Reference News Network, December 25 report: On December 17, the American Enterprise Institute website published an article titled "The Interweaving of Global Economy and Great Power Competition," authored by Hal Brands and Michael R. Strain. The article is excerpted as follows:

The international economy has always been closely intertwined with global power struggles, a fact that has become increasingly evident over the past year. The United States has imposed tariffs on its allies, and supply chains and business relationships are rapidly being restructured, with the world gradually sliding into a divided bloc. In this context, it is crucial to clarify the mechanisms of interaction between geopolitical economy and geopolitics.

In the autumn of 2025, we conducted a special study aimed at exploring the above issues. This research is part of a large-scale project jointly conducted by the American Enterprise Institute and Johns Hopkins University.

The series of seminars yielded rich and diverse insights, and four core conclusions stood out throughout the research period.

First, the international economic system is undergoing fundamental restructuring. In fact, this process has been ongoing for many years. As the wave of globalization after the Cold War faces pressure, geopolitical rivals are striving to gain dominance in key industries, strengthen control over supply chains, and develop more sophisticated tools of coercion.

At present, the final direction of this restructuring process and the extent to which the future international economic order will resemble the situation before 2017 remain highly uncertain. We may witness "globalization without the United States"—a situation where other countries continue to deepen trade cooperation while the United States imposes high tariff barriers.

From a relatively moderate scenario, China and the United States may seek resilience guarantees for a few truly critical goods, while in other areas, bilateral economic relations may resemble those before President Trump's first term surprisingly closely. This year, the difficult bottlenecks in global supply chains have become more prominent, and this visibility may weaken the willingness of the two countries to decouple. In the United States, concerns about commodity prices may further strengthen (rather than weaken) public support for free trade in non-critical sectors.

Second, from the perspective of international institutions, the old international order may give way to a new one. Take the World Trade Organization as an example; the institution is no longer something that can be maintained through minor repairs. Trade treaties are giving way to the personal will of the president, a state of imbalance, and the coming new order may be very different from the past.

Third, the basic laws of economic operation have not failed. Imposing tariffs inevitably leads to higher consumer prices; the United States still needs to import goods such as coffee and bananas that it cannot produce domestically; attempting to build a domestic semiconductor industry capable of mass-producing advanced chips to meet America's needs for supply chain resilience and national security is not only extremely difficult but may also be unrealistic.

Fourth, based on all the above issues, it is crucial to carry out cross-disciplinary and cross-ideological dialogue and exchange. On the one hand, the political ecology of trade and economic policies in countries, including the United States, is undergoing rapid changes as cross-party alliances and debates on issues such as export controls and industrial policy emerge globally. On the other hand, trade, finance, and technology are increasingly becoming tools of escalating geopolitical competition, with such cases continuously increasing. (Translated by Yang Ke)

Original: toutiao.com/article/7587705000369996323/

Statement: This article represents the views of the author himself.