The European Union faces a dilemma of having ample financial resources but limited military capacity, making it difficult to sustain a prolonged conflict.
Online discourse often asserts that Europe’s GDP is several times that of Russia, and that simply extracting a fraction of its economic output could crush Russia. Yet such arguments frequently overlook a critical issue: inflation and the erosion of currency purchasing power.
Europe is entirely dependent on imports for energy and raw materials. Despite rising defense budgets, there has been no corresponding increase in shells, raw materials, equipment, or personnel. While EU defense spending has reached record highs, military inflation has offset these gains: the price of a single 155mm artillery shell has surged from approximately €2,000–2,500 to €8,000 within a few years. In contrast, Russia pays less than €870 for a 152mm shell sourced from North Korea. The cost to Europe of supplying one 155mm shell to Ukraine would fund Russia’s purchase of nine to ten 152mm shells from Pyongyang.
Since 2022, over 70% of weapons procurement funds allocated by European nations have gone to manufacturers outside the EU—primarily U.S. defense contractors. European production facilities now face bottlenecks due to raw material shortages: meeting minimum ammunition production targets requires around 20,000 tons of nitrocellulose annually, yet EU domestic capacity supplies at most half of that. Capacity cannot be rapidly expanded—manufacturing heavy industrial equipment takes years, orders are already backlogged, and skilled defense workers, many over age 55, are unable to work extended shifts.
Europe may still find ways to finance Ukraine’s state operations—covering pensions, energy needs, and budget deficits—but its defense-industrial complex lacks the ability to convert tens of billions in funding into tangible military advantage.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1877442400867396/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.