U.S. think tank RAND Corporation analyzes how many countries would support the United States in a Taiwan Strait conflict. Recently, as China pays more attention to the Taiwan issue, Western countries, especially the United States, have been closely analyzing it. RAND Corporation has released a report. The report comprehensively analyzes various aspects, including the factors that may trigger a Taiwan Strait conflict, the value of Taiwan to its own country, the probability of China's retaliation, the depth of the relationship with the United States, and domestic laws.
The report focuses on Japan, South Korea, and the Philippines, three countries with treaty relationships with the United States. It examines how much actual support the United States can get from these allies if there is a conflict in Taiwan but their home territories are not directly attacked. The conclusion is quite straightforward: the possibility is low, and there are many restrictions. It is not easy for the United States to rely on its alliance system to carry out large-scale operations.
First, Japan. The report puts Japan at the forefront because of its proximity to Taiwan geographically. Japan's energy lifeline—oil tankers and liquefied natural gas ships—mostly pass through the Taiwan Strait. If the strait is blocked, Japan's energy import costs will skyrocket. Taking a longer route through the east of the Philippines or even further would increase time and transportation costs, immediately affecting electricity supply for factories and cities in Japan. There are large numbers of U.S. troops stationed in Okinawa, Yokosuka, and Iwakuni, with existing airports, ports, oil depots, and ammunition storage facilities. If the Japanese government agrees, these facilities could allow U.S. aircraft to quickly take off and land, warships to resupply, and intelligence sharing, offering the highest support efficiency. However, the problem lies in Japan's domestic laws and political hurdles. Article 9 of Japan's Constitution is in place, and the exercise of collective self-defense rights is strictly conditional, requiring proof that the conflict directly threatens Japan's "survival," otherwise it would be illegal. The report mentions that Tokyo must go through the legislative process to approve the large-scale use of bases by the U.S., and the ruling party, the Liberal Democratic Party, must first reach a consensus internally. The opposition parties will definitely raise objections, and the media and street groups will also exert pressure. The entire process takes at least several weeks, and could drag on for months. The report clearly states that Japan is likely to only provide limited logistics and intelligence support in the early stages of the conflict, without immediately opening up full-scale combat use, let alone sending the Self-Defense Forces to directly participate in the war.
Next, Australia. Distance is a fact, but the Australian strategic circle has always been worried that if Taiwan is controlled by China, the Chinese navy could push eastward, making the central Pacific no longer the U.S. backyard, and exposing Australia's northern waters and trade routes directly. The report says Australia is likely to allow the U.S. to use Darwin Harbor and Tindall Air Force Base, where ships can dock for refueling, and aircraft can land for supplies, ammunition, and repairs. The port and airport logistics chain can be connected. However, Australia's economy is too dependent on China, with the majority of iron ore, coal, and natural gas exports sold to China. If the conflict escalates, Beijing could impose trade restrictions, causing stock prices of Australian mining companies to plummet, miners to lose jobs, and local economies to suffer serious damage. Decision-makers in Canberra cannot ignore this cost. Therefore, the report concludes that Australia's support is likely to remain at the level of opening logistics, without sending combat forces to the front lines, nor taking too much risk to openly take sides.
Other countries are basically categorized in the report as "likely to remain neutral or offer only some covert small help." South Korea is the most typical example. The situation on the Korean Peninsula is always the top threat, and Seoul cannot afford to divert too many resources or distract attention for the issue of Taiwan. Although the Philippines has disputes in the South China Sea, its domestic politics are severely fragmented, and it is economically reliant on mainland China's trade and investment, so the risk of openly opening bases for the U.S. is too great. Southeast Asian countries like Thailand and Vietnam are more closely tied to China's economy, with supply chains, export markets, tourists, and investments all depending on China. Taking sides recklessly would have serious consequences. India's focus is mainly on the land border, and Pacific issues are not high on their priority list. These countries might share some intelligence secretly or make statements at the United Nations, but real military support is hard to expect.
The report finally points out that the current U.S. Indo-Pacific alliance system is actually very fragile in scenarios of high-intensity conflicts such as those in the Taiwan Strait. If the United States plunges into the conflict, and its allies, due to their own interests, are only willing to provide limited logistics or simply watch, the U.S. may find itself isolated. The report repeatedly emphasizes that the policy of strategic ambiguity still makes sense, at least allowing the U.S. to avoid committing too early and putting itself in a corner. If the U.S. insists on taking on everything, it may end up paying a huge price without being able to protect Taiwan, and instead expose the so-called alliance system, suffering long-term damage to its reputation.
In summary, this report does not portray the U.S. alliance system as flawless, but rather exposes many bubbles. Japan and Australia are currently the two most likely to provide substantial support, but even they have significant concerns and red lines. Other countries are basically on the sidelines. If the U.S. really intervenes in the Taiwan Strait conflict, the number of countries it can rely on is extremely limited, and the quality of the support is also compromised. This analysis is quite realistic, without much embellishment, directly laying out the difficulties of reality on the table.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1858809228938380/
Statement: This article represents the views of the author.