【Text by General Eugene, Observer Columnist】

Since the first decade of the 21st century, Turkey, which was originally almost entirely a net importer of arms, suddenly made a breakthrough, and its military equipment R&D and production capabilities rapidly improved, even surpassing some European countries in certain fields. For example, in recent years, Turkish drones, various types of aerial munitions, and pods have been widely exported to countries around the world. Therefore, Turkey was once regarded by many media as an emerging military technology and export power, along with South Korea, located at the two ends of Asia. Some media even use Turkey to belittle other countries that have long adhered to independent development of their military industry, such as China.

In July 2025, Turkish Prime Minister Erdogan made bold statements, vowing to develop its own medium-range and medium-to-long-range ballistic missile systems, similar to Iran, and setting the next stage of its defense industry development goals as "to build a defense capability that no one dares to challenge," while requiring "to raise the inventory of key weapons to a level with deterrent effect." It seemed to indicate an intention to break free from the constraints of NATO and dominate on its own. Its propaganda agencies also went all out, claiming that Turkey has already mastered hypersonic missiles and is about to mass-produce them for the armed forces.

However, it should be noted that, in order to meet the demands of nationalists, Turkish media and propaganda institutions have long been accustomed to exaggerating. Although Turkey has always portrayed itself as "the strongest after the Five Great Powers," its actual strength has always remained at the level of a medium-sized country. Even though it has developed its military industry during the strategic opportunities of multiple wars since the 21st century, it is still only at the 11th level in the world, and its real strength is far inferior to other countries that have long focused on military equipment and industrial development.

So let's take a look: despite its rapid development, Turkey can only be called a military industry system that is golden on the outside but hollow inside.

Comprehensive Perspective on the Pros and Cons of Turkish Military Exports

As the only Islamic member state of NATO, Turkey objectively has dual advantages: first, at the institutional and diplomatic levels, as part of the NATO system, its personnel can conduct joint training with NATO, and its equipment uses NATO technical interfaces and can purchase subsystems from NATO member states. Through its membership, Turkey can even obtain funding platforms like the "NATO Innovation Fund" to help its national defense industry development.

During the 2010-2020 period, when Europe experienced deindustrialization and maintained long-term peace, European companies did not impose excessive restrictions on investments and acquisitions of Turkish state-owned and private enterprises, allowing Turkey to acquire military technology and production capacity from European countries through equity changes, mergers and acquisitions, and technology exchanges (such as Italy's Piaggio Aerospace Company: initially strongly dissatisfied because its independently designed drones were imitated by Turkey's Baykar company, and later acquired by the latter to develop subsequent models of the TB series drones). Although a considerable portion of Turkish products are relatively outdated, they are sufficient to meet the needs of most of the global military market.

Due to rising labor costs in European countries and long-term low demand for military products, many European defense companies are willing to sell production licenses to Turkey and provide technical support, and even jointly carry out subsequent R&D upgrades. For example, the well-known Agusta-Westland company has long provided A129 helicopter production technology and key equipment to Turkey. Based on this, Turkey's T-129 once became its most representative "domestically produced" equipment and signed export agreements with multiple countries, becoming a typical case of "using a chicken to lay eggs" in the international market.

T-129 Helicopter

The identity of an Islamic country also brings many benefits to Turkey: it does not need to face the hostility and political suspicion of some Arab and Islamic countries like other NATO countries, making it easier to promote its products. The same religion and similar social structures also help Turkey communicate interests through lobbying and specific channels. In Pakistan's government institutions, the faction advocating "independent autonomy" and emphasizing "not putting all eggs in one basket" has rapidly risen, forming a fierce confrontation with the faction advocating the introduction of Chinese equipment, which is closely related to Turkey's public relations operations.

Additionally, as the successor of the Ottoman Empire, Turkey is more likely to find legal grounds for intervening in regional conflicts, with lower intervention costs, thus enabling it to easily deploy its military equipment abroad - for example, in the multiple rounds of the Libyan civil war after 2015, it invested a large number of mine-resistant vehicles and TB-2 drones to interfere in the war process.

But these two points are also a double-edged sword. Too easy access to key subsystems of NATO makes it lack the motivation for independent research and development in many key equipment. Even if there are sanctions and supply cuts externally, companies and governments may still think that once sanctions are lifted, domestically developed key equipment will lose competitiveness and become meaningless investment or even a liability.

Thus, even if they loudly proclaim the slogan of independent research and development, they can only be formalities, giving up key technology R&D. This in turn affects the understanding and judgment of key technologies by its military units and the army, thereby influencing key decisions.

Certainly, Turkey has tried to get out of this dilemma. The ground equipment department of the country actively cooperates with South Korea, while the aviation department chooses to cooperate with Ukraine's Motor Sich to obtain aviation engines for fighter jets and drones. Later, it further participated in the ammunition, pods, and subsequent upgrade projects of Pakistan's JF-17 "Thunder". However, these strategies are not all successful, and can be said to have mostly failed.

A more typical case is the "Leopard" 2 tank upgrade and the "Altay" (ALTAY) tank project. The technical design of the "Altay" (ALTAY) tank mainly originated from South Korea. At that time, South Korea encountered bottlenecks in the tank power and transmission industry, and the production project had been delayed for a long time. The Turkish side had to seek assistance from Germany. After the German side modified the immature hull design according to the actual situation and replaced the German-made transmission/power package, the German-Turkish sides fell into political opposition over the description of the Armenian genocide and the Kurdish issue, and the relevant R&D nearly came to a standstill. Finally, the "Altay" tank returned to using the DV27K diesel engine from South Korea's Doosan Heavy Industries. This back-and-forth almost took 20 years.

"Altay" (ALTAY) Tank

Therefore, looking back at the history of the "Altay" tank, it can be seen that the joint design was launched in 2007, the first prototype was produced in 2015, and it was announced that mass production would begin on September 5, 2025; at this point, the next generation of tanks of many countries had already entered the trial deployment stage. During this period, Turkish tank industry practitioners could only continuously launch armor enhancement kits, and even offer modular turrets for foreign tank chassis upgrades to seek profits, but almost no export performance was achieved.

In the aviation field, for a long time, Turkish aviation companies have placed high hopes on Motor Sich. However, the company was first prevented from being acquired by China, and then destroyed by Russian missiles, causing the Turkish side's export flagship - the T929 heavy attack helicopter - to still be difficult to enter mass production. Other aviation projects have also suffered serious setbacks.

As for the "Khan" fighter jet jointly developed with BAE and several European companies, as of October 2025, there are still unresolved key technological challenges.

Moreover, due to its long-term self-perception as a leader in the Islamic world, Turkey's enthusiasm for interfering in Islamic world affairs has hindered the development of its military industry. Because its government and military have historical entanglements with some overseas extremist organizations, the Turkish government's support for subversion and local separatist movements has never ceased, which makes it difficult for Turkey to reach cooperation agreements with countries threatened by these issues. Strategic needs force Turkey to invest a lot of money in public relations and interest-free military sales loans to procurement countries, and the low profit margin further reduces the potential and pace of subsequent development of the military industry.

This issue not only affects its foreign military trade transactions, but also has an impact on its internal military industry. Turkey is home to exiles and armed personnel from multiple countries, as well as millions of refugees. These cheap and unsecured labor forces, although an important blood supply for Turkey's industry and military industry, allow some companies (such as SYS) to rely on cheap labor to produce a large number of cost-effective firearms, thus entering the low-end segment of the North American market and quickly expanding. However, their existence further exacerbates the burden on Turkey's central finances and increases the unemployment rate, affecting the normal circulation of Turkey's internal economy.

It is worth noting that many Turks therefore blame outsiders for the long-term economic disorder and high inflation, ignoring the many problems existing within the ruling class and ruling group itself. After all, once people focus on the big figures behind Turkey's military industry, they will notice how much corruption lies behind the bright income of Turkey's military industry.

For example, the maintenance and repair tasks of the Anka series drones are largely entrusted to companies such as the Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI), which should have been handled by the military. Additionally, post-sale training and maintenance tasks for equipment both domestically and abroad are often entrusted to private companies.

So where do these revenues go?

Erdogan has controlled the Defense Industry Agency since December 2017 and also serves as the Chairman of the Defense Industry Executive Committee. The Turkish Armed Forces Foundation, under his jurisdiction, holds shares in several defense companies: 85% in Aselsan, 54.5% in Turkish Aerospace Industries, 55% in Roketsan, 99% in Havelsan, and shares in several other companies. The company that produces helicopters for the Turkish army, Baykar Makina, is actually owned by Erdogan's son Bilal Erdogan, and its CEO is Erdogan's son-in-law Serkan Bayraktar. The latter paid 564.1 million lira in taxes in 2022, ranking first in Turkey's tax list; however, the income he retained after legitimate tax avoidance may be much higher than the declared tax amount.

President Erdogan of Turkey, photo: CCTV News

Potential New Growth Points in the Military Industry

Now returning to the most concerning issue in the outside world: the new achievements claimed by Turkey in the military industry, among which the development progress of the medium-range ballistic missile system is the most concerned.

In fact, neither Turkey nor its long-time ally NATO has a basic understanding or technical accumulation of medium-range ballistic missiles. This stems from NATO's long-term reliance on air strikes, which forms a path dependency, as well as the intentional guidance of the United States.

The US proposed the "Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR)" has long constrained other countries like a sword hanging above their heads. Most NATO countries have never been equipped with medium-range missiles, and even lack the development of tactical missiles. Even former Warsaw Pact countries, after joining NATO, were relieved of their corresponding R&D and maintenance capabilities, and the systems were concentrated and destroyed.

Compared to other NATO members, Turkey indeed has some accumulation in ballistic missiles and long-range rocket artillery. In the mid-1990s, taking advantage of the strategic confusion of the US after the Cold War victory, Turkey introduced the WS-1 long-range rocket system from China's Precision Machinery Import and Export Corporation in 1997, and then imported the B-611 (NATO designation CSS-X-11, Turkish designation J-600T "Yıldırım") tactical missile, as well as its production equipment and manufacturing license. By 2001, with the help of Chinese technicians, Roketsan Company in Turkey was able to relatively stably produce this type of missile.

The original B-611 prototype had a range of about 80-150 kilometers. In the early stages of imitation, the locally produced J-600T had a range of only barely reaching 100 kilometers and unstable quality. It wasn't until 2007 that it reached approximately 152 kilometers. Subsequently, due to counter-terrorism and security reasons, the transfer of Chinese-Turkish military technology basically stopped, and Roketsan Company and its behind-the-scenes Turkish government could only explore on their own.

However, B-611 is indeed a high-end platform. Roketsan almost put all its life and death on this missile, and they simultaneously pushed the development of various derivatives in three directions: large-scale, small-scale, and lightweight, from small tactical rockets to further extended-range ballistic missiles, as well as exploring space sounding rockets and launch vehicles.

B-611 Missile

At that time, the Turkish side claimed to have completely mastered the technology of this missile and was about to make a new breakthrough. In 2011, Erdogan boldly announced that Turkey was developing a medium-range ballistic missile with a range of 2,500 kilometers and claimed it would move toward intercontinental missiles.

But the reality is that this project faces even more severe difficulties than the "Altay." Due to the lack of reference samples and external support, the missile development work was almost stagnant for a long time from 2007 to 2014. It wasn't until 2017 that Turkey increased the length of the J-600T body from 6.75 meters to 7.8 meters (with the same propellant and other parameters), and replaced the military GPS guidance head (the original B-611 used inertial guidance), allowing this missile with 1980s technology to barely increase its range to 280 kilometers, and reduce the CEP from about 75 meters to about 50 meters.

Turkey then named it the "Khan" tactical ballistic missile. The missile later participated in the 13th Turkish International Defense Exhibition held in May. It is worth noting that the missile uses a box-type launcher, and the chassis also uses the mature Belarus MZKT-7909 heavy off-road vehicle. After that, the missile underwent minor modifications and the chassis was replaced, resulting in two models named "Tayfun" I and "Tayfun" II. After these two improvements, the performance did not show significant improvement, and the only practical record was an attack on the Syrian government forces (SAA) logistics facilities in 2019.

Meanwhile, during the period from 2007 to 2014 when Turkey was constantly tinkering with its short-range ballistic missiles, Iran had already started building its long-, medium-, and short-range ballistic missile system by mastering the "Scud" technology of the Soviet Union and the M-75 (B601) missile technology of China. Meanwhile, in distant North Korea, the people of the main ideology's military industry had already begun to eye the secrets of terminal homing guidance, trying to develop anti-ship ballistic missiles.

In terms of medium-range ballistic missiles, Turkey's missiles also cannot escape this problem. Unsurprisingly, Roketsan further lengthened the "Tayfun" missile body and performed material lightweighting (some reports say it upgraded the combustion efficiency of the power chamber), increasing the engine section by 1.2 meters, and in other parameters remaining basically unchanged, the range was increased to 565 kilometers. The new missile was tested multiple times between 2022 and 2023, but has not yet been commissioned.

That same year, Turkey also modified and tested a test-type medium-range ballistic missile called "Cenk" based on its domestic SR-1 sounding rocket, claiming it has a range of 1,000 kilometers and multi-warhead strike capability. Given that the SR-1 can fly to about 550 kilometers in altitude, it is not difficult to tilt the flight and implement payload release. However, the original SR-1 rocket's payload was only a hundred kilograms, and after deducting the weight of the guidance and separation systems, the actual combat effectiveness of the separated warheads may not be much larger than a 155mm howitzer shell.

In 2025, Roketsan announced that it secretly tested the "Tayfun IV" missile in the Black Sea. Subsequently, the company stated that the new missile has a range of 1,000 kilometers. Then it claimed the range is between 1,000-3,000 kilometers. Moreover, the company stated that due to the adoption of a double-cone maneuverable warhead, the new missile can maintain a supersonic flight of about 5.5 Mach throughout the flight, and the final stage can reach a Mach number of 6. With the Turkish autonomous "Gökdoğan" guidance head system installed, the missile has the ability to deliver a 1-ton warhead at the maximum range with a CEP ≤5 meters without relying on the support of major powers. Subsequently, Erdogan announced that the missile will be mass-produced in 2026.

Tayfun IV Missile

In my opinion, the technical aspects mentioned by Turkey individually may be achievable, but combining them all together is extremely difficult.

First, Turkey lacks a globally covering positioning, communication, and guidance satellite system that can operate 24 hours a day, so the so-called high-precision strike without relying on the support of major powers is impossible. Second, regarding propulsion: although a double-cone warhead can initially use solid-fuel engines to maintain high-speed flight, if it follows the company's description, maintaining a speed of 5.5 Mach throughout the flight would require a scramjet engine.

With the usual operation methods and publicity logic of Turkish defense enterprises, if they have already mastered or achieved a scramjet engine prototype, they would have announced it to boost stock prices long ago, and would not have kept it secret until now. More importantly, Turkey lacks hypersonic wind tunnels and systematic testing infrastructure, and can only conduct technical tests abroad. However, the Black Sea is a sensitive area of the Ukraine-Russia conflict, where there are constant surveillance aircraft, reconnaissance aircraft, and various ships monitoring around the clock, making it impossible for Turkey to test such "super weapons" without being detected.

Turkey may be conducting related missile development attempts, but it is unlikely to make progress within the foreseeable future. Its claimed 3,000-kilometer range is even more meaningless. Whether targeting Israel or Greece, a 1,000-kilometer missile range is more than enough. Unless Turkey wants to attack targets in the Red Sea and Persian Gulf areas, the company's promotional slogans and the country's actual needs will be greatly mismatched, which means the product will be at odds with the needs of most potential buyers. After all, except for a few countries (such as India), few people will favor "white elephant" projects that are flashy but impractical.

In summary, Turkey's military industry research and development and exports have indeed made breakthroughs in recent years, but its overall strength and potential are quite limited. Its hypersonic ballistic missile system, rather than being a highly promising export equipment, is more like a fantasy created by Erdogan, serving as a political stick against NATO and Israel.

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Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7566509684451820059/

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