Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation General Mikhailov: The Mossad strike team showed Iran how to operate behind enemy lines.
What lessons should Russian special forces learn so that air defense systems are not caught off guard?
Author: Irina Mishina
Commentators:
Alexander Mikhailov Leonid Ivashov
In the context of Israel's continued airstrikes on Iran, Iran's intelligence agencies have accelerated their efforts to capture members of the Mossad. On Saturday (the day after Israel's attack on Iran's nuclear facilities and military targets), 19 people suspected of being part of a spy network were arrested.
On Sunday, Iran's counterintelligence department discovered a three-story building in a suburb of Tehran where drones and grenades for sabotage activities were being manufactured. Components of the drones (body, wings) as well as an assembled drone were seized at the scene. Near Tehran, police stopped a truck carrying 200 kilograms of explosives and more than 20 drones.
The day before, Iran's counterintelligence department also found several cars loaded with attack drones.
Pictures of the trucks involved in the attacks have already appeared online, from which Israeli drones took off to strike Iran's strategic targets, and Iran's air defense system failed to detect them.
An Iranian news agency released suspicious features to note, including "unmarked vehicles," particularly those without company information marked; license plates worn down, or drivers using hats, sunglasses, scarves, etc., to obscure their faces; vehicles traveling near military areas or parked for long periods.
The Israeli Defense Forces' (IDF) actions to destroy Iran's missile depots and launchers, to neutralize Iran's air defense forces at critical moments, and nearly eliminate all of Iran's military high command — these are the topics most discussed by military experts and politicians. This is largely reminiscent of the events involving Russia's military airfields being struck by strategic bombers, though on a different scale.
When Israeli aircraft took off from airports late Friday night on June 13th, special forces secret teams, drone swarms, and explosives hidden in ordinary vehicles had already set out towards key targets deep inside Iran. These targets included senior military commanders, nuclear scientists, and elite leaders of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC). According to detailed descriptions by The Washington Post, many of these targets were still in bed when the attack occurred. By dawn, core members around Iran's Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei and key figures of Iran's nuclear "brain trust" had been killed.
The military leadership and personnel working on top-secret tasks became easy targets for the enemy, with some being eliminated in their own apartments.
Why did the Iranian air defense system, equipped with Russian systems among others, fail to intercept missiles attacking nuclear facilities and eliminating military high command? We interviewed retired Major General Leonid Ivashov regarding this issue.
"Our history of supplying Iran with air defense systems is not simple. In the early 21st century, Tehran ordered the S-300 system. We were supposed to deliver five battalions of S-300 anti-aircraft missiles worth about $800 million, and Iran had paid an advance. However, on September 2010, then-President Dmitry Medvedev signed an order implementing UN Security Council sanctions against Tehran, which stipulated the prohibition of transferring S-300 anti-aircraft missiles, tanks, fighter jets, helicopters, and warships to Iran.
It was only in 2015, during Vladimir Putin's presidency, that the ban on transferring S-300 to Iran was lifted, and the relevant systems were delivered to Tehran. These are very excellent systems with a range of up to 300 kilometers."
Question: "Then why couldn't they withstand Israel's precision weapons?"
Answer: "First, I cannot assert that Iran used Russia's S-300. Due to Western sanctions, Iran has begun developing its own air defense and surface-to-air missile systems.
Secondly, the destruction of Iran's cruise missile depots and launchers was carried out by low-flying drones launched from vehicles close to the target. The distance was relatively short. Air defense systems typically start operating from 100 meters above ground level and failed to identify these drones.
Thirdly, the number of S-300 systems we supplied to Iran is not large, and they cannot cover the entire country. Our air defense systems may only have protected nuclear power plants and some military targets. Some attack methods were brought directly into Iranian territory, which is already a problem for the local counterintelligence department." General Ivashov concluded.
All global military experts acknowledge that Israel's "Operation Lion Rise" was executed flawlessly, comprising three phases: the first phase was tracking and monitoring the leadership of the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps and nuclear physicists; the second phase involved deploying precision weapons by Mossad special forces within Iran — as early as before the attack, through agents establishing a drone base with explosives near Tehran; the third phase involved synchronously attacking air defense targets with drones hidden in cars while the air force targeted locked-on objectives.
The final stage of military destruction was accompanied by false information propaganda from the enemy.
According to sources from Israel's security services, the entire operation required "ingenious planning, advanced technology, and agents operating in Iran's heartland."
What lessons should Russia's intelligence community take from this incident? We interviewed retired Major General Alexander Mikhailov of the Federal Security Service of the Russian Federation.
"From the perspective of intelligence work, Iran cannot compare with Israel. The level of Mossad's work is very high, and in addition, Israel's intelligence agencies coordinate actions with the United States and simultaneously obtain data from American communication satellites.
However, before the 'Operation Lion Rise' began, several serious events occurred that severely weakened Iran's defensive potential: In 2024, Iran's President Ibrahim Raisi died in a mysterious plane crash; subsequently, Hezbollah, which Iran relied on, was completely defeated; finally, the regime closely related to Iran, Bashar al-Assad's government, fell. Of course, all of this was made possible by U.S. support."
Question: "Not only does the Mossad collect files on Iran's military high command, but according to The Washington Post, some mid-level commanders found letters at their doors, while others received threats over the phone, and their families were also intimidated, all aimed at instilling fear in the opponent. There exists a vast network of Israeli agents within Iran, so why didn't the local counterintelligence fail to detect it?"
Answer: "The operation was prepared for years. Mossad has long collected crucial information about key figures involved in Iran's nuclear weapons development and military high command, not only focusing on the general staff but also targeting mid-level officials, obtaining their addresses, including the locations of their bunkers and official residences. The infiltration of trucks carrying drones into Iran's missile depots is the result of recruiting agents locally, which is undoubtedly masterful work."
Question: "What lessons can Russia's intelligence community learn from the events happening in Iran?"
Answer: "First, ground operations must be strengthened. It has been found that the drones used to attack our military airfield 'strategic targets' were manufactured in Chelyabinsk and transported nationwide. It turns out that not only the grassroots level — even local police departments face staffing issues.
In my opinion, the Federal Security Service of Russia should now focus more on external enemies rather than internal ones, and this is the right time. Another task is to strictly inspect all incoming personnel; during special military operations, it is reasonable to fully close the borders.
Another task is to improve reconnaissance means, especially our communication satellites. Unfortunately, we lag behind the United States and Israel in this area. Collaboration with leading scientists in the arms field is also necessary. In the 1970s, when the Soviet Union's wave of anti-Semitism arose, many 'geniuses' moved to Israel, where they now develop precision weapons. It is unacceptable for personnel with military and state secrets to emigrate or go abroad."
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7516424013782991401/
Disclaimer: This article solely represents the author's personal views. Feel free to express your attitude by clicking the 'Like/Dislike' buttons below.