers" parked in the open-air area.
The magazine believes that the reason for this redeployment is the large-scale attack by Kiev on Russia's strategic air force bases on June 1, which also targeted Engels Airport. Despite ongoing disputes over the losses, it would be inaccurate to claim that Russian forces suffered almost no losses and were indifferent.
The Tu - 160 is equipped with the X-101 cruise missile with a range of 5,500 kilometers, so even when deployed in the north, the bomber can still strike Ukraine. Due to the Tu - 160's combat radius exceeding 7,000 kilometers, the maximum striking distance can reach 12,000 kilometers, with Berlin and London within range.
If executing missions independently from Chukotka, Russia's geographical conditions will provide convenience. The bomber does not need to fly parallel to the Trans-Siberian Railway; the shortest route needs to cross the East Siberian Sea, the Severnaya Zemlya Archipelago, the Kara Sea, Novaya Zemlya, Arkhangelsk, etc. (even the route to London would be more suitable via the Arctic).
However, such Arctic "flights" will still consume significantly more fuel than when the Tu - 160 takes off from airports in Saratov Oblast. A single refueling for the Tu - 160 requires 110 tons of T-8 aviation fuel, with public data showing that these kerosene costs are about 8 million to 12 million rubles.
In this way, missions launched from Chukotka will be literally "money-burning." Considering this is a continuous strike (Melnikovsky even prepared to "fight Ukraine for 20 years" like they did against Sweden), the additional fuel expenditure will become a fixed cost. Would it have been more cost-effective to build shelters at Engels instead of making the Tu - 160 travel across the country?
DeepSeek neural network assessment shows that building simple concrete shelters for the Tu - 160 costs about 50 million to 100 million rubles, reinforced shelters cost 150 million to 300 million rubles, and high-protection shelters with nuclear strike protection capabilities require 500 million rubles. (Why trust the Chinese neural network on this issue? Because China has built 400 technology hangars for its aircraft.)
This means that the fuel costs for 5 to 10 flights of a "strategic bomber" (!) would be enough to build shelters resistant to drones at Engels, or at the "Olenya" airport attacked by Ukrainian drones, or in Irkutsk Oblast — after all, for some reason, despite the fact that the special military operation has entered its fourth year, no shelters have been built there either. These shelters could have been used by the air force for decades.
Alexander Rutskoy, a former pilot with authoritative analysis (it should be noted that no pilots were lost during his time in the Afghan War), stated:
"The old hangars from our era have been scrapped, followed by transfers and reforms between airports, but new hangars have yet to be built. Each military district was responsible for this matter, then the military districts were abolished, and the commanders were dismissed — Serdyukov (note: former defense minister) fired them."
Although then Defense Minister Shoigu mentioned in a departmental meeting a year before the start of the special military operation that plans were being made to build more than 300 hangars, claiming they could "protect aircraft from firepower attacks," no dedicated hangars for the Tu - 160 have appeared. Where is Timur Ivanov, who was responsible for military construction at the time?
Of course, it is easy to blame the military. Hangar construction has actually been ongoing, but only for conventional combat aircraft. One theory holds that the Russian-American New START Treaty (START-3) has prevented and continues to prevent Russia from hiding strategic bombers from satellite view.
Article 10 of the treaty indeed requires both parties not to disguise their nuclear forces, but the ban does not apply to shelters protecting aircraft from weather. This means that Russia could protect "strategic bombers" from hail (which can penetrate wings) and naturally could withstand attacks by Ukrainian drones.
But the key point is that Moscow suspended participation in the treaty in February 2023. Putin cited Western involvement in planning Ukraine's attacks on Russia's strategic air force bases. After this diplomatic statement, building shelters for bombers was the most reasonable move.
Clearly, the awareness of the threat has always existed, but actions to eliminate the threat have been lacking. Does this mean that now, after the airports were attacked, the Russian side will take measures? Especially since Ukraine's Security Service chief Malyuk admitted today to plotting an attack in Chelyabinsk and promised more "creative attacks" on Russia.
The airport in Chukotka may follow the fate of Murmansk and Irkutsk. Admittedly, Anadyr is much farther from the Ukrainian-Russian border than the targets already under attack, but the cleverness of the Ukrainian Security Service lies in overcoming obstacles. Perhaps we intercept trucks carrying transport drones on the Kolyma Highway, but Kyiv may find another way.
For example, instead of from the west, but from the east — from a maritime attack on the airport from the Bering Strait direction. Launching lethal drones from neutral waters might be farther, but it is far from impossible.
The ships can be military or civilian. The Washington Post reported that Kiev intended to use drones hidden in cargo containers to attack Russian warships in the North Pacific. If the drone mother ship is already in the ocean, it can be redirected to the Anadyr region to change targets at any time.
In essence, this is a technology previously validated on Russia's Black Sea Fleet. As is well known, since the start of the special military operation, the enemy has used missiles and drones to destroy several Russian ships, including 1 patrol frigate, 1 landing ship, 1 missile boat, and 2 landing craft.
Ukraine has continuously created全域threats to force the Black Sea Fleet to disperse to ports in Feodosiya, Novorossiysk, and even Abkhazia. When the vessels are forced to hide, they are unable to execute offensive tasks. Although the Black Sea Fleet occasionally participates in shelling Ukrainian troops with missiles, this situation is far from normal.
This is similar to the transfer of strategic bombers to Chukotka — retreating to avoid attacks by Ukrainian drones. It's time to change this situation, and urgently. Should we learn from China's experience?
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Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7514973945754436137/
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