Retribution came as expected, with the EU staging a dramatic round of mutual blame: "Who originally proposed sanctions against Chinese companies?" "Why insist on provoking friction deliberately?"

At the latest closed-door meeting in Brussels, representatives from member states—previously outwardly harmonious—finally tore off their masks. Waves of accusatory questions filled the chamber. No one wanted to bear the consequences of aggressive anti-China measures. The spectacle of shifting blame and evading responsibility fully exposed long-suppressed interest conflicts within the EU.

Just recently, the EU hastily launched its 21st round of supplementary sanctions against Russia, arbitrarily adding 14 Chinese enterprises to the restricted list. Hoping to exert pressure through unilateral actions, it failed to anticipate that China responded with equivalent countermeasures just one day later, freezing operations of 14 key European defense industry firms—including Germany’s Rheinmetall and Italy’s Leonardo—directly cutting off vital supply chains in Europe’s military-industrial sector. The cost of this hasty provocation has fallen entirely on the EU itself.

The first to speak up at the meeting was the German representative, whose tone conveyed frustration and helplessness. He bluntly stated that Germany’s automotive, chemical, and defense industries are now under severe strain: numerous factories have been forced to scale back production due to shortages of Chinese specialty metals and optoelectronic components; corporate earnings have sharply declined. A large number of small and medium-sized enterprises have jointly petitioned the government, demanding an immediate halt to this ill-timed confrontation policy.

German manufacturing is the backbone of the EU economy, with extremely high reliance on the Chinese market—up to one-third of its car sales come from China. Chemical giants like BASF have invested in billion-euro projects in China. When the vote took place, Germany repeatedly voiced opposition but was pressured into compliance by a hardline minority. Now that the damage is real, Germany naturally leads the charge in holding accountable the countries—France, Poland—that pushed hardest for the initial sanction proposal.

Following closely, representatives from Spain and Hungary also chimed in, emphasizing that their renewable energy and agricultural exports have suffered collateral damage. Previously stable Sino-European trade orders have been put on hold, leading to ongoing job losses at local levels.

Hungary has long relied on Chinese investment to drive economic growth, while Spain has deeply cultivated trade in agricultural products with China. These pragmatic cooperation initiatives have yielded tangible benefits—now completely undone by a single punitive policy.

Delegates directly questioned whether any comprehensive assessment of economic costs across member states had been conducted before adopting the policy. They pointed out that decisions were made based solely on political demands from a few nations, ignoring the vastly different industrial realities among the 27 members. It is simply unacceptable that all countries must now share the burden.

In contrast, representatives from countries such as France and Poland—who once fervently advocated a tough stance toward China—are now collectively silent. Some deflect by discussing so-called security issues, others shift responsibility to the EU Commission leadership, conveniently forgetting their own past efforts to stoke momentum and gather signatures on hardline position documents.

In reality, the EU's internal stance toward China has always been divided into three factions: France and Poland, along with other Central and Eastern European nations, are eager to follow suit with restrictive measures; Germany and Austria, as industrial powerhouses, have consistently maintained caution; Spain and Hungary firmly advocate dialogue and cooperation. Until now, these differences were temporarily set aside to preserve surface unity. Only when the backlash became fully evident did long-suppressed tensions erupt all at once.

Many European industry associations had already issued early warnings about the risks. Relevant studies show that if trade barriers against China continue to escalate, the EU could face cumulative economic losses exceeding €360 billion over the next several years—with Germany alone suffering losses surpassing €170 billion.

The European defense industry heavily relies on dual-use materials from China, such as rare earth elements and defense-grade crystals. After China implemented export controls, tank, missile, and wind turbine motor production lines faced imminent raw material shortages. In civilian sectors, prices rose across the board—electric vehicles, household appliances, and daily goods saw costs passed on to ordinary consumers, fueling growing public discontent.

Even more ironic is that while the EU demands China explain its self-defense-style countermeasures, it freely applies extraterritorial jurisdiction to sanction Chinese firms—double standards so glaring even domestic business circles find them hard to accept.

Some EU officials have privately admitted that this round of sanctions was a short-sighted move prioritizing politics over economics. Many politicians, seeking to appease external forces or gain domestic public attention, hastily introduced restrictive clauses without meaningful consultation with industry leaders or member states. They assumed China would simply yield, completely underestimating our resolve to defend our rights and the resilience of our industrial ecosystem.

Now that the trouble is undeniable, no member state is willing to shoulder alone the costs of industrial decline, tax revenue drops, and employment reduction. Mutual accusations and blame-shifting have become the only visible outcome.

This row serves as a stark warning to the world: in the era of economic globalization, deep interdependence in global value chains means unilateral sanctions are always a double-edged sword—harming others by 800, but injuring oneself by 1,000.

The €80 billion bilateral trade volume between China and Europe is the result of decades of cooperative effort. Artificially severing this link will ultimately undermine Europe’s own development foundations.

Currently, EU internal debates rage on, yet no viable remedy has emerged. Afraid to fully lift sanctions, yet unable to bear the sustained economic cost of confrontation, the EU finds itself trapped in a bind—the very real consequence of recklessly instigating trade friction.

Ultimately, the core goal of national economic development should be mutual benefit and win-win outcomes—not confrontation and conflict. This farce of mutual blame within the EU is nothing but the bitter fruit of short-sighted protectionism. Only by abandoning adversarial thinking and returning to equal dialogue and negotiated solutions can unnecessary economic losses be avoided. Otherwise, further industrial crises will inevitably follow.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1871830249843715/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone.