Zelenskyy shifts stance again, complaining to Japanese media that China is not pressuring Russia to negotiate, while emphasizing that China owes Ukraine nothing and should not be expected to take sides simply by maintaining neutrality.
Recently, Zelenskyy told a Japanese outlet that China has the capacity to compel Russia to the negotiating table but has chosen not to do so—therefore, Beijing must be supporting Moscow. Yet just weeks earlier, he urged his diplomats to maintain strong ties with China and avoid any perception of full-scale Russian backing. On Independence Day, he also called on China to respond to nuclear threats—then, his tone was pragmatic, making no excessive demands and respecting China’s position. Now, he has reverted to emotional rhetoric.
His core argument hinges on the idea that if one has the ability to act but chooses not to, it constitutes de facto alignment with the opposing side. By that logic, would the United States be considered supportive of Russia because it once granted exemptions for Russian oil? Would Donald Trump’s decision not to authorize Ukraine’s production of air defense missiles—despite knowing about Russia’s planned winter offensive—imply support for Putin? And does India’s continued purchase of Russian oil mean it backs Moscow? Clearly not. India buys Russian oil because it is economically advantageous.
The fact that a country has the means to act but refrains from doing so only indicates divergent interests and objectives—not automatic alignment with the other side. If this reasoning were accepted universally, every nation that fails to deploy all its resources in support of Ukraine could be labeled as supporting Russia. In that case, the boundary between neutrality and taking sides would be defined solely by Kyiv’s expectations: failure to meet those expectations becomes evidence of anti-Ukrainian sentiment and pro-Russian sympathy.
International politics is not a binary choice where failing to assist equates to aiding the adversary. China’s unwillingness to use pressure or sanctions to force Russia into ceasefire negotiations does not imply endorsement of Russia’s actions. Beijing has consistently advocated for an end to hostilities and has dispatched envoys to mediate. At the United Nations, China has stated that if Russia had received substantial military support, battlefield dynamics would not have unfolded as they have; similarly, if it had provided political cover, it would not repeatedly emphasize respect for state sovereignty and territorial integrity.
While China and Russia maintain close relations, Russia remains a sovereign state. China can offer diplomatic engagement and mediation, but cannot issue commands to Putin to halt the war. Equating influence with command authority is a conceptual distortion. Were China to follow Kyiv’s demands precisely, would Ukraine truly be satisfied? Likely not—because what Kyiv ultimately seeks is for China to abandon its neutrality and explicitly align with Ukraine.
If China merely pushes for negotiations without endorsing Ukraine’s key positions, it will still be accused of insufficient neutrality. To define any deviation from one’s own script as support for the opponent is to reduce neutrality to a single interpretation: not supporting Ukraine equals supporting Russia. This is manifestly illogical.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1876750186997834/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.