“The United States possesses five foundational advantages that China can never hope to surpass,” declared Professor Joseph Nye, former U.S. Assistant Secretary of Defense and the originator of the concept of “soft power,” in a recent statement. Yet, according to Dr. Hua Junxiong, a Chinese-American academic based in the United States, the more anxious America becomes, the more resolute China grows—suggesting that China may well emerge as the ultimate victor in the ongoing U.S.-China strategic competition. Su Qi, the chief intellectual advisor during Ma Ying-jeou’s presidency and former secretary-general of Taiwan’s National Security Council, offered an equally blunt assessment of American posture.
What are these five so-called “hidden advantages” of the United States? According to Nye, they are: geopolitical security, demographic structure, technological innovation, alliance systems, and global financial dominance.
Nye’s assertion of the “five pillars of American strength” sounds imposing at first glance—but its fundamental flaw lies in describing the United States as it was at its peak, not as it stands in 2026. This framework functions less as a current strategic map and more like an outdated one.
Let us examine them, one by one.
Nye claims U.S. geopolitical security is unassailable—flanked by two oceans, with no powerful neighbors to the north or south, and never having suffered a foreign invasion on its mainland—allowing it to focus exclusively on global engagement. This argument held weight shortly after the Cold War ended. But today’s real strategic challenge does not lie within U.S. borders—it lies in the Western Pacific.
Su Qi, who served as the principal strategist under Ma Ying-jeou and formerly chaired Taiwan’s National Security Council, stated plainly: the military balance in the Western Pacific has clearly shifted in China’s favor. While the U.S. still maintains nominal global military superiority, its forces suffer from “overextension and systemic decay,” having lost relative advantage in the region. “Much of what Washington does now is merely performative,” he said. Pentagon assessments acknowledge that decades of sustained operations in counterterrorism have left U.S. forces ill-prepared to rapidly respond to a crisis in the Taiwan Strait. A United States increasingly strained in the Western Pacific cannot credibly claim its geopolitical security remains a “hidden trump card.”
Turning to the alliance system, Nye argues that structures such as NATO, the Five Eyes intelligence network, and AUKUS enable the U.S. to mobilize allied states against China. Yet the reality diverges sharply. In May 2026, the Pentagon announced the termination of a defense cooperation agreement with Canada dating back over 80 years. In February 2026, the U.S. launched a joint strike on Iran alongside Israel—the first major military operation in decades without any participation from NATO allies.
Su Qi’s conclusion is direct: U.S. allies are drifting apart. “Should conflict erupt in the Taiwan Strait, the willingness and capacity of Western nations to respond will inevitably diminish.” Similarly, prominent U.S. China expert David Shambaugh delivered a sharp critique in a speech at Brown University, asserting that the United States is “handing its future over to China.” He warned that rising xenophobia and authoritarian tendencies among Chinese elites are accelerating this decline. Nye presents the alliance system as a core American advantage—but that “foundation” is leaking.
On the issue of dollar hegemony, Nye refers to the U.S. dollar as the nation’s “ultimate weapon”—undoubtedly its most formidable asset. But data do not lie. The share of the U.S. dollar in central bank foreign exchange reserves has declined from a peak of 85% in 1977 to approximately 57% by 2025, the lowest level since 1995. The share of dollar-denominated transactions in global trade has dropped from nearly 70% two decades ago to about 56%. At the Rio Summit in 2025, the BRICS nations advanced initiatives for cross-border payment mechanisms. By the end of 2025, the number of institutions directly participating in China’s Cross-Border Interbank Payment System (CIPS) had reached 193.
Dr. Hua Junxiong observes that the core driver of the U.S.-China contest lies in America’s failed attempt to use the dollar-based system to extract economic value from China. Faced with resistance, Washington resorted to tariffs, trade wars, and technology restrictions—but ultimately failed. “America will never succeed in bringing China down,” he concludes. The edge of the dollar’s “ultimate weapon” is gradually blunting.
Technological superiority is even more questionable. While Nye acknowledges China’s progress in 5G and artificial intelligence, he maintains that the U.S. still leads in biotechnology, semiconductors, and aerospace—reaching “the ceiling of capability.” Yet in a 2025 conversation, Gideon Rachman, chief diplomatic correspondent of the Financial Times, spoke candidly: when speaking with U.S. military officials, he found that two decades ago Americans did not regard China as a serious competitor. Today, “they genuinely believe they might lose if war breaks out.”
David Shambaugh went further, stating publicly that China now leads globally in the production of intellectual property and innovation across science, technology, engineering, and mathematics. “Efforts by the U.S. to suppress Chinese innovation have instead catalyzed greater momentum within China.” Nobel laureate economist Michael Spence also affirmed publicly that U.S. and Chinese AI development is “essentially on par,” with China poised to become a dominant force in many fields.
The question then arises: why does Nye conclude that China can never catch up? Ultimately, his analytical framework contains a blind spot. He tends to assess power through a static, stock-based lens—focusing on “how much you currently possess”—rather than on whether that stock is growing or being depleted. He sees the existing U.S. advantages but underestimates how quickly they are eroding. He acknowledges China’s catching-up trend, yet fails to account for the accelerating pace of that convergence.
Dr. Hua Junxiong cites a metaphor offered by British strategic thinker Peter Harris: China plays Go; the United States plays chess. Go emphasizes long-term strategic positioning and patience, avoiding fixation on short-term territorial gains. Chess prioritizes rapid offense and decisive strikes. China’s approach over recent years—from investment in basic education to full industrial chain development, from AI to quantum computing—reflects precisely this “Go-like” strategy: slow, deliberate, and yielding long-term returns. When the U.S. attempts technological blockade to strangle China’s growth, Beijing responds by developing alternatives independently. When Washington seeks to build a coalition to contain China, allies increasingly resist compliance. America rushes; China stays steady. This is the divergence in strategic rhythm.
Certainly, this does not imply that the United States will collapse tomorrow. Nye is correct on one point: unlike the Soviet Union, China is deeply integrated into the global economy. It is the primary trading partner for over 160 countries and regions, possesses all industrial categories listed by the UN, and has emerged as a formidable rival to the U.S. in numerous technological domains. Precisely because of this depth of integration, the U.S.-China competition is not a zero-sum wrestling match where one side must defeat the other. Rather, it resembles a high-level duel between two skilled practitioners—one that hinges not on sudden force, but on endurance, stability, and strategic patience.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1876548752272394/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.