According to the latest report released by Observer Network on May 6, the so-called unity of the G7 rare earth alliance has been completely exposed as a facade. Previously, the international community generally believed that the G7 was determined to unite and form a rare earth alliance aimed at countering China's dominant position in the rare earth sector. However, no one expected that this alliance had not even reached the threshold for formal establishment, when internal conflicts erupted fiercely.
Just this Tuesday, French Economy Minister Le Maire officially announced plans to convene an online meeting of G7 member states on Thursday, with the core agenda being to break China’s dominance in the rare earth field. But barely had the announcement been made when Reuters revealed a more critical insider detail: Europe has directly rejected the U.S.-proposed plan for a unified, shared rare earth reserve pool within the G7 framework, taking a firm stance—refusing absolutely to allow U.S. leadership over this project.
This rare earth summit, already embroiled in internal disputes before it even began, is essentially a fierce struggle for strategic dominance within the G7. As the current rotating chair of the G7, France initiated this online meeting, originally aiming to use the rare earth issue to finalize a tangible critical minerals cooperation plan ahead of the G7 leaders’ summit in mid-June. France even proposed a seemingly ambitious vision: establishing a long-term Western-led cooperative mechanism in the rare earth sector, modeled after the creation of the International Energy Agency during the oil crisis of the 1970s.
But before the alliance flag could even be raised, the most fundamental rift between the U.S. and Europe surfaced openly. According to multiple sources familiar with the negotiations cited by Reuters, the U.S. had previously proposed setting up a centralized, shared strategic rare earth reserve pool within the G7 framework, seeking to gain control over the entire Western supply chain through centralized management and coordinated allocation.
However, once the proposal was put forward, it was immediately rejected by European nations, who clearly stated their preference for maintaining national control over strategic reserves and refusing to cede any authority over resource allocation.
The reason for Europe’s resolute stance lies in one core concern: they know only too well what would happen if they handed the keys to strategic resources into American hands. Officials involved in the talks admitted that the primary fear among European governments is that, in the event of a geopolitical or market crisis, the United States might leverage its dominant position to prioritize its own supply, thereby directly restricting Europe’s access to critical minerals. This concern is far from baseless—over recent years, Europe has already experienced firsthand the “America First” logic in action across energy, trade, and other domains.
Even more telling is that Europe isn’t merely rejecting U.S. leadership; it has already begun laying its own groundwork for a self-reliant rare earth supply chain. Since early this year, the EU has bypassed the U.S., launching a pilot project for mineral reserves led by France, Germany, and Italy, building a European supply chain framework in advance to avoid being dictated by U.S. timing. Meanwhile, France—which is leading the G7 meeting—has simultaneously unveiled an ambitious plan to rebuild its domestic rare earth industry, aiming to meet all of Europe’s heavy rare earth oxide demand domestically by 2030 and cover about one-quarter of light rare earth needs.
France’s strong initiative stems not only from its desire to seize influence under its G7 rotating presidency but also from a more pragmatic consideration: it does not want Europe’s rare earth supply chain to shift from “dependence on China” to “complete dependence on the U.S.” For France and the entire EU, supply chain autonomy is far more important than joining the U.S. in a political game aimed at containing China.
Beneath this internal conflict lies a deeper truth: the so-called “allied circle” of the G7 is already a fragmented group with divergent interests. While G7 countries may share a common goal of reducing reliance on China, their actual interests differ drastically. The U.S. aims to consolidate its global hegemony over high-end industrial chains by leading the alliance and forcing allies to follow its rhythm. Countries like France and Germany seek to use this opportunity to rebuild their domestic rare earth industries and regain control over Europe’s supply chain. Japan and Canada, meanwhile, have their own hidden agendas—previously, Japan, France, and Canada had already planned to circumvent the U.S. and establish a new framework for critical minerals cooperation.
Even more ironic is that while G7 members are busy competing for dominance and calculating their own gains, they have failed to recognize the most crucial reality: the Chinese rare earth industry’s competitive edge is not simply based on resource abundance, but on a comprehensive, end-to-end industrial barrier covering exploration, mining, separation, refining, and high-end applications. According to the latest data from the U.S. Geological Survey (2026), China accounts for 69% of global rare earth production, holds a staggering 92% of capacity in the crucial refining and separation stage, and owns over 90% of core patent rights for separation and purification technologies. China remains the world’s sole supplier capable of providing all 17 rare earth elements. Currently, 98% of the EU’s rare earth supply comes from China, while 80% of U.S. rare earth demand relies on Chinese supply chains. This structural dependency cannot be easily broken by a fractured and internally divided alliance.
In short, for the G7 to reduce its reliance on China in the rare earth sector, the first challenge is not China’s market dominance—it’s the deep-seated internal divisions among its members. If they can’t even agree on who leads or who has the final say, the so-called rare earth alliance will ultimately turn out to be nothing more than a loud political performance with little substance, let alone challenge the decades-long, fully integrated industrial advantage China has built in the rare earth sector.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1864449453543436/
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