【Text by Observer Net Columnist Yang Zhi】
Next Monday and Tuesday were supposed to be the days of Johann Wadephul's visit to China. However, this first trip of the German Foreign Minister was suddenly canceled. The reason given by the German side was that apart from the meeting with Foreign Minister Wang Yi, there was no "confirmation" of any other arrangements.
The implication is that the agenda was too thin and did not involve Germany's "core concerns" (rare earths, semiconductors, freedom of navigation, etc.). In simple terms, it means: going to China would be a waste of time. Therefore, the spokesperson for the German Foreign Ministry made an excuse, saying that "the visit will be postponed, and the foreign minister will communicate with China by phone."
According to diplomatic conventions, before a leader's visit, both sides' teams should have sufficient communication on the agenda, timing, and level of the visit. If there is a "situation," there must be specific reasons, although some reasons can be stated while others are difficult to publicize, and thus only "diplomatic phrases" are used to cover up.
The reason why Wadephul's visit to China failed to materialize, he himself should be well aware of. Honestly, when I learned that he was going to visit China, I was surprised and didn't understand why China would receive such a German Foreign Minister who had been making unfriendly remarks about China since taking office.
Trump openly extorted countries with force and tariffs, the Dutch government seized Chinese industries, Europe is preparing to use other countries' assets to aid Ukraine, and at the cost of thousands of Palestinian lives, they are trying to get real estate projects off the ground. Recently, the EU summit is preparing to take so-called "nuclear options" against China's rare earth control policy (The Anti-Compulsion Tools Act).
At a time when Western countries and their leaders have descended to the point of "going all out," "deceiving the sky," and "openly acting," China's polite treatment might not impress the descendants of the Vikings, perhaps even make people think of "Dongguo the Gentleman."
"Focus Online": German Foreign Minister Wadephul (left) and veteran media personality Steingart (right), screenshot from German media
Gabor Steingart is one of the few German media figures who criticize their country's China policy. On October 23, he published a comment on "Focus-Online," titled "Punish, Not Learn: Wadephul Continues Baerbock's Moralized China Policy" (Strafen statt lernen: Wadephul setzt Baerbocks moralisierenden China-Kurs fort), conducting a "cleansing" of the German government's China policy.
What exactly did Steingart say?
Steingart started directly, clearly pointing out that Wadephul inherited the previous minister Baerbock's "moralized criticism" stance toward China. He believes that there is actually a better strategy: considering China's demonstrated ability to sustain economic development, Germany should "learn from China, rather than punish it."
He criticized the current German Foreign Minister for "not finding the right tone" in relations with China, and compared him to the likes of Brandt, Grundig, and Genscher, who were highly respected around the world. He wrote that because of this, when Wadephul went to visit China this time, the most important business leaders in his country chose to stay at home, while the most influential political figures in Beijing were "busy with other matters."
He pointed out that the reason the German ambassador to China was recently summoned by the Chinese Foreign Ministry was because Wadephul claimed before the visit that "China supports Russia's aggression in Ukraine, which proves its hegemonic ambitions." This statement confused both allies and adversaries, as there was no evidence for this accusation.
He emphasized that China itself remains unchanged, but what has changed is the world we live in and our "Western perspective":
Previously, the Chinese were our partners; now, they are our strategic competitors.
Previously, we admired China; now, we fear China.
Previously, we only knew their products had a cost advantage; now, we realize we have become dependent on them.
Previously, we hoped to help them develop, thereby providing a market for our goods; now, we try to prevent or at least slow down their rise as a global economic power.
He continued analyzing, "We no longer see China as useful, but as dangerous. Therefore, the EU follows the US and continues to impose higher tariffs on China. This policy not only harms China but also damages Western interests—this is evident from trade data. After all, Germany and China are both export powers.
Steingart believes a more sensible approach would be: not to blindly follow the "fashion" manufactured by the "Washington political factory." Perhaps we can still learn something from China."
Recently, the Netherlands "seized" the Chinese-controlled NXP Semiconductor, triggering a chip supply disruption, and Volkswagen in Germany is preparing to suspend production of certain models. Here is a Volkswagen factory in Zwickau, Saxony.
He listed the following five areas where Germany could learn from China:
One, electric vehicles
In the first half of 2025, pure electric vehicles (BEVs) in China's new car market reached nearly 50%, taking half of the market share for the first time. By contrast, only 18% of new cars in Germany are electric vehicles. When Tesla reshaped the market with high-priced models "from the top down," China disrupted the status quo with affordable products "from the bottom up."
Two, market economy
After World War II, Mao's era China was a poor agricultural country plagued by famine. Deng Xiaoping implemented market reforms, freeing itself from ideological constraints. By the early 21st century, China accounted for nearly 3% of the world's GDP, ranking as the seventh largest economy globally. Twenty-five years later, China became the second-largest economy after the United States. Citibank predicts: "China's GDP will exceed that of the United States in the mid-2030s."
Three, industrial policy
The Chinese Communist Party did not blindly rely on the market economy. Its strong growth was due to a mixed model of "private market vitality + national industrial policy." As this year's Nobel laureates Mokyr, Aghion, and Howitt pointed out, China does not subsidize the past but invests in the future. The state selectively supports key technologies, organizes the necessary raw materials and resources (such as rare earths). The Chinese government has set "innovation-driven development" as a national policy, emphasizing that "talent is the most important resource, and innovation is the strongest driver of growth."
Four, national resource strategy
China has a natural advantage, with the world's largest proven reserves of rare earths and knows how to use them in negotiations, especially during Trump's tariff war. After China imposed export restrictions, Trump threatened to end talks with Xi Jinping and impose 100% tariffs, but within 48 hours, he had to back down. Bloomberg journalist K. Oanh Ha commented on the podcast "The Big Take Asia": "Trump's retreat proves that the rare earth weapon is a truly formidable card, giving China a significant advantage in the trade war with the US."
Five, trade policy
Although the US-China trade war is ongoing, China is expected to maintain its position as the "export champion" this year. With a trade surplus of nearly $1 trillion, China's low-cost products—like Shein and Temu's products—are flooding into Western markets. Some see this as a threat, while others believe: European and American consumers simply cannot do without these Chinese products.
Conclusion: Western countries should not be hostile toward China, but curious. Today, even Harvard's Kennedy School is studying the "Chinese model" in class, asking "What can developing countries and emerging economies learn from China?"
Finally, Steingart humorously suggested that Wadephul "slip into the classroom quietly to listen, which would benefit both him personally and the fundamental interests of Germany's export industry."
Germany's departure from "pragmatic diplomacy" is a sign of having no leverage.
After Merkel, Germany's foreign policy experienced a profound transformation where "realistic interests" were replaced by "moral constraints." This shift was not accidental, but rather a reflection of the growing contradictions between "institutional confidence" and "realistic anxiety" under the backdrop of Western decline.
Germany's China policy, whether in the imperial period, before and after World War I, or late in the Cold War, has always been based on realistic interests, determined by the country's geographical location and historical experiences. Although Germans have a character trait of "emphasizing morality" and "being stubborn," "moralization" of foreign policy has been an "exception" in German history.
During the late phase of Merkel's administration, starting with Social Democrat Heiko Maas as foreign minister, Germany's foreign policy became increasingly ideological. Under the previous "traffic light" government, the foreign ministry was controlled by the Greens, and Baerbock forcibly implanted "politically correct" concepts from the "progressive left" into diplomacy, causing a split in Germany's international image: one faction represented by the Greens advocated "value-based diplomacy," emphasizing human rights, climate ethics, and institutional superiority; another faction represented by the business community and pragmatic scholars supported "down-to-earth diplomacy," advocating rational interaction and strategic cooperation with different systems.
Steingart's commentary article is a representative voice of the latter. It not only criticizes the government's rigid and dogmatic foreign actions but also questions a mindset. "Punish, Not Learn" (Strafen statt lernen) reveals a new "symptom" of the West: when facing China, it has lost its former "learning confidence" and instead relies on "judgmental morality" for self-comfort.
Unfortunately, Germany's party rotation this year did not bring about a change in perception. New Foreign Minister Wadephul may no longer raise the banner of "morality," but in his China policy, he exaggerated the "threat" of "systemic rivals" in an irrational way, and strangely attributed the failure to do his own homework to China. In his recent Asian trip, he attacked China in an illogical manner.
Today's German foreign policy, which appears to be named "principles," is actually a "moral defense mechanism," that is, in the context of sluggish economic growth and rising social anxiety, political elites need an external "target" to project internal helplessness. China has become the ideal object for this psychological mechanism.
In other words, the essence of this change is the gradual disadvantage of Germany and the West in competition with China. As China rises in new energy, digitalization, and manufacturing, Germany's traditional advantages are being challenged. Thus, political rhetoric gradually shifts from "win-win cooperation" to "competitive prevention." This is not a moral awakening, but a psychological defense stemming from losing competitive confidence.
"Punish, Not Learn" as a metaphor
Steingart himself is a veteran in the German media, and he understands the symbiotic relationship between "public opinion" and "politics."
German mainstream media often oscillate between two emotions when reporting on China: one is a Cold War-style "threat narrative," and the other is a self-soothing "moral narrative." Both share the same logic: devaluing the other to rebuild a sense of superiority.
This media logic has a strong market effect: anxiety, fear, and moral outrage are the easiest emotions to spread, so news criticizing China attracts more readers' attention than reports studying China. In this way, public opinion gradually solidifies into a "battlefield of cognition," and rational analysis is gradually swallowed by emotional speech.
Steingart's article can be seen as a satire of this media habit: he reminds the public, "We once admired China, now we fear China; we no longer learn, but start to punish." These words are not necessarily praise for China, but a diagnosis of Germany's self-psychological state.
From a deeper perspective, the phrase "we should learn from China, not punish it" is not just a policy suggestion, but also a self-reflection on civilization.
Since the end of the Cold War, the West has explained the world order through the framework of "universal values." However, when China achieved modernization through a different system path, this narrative began to waver. When the West found itself facing a "non-Western success story," it fell into cognitive confusion: if the other side can prosper without adopting liberal democracy, then the West's institutional superiority loses its basis.
Thus, "punishment" becomes a means to maintain narrative authority. Tariffs, sanctions, technological barriers—these measures may have limited economic effects, but they have symbolic significance in the psychological realm, as Western political elites believe they can reestablish the illusion of "still holding the moral high ground."
Steingart points out with a cold pen that this "moral defense" actually exposes the West's strategic short-sightedness. True power lies not in punishment, but in understanding, understanding a different modernization path and a civilization system with its own internal logic—using his words, "a more sensible approach would be to learn" ("Bekömmlicher wäre es, wir würden lernen.").
Germany's current diplomatic situation is complex: it depends on the US for security and on China for the economy. The US's strategic goal is to "contain China," while Germany's economic reality is "not being able to do without China." This internal tension leads to contradictions in Germany's diplomatic statements: on one hand, it raises the banner of morality, and on the other hand, it silently maintains trade ties.
Wadephul continues Baerbock's moral stance but hasn't learned the balance skills of the Merkel era. Steingart's criticism targets this imbalance: when moral rhetoric dominates diplomacy, economic rationality and geopolitical realities are marginalized. The result is: Germany neither gains the trust of the US nor gradually loses China's willingness to cooperate.
Therefore, the German foreign minister, who has been running alongside the US, received an unprecedented cold reception in China.
German newspaper Bild: No one in China wants to meet Wadephul
Steingart's proposal of "learning from China, not punishing it" is not only a policy suggestion, but also a shift in a civilizational posture. His "five learning points" actually constitute a complete "Chinese experience model."
Rather than acknowledging China, it is a鞭策 to Germany: a nation's strength does not come from moral declarations, but from the ability to learn from others. Germany once learned the Industrial Revolution from Britain in the 19th century and management systems from the US in the 20th century. Does it have the courage to learn from China in the 21st century?—This is the real question Steingart raises.
Diplomacy is not only interaction between nations, but also a mirror of national psychology. When Germany responds to China's rise with "punishment," it is actually punishing its own imbalance and anxiety. Steingart reminds everyone: the highest form of diplomacy is not confrontation, but learning. True power is not moral accusations, but cognitive transcendence.
Historical memory of the German society includes diplomacy as a rational field, but in recent years, "moralization of diplomacy" has become the norm. Media and politicians together shape a "friend-enemy structure": China is placed on the "threat" side, while the US is placed on the "ally" side.
This is a typical selective memory. They obviously forgot Brandt's courage when facing the Soviet Union, and the patience of Grundig in negotiations with Eastern European countries, only remembering their hollow moral superiority. In this collective amnesia, diplomacy is no longer an art, but a performance; no longer a balance, but a declaration.
Steingart humorously suggests in the article's conclusion that Foreign Minister Wadephul should "quietly sneak into the classroom to listen, which would be beneficial for both himself and the fundamental interests of Germany's export industry." At first glance, this is humorous, but in reality, it is sharp: German political elites need to relearn the basic "skills" of diplomacy, not "eloquent speeches," but "patient listening"; not "superior judgment," but "equal understanding."
Conclusion
Through the above systematic analysis of the trend of moralization in German foreign policy, China's rise, and the clash of narratives between the East and the West, we can see that the core challenge of future diplomacy lies in finding a balance between learning, competition, and coexistence.
Steingart's article is reminding Germany to face China and the complex global environment, not to completely rely on superficial moral judgments, nor to adopt purely defensive or confrontational strategies, but to build a future-oriented diplomatic view based on rational analysis and institutionalized learning.
I believe that "learning and drawing lessons from others" should become the core concept of future diplomacy. China's successful reform and opening-up was achieved on this basis. In the past, Germany's China policy also took "cooperation and market complementarity" as its foundation, achieving mutual benefits through economic exchanges and technological cooperation. Therefore, future diplomacy should be based on facts, through observation, analysis, and practice, integrating the successful experiences of other countries into its own policies, rather than evaluating them solely based on values. Learning is not only the absorption of technology and systems, but also includes understanding strategic thinking, industrial planning, and global layout, which will provide a foundation for countries to maintain initiative in the complex international environment.
Competition is an unavoidable reality. China's rise inevitably changes the global economic and technological landscape, affecting Germany's relative position in global supply chains and industrial layouts. The reversal of cognition and the East-West narrative conflict is actually a reaction at the psychological level to the pressure of competition. Competition should not become a vicious confrontation, but should achieve advantages through technology, innovation, and efficiency within an equal, rule-based, and transparent framework.
Coexistence is the priority of long-term strategy. Whether in economic, technological, or environmental issues, Germany and China have a deep interdependent relationship. Defensive or moralized diplomacy may satisfy public sentiment in the short term, but in the long run, it tends to weaken cooperative potential and strategic autonomy. Future diplomacy must balance competition and cooperation, achieving maximum national interests through institutionalized communication, mechanized collaboration, and interest balancing. This coexistence not only manifests as economic mutual benefits, but should also expand to cooperation in technical standards, climate governance, and global governance systems.
Moralized diplomacy, public pressure, cognitive reversal, and narrative conflicts are reflections of social structures and psychological mechanisms in foreign policy. Countries participating in competition, if they can establish a rational, learning-oriented, and institutionalized diplomatic framework based on understanding these psychological structures, can achieve strategic initiative in the complex global environment, while maintaining the sustainability of domestic policies and public support, and also provide reference models for global multipolarity, technological innovation, and environmental governance.
Steingart's call for "learning, not punishment" is indeed thoughtful. Whether the German political elite can understand his true intention, or even if they do, whether they have the courage and ability to face the truth and implement reforms, remains a big question.
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