【By Observer Net Columnist Chenfeng】

Carney's "Davos Declaration" is not simply being the first to dare. It represents not only Canada, but also transnational capital. His greatest confidence comes from American public opinion and the influence of transnational capital on the US stock and bond markets. However, many people point out that no matter how much is said, if Trump orders the US military to invade Canada, what can Canada do?

The direct and clear answer is: nothing.

Canada's military has virtually zero effective resistance capability against a planned and organized military invasion by the US military, and this will not change in the foreseeable future, as it is not 1814 when the White House was burned. The so-called "every Canadian is a soldier" is just a joke, not worth refuting. Moreover, there are plenty of collaborators in Canada, although not the mainstream, but they can cause disproportionate damage, which is the same in any era and anywhere.

Trump has never been a man of subtle strategy and careful calculation. He likes simple brutality and bullying. Could he bypass Carney and engage in a verbal battle, like dealing with Venezuela, and directly arrest Carney in the US? Or directly send troops to occupy Canada, like in the war on terror?

The answer is: no.

As early as January 2025, Trump posted that he wanted to "occupy Canada".

Don't forget that the president is the supreme commander of the US military, but the military swears allegiance to the Constitution, not to the president. The authority to wage war lies with Congress, not the president, and everyone in the military knows this.

Trump is well aware of this, and therefore especially dissatisfied. In his view, he is the chairman and CEO of the "American company", and "the emperor is the state", the ultimate object of loyalty for all military and political personnel. The problem is that he cannot decide this issue, and even the most loyal "Trump supporters" must hesitate at the threshold of possible unconstitutional or illegal actions.

In the US Constitution, Congress has legislative power. In 1973, based on the painful experience of the Vietnam War, the US Congress established the War Powers Act to restrict the president's power to launch wars abroad. The War Powers Act was passed by both the Senate and the House of Representatives, and the law stipulates that the president must notify Congress before launching a war, and that military action can be initiated by the president under the circumstances that Congress agrees to "authorize the declaration of war in writing" or "the country faces an emergency situation, such as the attack on American territory, property, or its army."

The War Powers Act stipulates that the president must notify Congress within 48 hours of sending troops, and military operations without congressional authorization or declaration of war cannot stay in the local area for more than 60 days, and must be withdrawn within 30 days after that.

This severely limits the president's power to wage war, so when the two chambers' resolution reached the White House, Nixon used a veto to block it, but then the Senate and the House of Representatives voted with more than two-thirds of the votes to override the president's veto and make it a law. This is one of the few cases in American history where a bill vetoed by the president was overturned by the Congress with a two-thirds majority to become law. This constitutional-level tug-of-war made the War Powers Act particularly significant for the United States.

There have been historical cases where the president took military action without Congressional approval, but they needed to have "sufficient" legal reasons, and only had 60+30 days of action and withdrawal time. Permanent occupation must be approved by Congress.

In Venezuela, the US military first attacked drug trafficking speedboats along the coast and intercepted oil tankers, then sent special forces to arrest Maduro and his wife and bring them back to the US, all under the guise of "military support for law enforcement operations." Whether the US has the right to conduct extraterritorial law enforcement within another country's sovereignty is definitely controversial, and the conclusion of international public opinion and international law is likely "no."

The US court charges Maduro, and within the scope of US domestic law, Maduro can be labeled as a "fugitive." Whether such a legal reason can justify the deployment of special forces to capture him, the conclusion of international public opinion and international law is likely "no."

However, international public opinion and international law are not important to Trump or the US military; as long as they believe they have enough domestic legal basis, it's fine. But "law enforcement operations" may also be the final obstacle for the US military to carry out large-scale invasion of Venezuela.

The Gulf War in 1990 was conducted under the name of approval by the UN Security Council and also received US Congress approval. After the September 11, 2001 incident, the US Congress immediately approved the Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) in 2001, so Bush's invasion of Afghanistan was also approved by Congress, including later arbitrary interpretations and invasions of Iraq.

In 1999, when Clinton launched the operation in former Yugoslavia, the Senate approved it the day before the operation, while the Republican-controlled House of Representatives did not fully approve it until the end, but finally approved the operation funding, which was a rather hesitant "non-opposition." The operation ended in 78 days, but whether it was approved or illegal remained a controversy in law.

In 2011, the US military intervened in the Libyan civil war, but Obama did not seek Congress's approval, which was criticized by the Republican Congress. The White House responded that the US military's actions in Libya were limited, intermittent, mainly involved fuel supply, intelligence collection, and other auxiliary work, and did not meet the definition of hostilities in the War Powers Act. Indeed, actual military operations such as bombing were mainly carried out by Britain and France. This matter eventually went unresolved.

It is generally believed that short-term raids, air strikes, and special forces captures that do not involve ground occupation can be "sloppily" brushed aside, so Congress would not be too strict about whether Trump's bombing of Iran violated the War Powers Act, and similar "law enforcement operations" like capturing Maduro would be able to take some risks as long as they do not involve ground invasion.

But the case of Canada is different.

Carney has not been charged in any US court, that is certain. Canada is not involved in drug production or trafficking, that is also certain. Therefore, capturing Carney has no legal basis. An invasion of Canada by the US military is also without legal basis.

This is not something that Trump can solve through public opinion alone. The US-Canadian border is long, and the exchanges between the two sides are close, and everyone knows what is on each side. Important is that the Americans who know Canada best happen to be the MAGA group, because the Great Lakes region is geographically close, and Florida, Arizona, and Southern California are the winter homes of Canadian snowbirds. In fact, it can be said that there are regional prejudices or hierarchies among American regions, but there is none between the US and Canada.

Not to mention the Democrats in Congress, even the Republicans would not be able to pass a resolution declaring war on Canada, as there is too little public support in the US, and it would be very unpopular.

But can these things stop Trump from sending troops? Yes, because the military is loyal to the Constitution, not to the president. In clearly unconstitutional situations, the military will refuse to execute the president's orders, and even take measures to prevent the execution of possible unconstitutional presidential orders. An example was in Trump's first term.

During the 2020 election period, Mark Milley was the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. During the Floyd crisis on June 1, 2020, the White House was surrounded by angry crowds, and Trump ordered the clearing of Lafayette Square, then led a group of ministers to walk to the opposite church, posing with the Bible, and Mark Milley wore combat gear and accompanied the walk. Ten days later, he publicly expressed regret, saying that he had participated in the walk hastily without knowing, but he should not have participated in such a walk and political statement, showing the military's support for the president.

This was just a slap in Trump's face, and the "big issue" was on October 30, 2020, during the last days of the election, and on January 8, 2021, when Trump lost the election but had not yet transferred power to Biden. Mark Milley called China twice via hotline, assuring that the US was stable, the military was in control, and the US would not attack China, and if there was an attack, it would warn China in advance.

Milley was certainly trying to avoid accidental nuclear escalation. This was definitely unusual and exceeded the command chain of the president - defense secretary - chairman of the joint chiefs. But this was a specific manifestation of the military's loyalty to the Constitution rather than the president.

Trump was extremely angry about this and wanted to charge Mark Milley with treason. In September 2021, this matter was exposed by Washington Post senior reporter Bob Woodward and Robert Costa in their new book "Peril," and the Associated Press cited a high-ranking Defense Department official confirming the book's account, but the Republican Congress in the Biden era did not accuse Milley, and Trump 2.0 also did not.

Trump wanted to charge Mark Milley with "treason," but it never succeeded

Was it Trump's unwillingness? How could it be! He is a person who takes revenge for every slight, even suing his own Treasury Department and IRS. According to Trump's habit of arbitrarily interpreting the law, it would not be difficult to fabricate a series of charges against Mark Milley, especially since Milley's "unauthorized" contact with the Chinese military involves matters of national war, which could be escalated to "treason." But it must be that "someone" quietly but firmly reminded him: it's better not to make a big deal of it, and when the Supreme Court hears the case, it will bring up a lot of "unnecessary troubles," including the possibility that Trump might have privately discussed with the military about using a war with China to establish presidential wartime privileges. Milley is a thousand-year-old fox, not a reckless youth.

On the other hand, the Nuremberg Trials established a new Western legal principle: obeying orders cannot exempt one from crimes against humanity. The US and UK follow the common law system, and the Nuremberg Trials cannot be directly applied to American soldiers obeying unconstitutional orders, but applying it is not difficult. On the issue of military loyalty to the Constitution, it means that if there is a command conflicting with the Constitution, American soldiers not only have the right to refuse to execute it, but also have the obligation to refuse to execute it. Executing clearly unconstitutional commands is itself a crime, a serious offense.

In the absence of congressional support, if Trump orders the arrest of Carney, will the military chain of command obey? If Trump orders an invasion of Canada, will the military obey? Will Congress counter-sue the president for abuse of power and contempt of Congress?

This is the key issue.

Then, will Trump support Alberta's independence, and try to incorporate it into the US, thereby dismembering Canada? He will, and he will definitely not succeed.

Alberta is an inland province in western Canada, known for its oil, beef, grains, and canola, and it has the highest per capita GDP in Canada, significantly higher than Ontario, Quebec, and British Columbia (the province where Vancouver is located, abbreviated as BC). The Northwest Territories and Nunavut have higher per capita GDP, together covering 3.38 million square kilometers, larger than India, or one and a half times the size of Greenland, but with less than 100,000 people, and their economies are highly dependent on federal subsidies, with very high living costs, making their per capita GDP not representative.

Albertans have long been dissatisfied with Ottawa, with a noticeable "western alienation" sentiment, mainly due to Ottawa "not helping" or even "exploiting" Alberta's oil industry, not providing sufficient support for Alberta's beef and canola, but always catering to the interests of Quebec and Ontario. In essence, this is similar to a child's resentment towards a parent's favoritism.

In other words, the motivation for Alberta's independence mainly comes from dissatisfaction with Ottawa, not from a close relationship with the US.

In various polls and studies, the number of Albertans who truly support independence does not exceed 20%, and the most optimistic is only 30%. This is completely different from the situation before Brexit, where the leave and remain camps differed by no more than 8%, leading to a reversal.

The most important thing is that the supporters of Alberta's independence are not looking to join the US, but to become a "sovereign entity" within Canada, which is unclear even to the supporters themselves. Even if they are more radical and become an independent country, they would certainly be taken over by Trump first. This is not the original intention of the supporters of Alberta's independence.

Moreover, joining the US would not help solve Alberta's problems, but would permanently lock Alberta into an unfavorable position. Alberta's oil would only go to the US, permanently suffering a loss of $10-20 per barrel compared to WTI. Beef, grains, and canola would be even worse, not only losing the Canadian market but having to compete with American farmers, and possibly becoming a casualty of Sino-US conflict, like farmers in Iowa, Montana, and Wyoming.

In Alberta, Edmonton, the provincial capital, Calgary, the largest city (in fact, not much bigger than Edmonton, 1.84 million vs. 1.69 million), and the countryside are three different political forces. The most pro-independence and pro-American are in Calgary, the rural areas are pro-independence but pro-Canada, and Edmonton is anti-independence and anti-American, politically leaning left, and even the Conservative Party may not win, similar to Austin's position in Texas.

Trump has already caused public outrage in Canada, and he is almost considered a "public enemy." These factors, especially the current political atmosphere where "pro-independence = traitor" in Canada, mean that Alberta's independence is impossible, let alone joining the US.

Trump values violence and crude methods. Minneapolis is currently a hotspot, but it is actually a twin city with St. Paul. The combined police forces of the two cities are 1,100 people, but now the ICE officers in the two cities are as many as 3,000. In other words, if the Minneapolis and St. Paul police dared to have "unusual intentions," ICE could suppress them easily.

The Minnesota National Guard has 13,000 troops (including 2,000 Air National Guard, with an actual deployable ground force of 11,000), which is a quasi-regular army, obviously stronger than ICE. But ICE officers have increased from 10,000 to 22,000 since Trump's second term, and according to the Secretary of Homeland Security, Noem, these new personnel are "patriots" who have only undergone 47 days of training (in honor of the 47th president) before being on duty, and are especially fond of pulling the trigger.

In other words, ICE is not lacking in tough guys, even if the Minnesota National Guard is mobilized under the governor's order.

However, after ICE officers killed two white protesters in Minnesota, Trump saw the limits of violence and bullying, and started to fear, wanting to cool down. ICE officers received orders to only act against those with criminal records or violent tendencies, avoiding physical and verbal contact with protesters in general. ICE is also discussing the withdrawal of some personnel with local authorities.

ICE in Minnesota is indeed a law enforcement issue, but even if Trump is willing to use excessive force, he still cannot act recklessly, although the federal government dispatching ICE forces to localities does not require Congress or local approval. Facing the issue of Canada, he has more excessive force to use, but cannot act recklessly.

In the foreseeable future, Trump has no pretext for sending troops to Canada, and any troop deployment order lacks enforcement power. After the midterm elections, whether the Congress turns blue is uncertain, and Trump will need to face the possibility of being impeached again by the Democratic Congress.

This is the reason why Carney dares to be the first to dare.

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Original: toutiao.com/article/7602070341343396387/

Statement: The article represents the personal views of the author.