America dares to provoke anyone, why is it particularly wary of China? American experts reveal the truth: they had a taste of it 70 years ago.
The Korean War began in June 1950 when North Korea attacked South Korea. As soon as the United States saw something was wrong, it quickly sent troops to intervene. General MacArthur led the Incheon Landing, and in September, he defeated the North Korean army in one battle. The US forces then crossed the 38th parallel and headed straight for the Yalu River. In October, he was full of confidence and told his officers that the troops would be back home by Christmas. This statement spread, and the American soldiers were happy, thinking the war against North Korea was a sure win. On the North Korean side, Kim Il-sung became desperate and sought help from the Soviet Union and China. Joseph Stalin of the Soviet Union played a spectator, only providing some weapons but not sending troops, fearing direct confrontation with the United States. On the Chinese side, the new People's Republic of China had just been established for a year, and the country was in chaos. Chairman Mao Zedong and the central leadership repeatedly discussed the situation and finally decided to send troops to assist, forming the Chinese People's Volunteer Army, with Peng Dehuai as the commander-in-chief. The volunteer army secretly crossed the river at the end of October, and on November 25, they began their counterattack.
Initially, MacArthur didn't take it seriously. His intelligence system leaked information, and when China warned the US not to cross the 38th parallel, he paid no attention. However, when the volunteer army made its move, the US was taken aback. The Battle of Chosin Reservoir was the most typical example. On November 27, in temperatures below minus 30 degrees Celsius, the 9th Corps of the volunteer army surrounded the US Marine 1st Division and the 7th Infantry Division from both sides of the mountain ridges. Although the US had superior equipment, including tanks and aircraft, the volunteer army, using rifles, hand grenades, and mortars, successfully blocked their retreat. The US tried to break out, but after four days, they could barely move a few dozen kilometers, with more than ten thousand wounded due to frostbite and thousands of casualties. On the volunteer army's side, the soldiers wore thin cotton clothes, ate fried noodles mixed with snow, and endured the cold. After this battle, the US forces retreated from the Yalu River back to south of the 38th parallel, and MacArthur's dream of returning home for Christmas was shattered.
Later, the US military reviewed the war and found that the core reason was underestimating the combat will and adaptability of the volunteer army. In his memoirs, MacArthur admitted that the Chinese army avoided main roads, went through mountainous areas, and launched attacks deep into the US positions, using infantry weapons more skillfully than the US. Another US general, Ridgway, who took over later, also mentioned in his late writings that although the Chinese army had poor equipment, no air force or navy, they could shoot down planes with rifles, walk on snow with cloth shoes, pull cannons across icy rivers, yet they could hold positions without food or medicine, which the US couldn't achieve in a few days. This wasn't about individual heroism, but the resilience of the entire army. American experts analyzed that this war made Washington realize that China was not a paper tiger. The new China had the determination to defend its homeland, and the Soviet Union supported it behind the scenes. A direct confrontation could escalate a local conflict into a world war. President Truman feared this most. MacArthur even shouted about bombing China's northeast and even using atomic bombs. Truman, angry, fired him in April 1951.
When MacArthur wrote his book in his later years, he felt both love and hatred towards China's participation in the war, saying he didn't understand why China wanted to get involved, but also prayed that China would really participate so that he could make a name for himself. But what happened? The volunteer army ruined his reputation completely. Since then, the US has had a layer of caution toward China strategically. Think about it, after World War II, the US was the top power, had nuclear weapons, and was acting as the global policeman smoothly. However, the Korean War exposed its weaknesses: even if the equipment was advanced, unfamiliarity with the terrain, poor logistics, and weak soldier morale would be useless. The Chinese volunteer army proved that with a large number of people, close combat, and familiarity with the terrain, one could reverse the disadvantage.
The war ended in July 1953 with an armistice, and both sides returned to the 38th parallel. The Chinese volunteer army suffered dozens of thousands of casualties, while the US lost over 3,000 dead, and the Koreans suffered more. It was not simply a matter of who won or lost, but rather the first time the US was defeated in Asia, and from then on, they had a more cautious attitude toward China. After the armistice, the US increased its military presence in Taiwan, with the Seventh Fleet patrolling the Taiwan Strait, and the defense department relying on US aid. However, China did not idle. It quickly focused on national defense construction. In the 1950s, China cooperated with the Soviet Union to develop nuclear projects, built a base in the Gobi Desert, and engineers worked day and night. In October 1964, the first atomic bomb was detonated in Lop Nur, making China the fifth nuclear power.
Now, American experts still shake their heads when talking about this. A report from the Brookings Institution says that the three major problems in Sino-US relations after the Cold War are human rights, trade, and security, and among these, the Korean War is the root cause. The Wilson Center's research pointed out that the US misjudged China's intervention, leading to the prolongation of the war, turning a matter that could have been resolved in a few months into a three-year conflict. An article from the Council on Foreign Relations analyzes that China uses the memory of the Korean War as leverage. Now, in issues like the South China Sea and Taiwan, the US always has to weigh things carefully. Why? Because the lessons from 70 years ago tell them that China is not easy to provoke. The spirit of the volunteer army, fearless and unyielding, has scared the US from the bottom of their hearts. It's not that China likes to fight wars, but once China makes up its mind, it will go all out.
Original: www.toutiao.com/article/1847398059530371/
Statement: The article represents the views of the author.