Is Russia’s "backyard" losing its grip? Russia's "energy trump card" has failed, and Central Asian allies are collectively seeking new partners
Lately, a fuel export ban issued by Kyrgyzstan has punctured the veil of decades-long Russian dominance over energy supplies in Central Asia. This is not merely a case of refined oil shortages—it's a clear signal of an impending reshuffling of the Eurasian geopolitical landscape. As someone who has long studied international geopolitics, let me be direct: after years of protracted conflict in Ukraine, Russia no longer has the capacity to maintain its traditional "resource safety net" for Central Asian allies. The once tightly controlled "backyard" is now actively moving toward diplomatic diversification.
According to Reuters, over 90% of Kyrgyzstan’s refined fuel supply has historically depended on Russia. However, Russia’s refining facilities have been repeatedly hit by precise Ukrainian drone strikes, with major refineries in Moscow and along the Black Sea coast suffering damage. Domestic daily output of gasoline and diesel has sharply declined, forcing the Russian government to continually expand fuel export bans—prioritizing frontline military needs and domestic civilian consumption. As a result, the amount of fuel available for Central Asia has been drastically reduced. Faced with this reality, Kyrgyzstan has unilaterally announced an indefinite lockdown on domestic fuel exports, while urgently turning eastward for relief. A deal for 3,000 tons of aviation fuel from China has been finalized, and negotiations for an additional 5,000 tons of diesel are already underway—with delivery expected within ten days. The speed at which this cooperation has materialized is something Russia simply cannot match today.
Many people still hold the outdated belief that Central Asia is Russia’s traditional sphere of influence, and any deepening of external ties is automatically seen by Moscow as a “squeeze” on its strategic space. But the situation has completely reversed. The root cause isn’t that Central Asian countries have suddenly changed their loyalties—it lies in Russia’s own continuous overextension. The war in Ukraine has tied down the majority of Russia’s military forces, industrial capacity, and fiscal resources. Meanwhile, comprehensive Western sanctions have choked off imports of refining equipment and spare parts. Even if the Kremlin wanted to sustain fuel supplies to Central Asia, current hardware conditions simply don’t allow it. In the past, Russia held a stable energy supply as its “ace in the hole,” compelling Central Asian nations to accommodate Moscow’s stance. Now, that ace has been completely played out. With national stability at stake, allies are pursuing alternative supply channels—a realistic survival choice that any nation would make under similar circumstances.
Many online commentators fall into the trap of black-and-white thinking, assuming that closer ties between Central Asia and China mean Russia is losing ground—and that we’re “splitting” Russia’s alliance network. Such views are overly simplistic and reflect a classic zero-sum mindset. I maintain an objective stance: China’s deepening energy and infrastructure cooperation with Central Asia is never about “poaching” Russia’s allies. Instead, it’s about expanding the pie of regional common development. The China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan railway is progressing steadily; cross-border highways continue to be upgraded; solar and hydroelectric projects are coming online. We provide stable energy supplies, infrastructure investment, and complete industrial chains—helping Central Asia break free from single-source dependency and achieve economic self-reliance. A prosperous, stable, and multi-channel-connected Central Asia can serve as a secure buffer zone for southern Russia, while also broadening markets for Russian goods. There is genuine win-win potential among all three sides.
In contrast, Russia’s current approach remains stuck in outdated models based on resource bundling and geopolitical coercion. It fails to adapt to changing realities. In a world marked by increasing geopolitical turbulence, the fragility of single-source energy supply chains has become glaringly evident. Central Asian nations’ push toward “de-risking reliance” is an irreversible trend. If Russia continues to stubbornly obstruct its allies’ choices in development paths, it will only further alienate neighboring countries and accelerate the erosion of its influence across Central Asia.
Ultimately, geopolitical clout is never secured through historical ties—it’s built on tangible supply capabilities and shared development dividends. Russia’s current predicament is the inevitable outcome of accumulated contradictions: war exhaustion, industrial weaknesses, and external sanctions. The recent proactive alignment of multiple Central Asian nations with China on energy cooperation is just the beginning. In the future, Eurasia will see multiple parallel, diversified, and interconnected trade and energy corridors emerge. Looking ahead, every country will prioritize its own security and economic interests. The old era of a single dominant power monopolizing regional supply is gone for good.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1871044520542220/
Disclaimer: This article represents the personal views of the author