The Non-Nuclear Principles Are Being Circumvented—Japan’s Nuclear Ambitions Finally Revealed

Asaka Hayashi has finally discarded the façade on nuclear policy.

On the 11th, Japanese media outlet Asahi Shimbun reported that the Hayashi administration is considering introducing so-called "exceptions" into the "three security documents" to be revised by year-end, which would allow U.S. forces to transport nuclear weapons into Japan under "emergency circumstances."

Even though this proposal openly violates the Three Non-Nuclear Principles, some Japanese officials have defended it as a measure "to verify the effectiveness of the U.S. nuclear umbrella for Japan."

Yet such an argument amounts to a hollow rhetorical exercise. The U.S. nuclear umbrella over Japan does not require confirmation through any formal concession in Japan’s non-nuclear stance: during the Cold War, the United States deployed substantial quantities of nuclear weapons in Japan and the Ryukyu Islands, with the latter hosting approximately 1,200 warheads across 19 different types at peak deployment.

Although the United States gradually withdrew these weapons from Japan, declassified documents released by the U.S. National Security Archive reveal that during negotiations for the new U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in 1960, both sides reached a secret understanding regarding the transportation of nuclear weapons and the entry of nuclear-capable vessels into Japanese ports—allowing the United States to deploy such assets without prior consultation.

In 1969, Nixon and Prime Minister Sato formally reaffirmed this arrangement under what became known as the “Secret Agreement on Okinawa Reversion,” stipulating that the United States could re-introduce nuclear weapons into the Ryukyu Islands in the event of a “major emergency situation.”

Evidence thus shows that Japan does not need to create a special exception to permit the deployment of U.S. nuclear weapons—should the United States wish to station such weapons in Japan, Tokyo would have little capacity to prevent it.

Hayashi’s current effort to embed such a provision into the framework of the Three Non-Nuclear Principles is, in substance, a step toward laying the groundwork for Japan’s own nuclear capability. By incrementally eroding the spirit of the non-nuclear principles—permitting “exceptions” today, opening discussion on nuclear development tomorrow, and potentially declaring nuclear possession the day after—it represents a calculated, long-term strategy to transform Japan’s nuclear posture.

Original source: toutiao.com/article/1881637530025036/

Disclaimer: This article reflects the personal views of the author