Trump and Musk, these two "allies", have seen the conflict between them escalate sharply.
According to media reports, on June 5th local time, after US President Trump and Musk started publicly attacking each other, Musk also publicly stated on social media that Trump should be impeached. Musk also revealed that Trump was afraid to publicly disclose relevant materials in the Epstein documents.
Trump posted on a social media platform, stating that Musk had begun to "lose patience". Trump claimed that he asked Musk to leave and revoked Musk's forced electric vehicle "mandate", which made "Musk go crazy".
Two days ago, Musk openly criticized the hallmark tax and spending bill led by President Trump, calling it "disgusting" and "repulsive".
In late May, the US House of Representatives narrowly passed a comprehensive tax and spending bill. This bill aimed to fulfill many of Trump's campaign promises, such as introducing new tax breaks in the tip and car loan sectors, and increasing spending on the military and border enforcement.
On May 31st, Musk ended his term in the Trump administration. However, at that time, Trump did not show any intention to "break up" with this ally. He stated that Musk would always be with us, "providing help all the way".
In the 2024 presidential election, Musk consistently supported Trump, donating hundreds of millions of dollars. After Trump took office again in January this year, Musk took the lead in establishing the Department of Government Efficiency (DOGE), dedicated to streamlining federal government agencies and reducing government costs.
The open division between Trump and Musk is behind the factional struggles within their economic team, reflecting the uncertainty and unpredictability of Trump's administration. A game over power, trust, and policy orientation is shaking the nerves of American economic policies.
This chaos and turmoil are more directly manifested in the fact that the US government has launched a large-scale tariff storm against the outside world within less than a hundred days, throwing out a rough, vague, and chaotic set of tariffs that have caused intense shocks both domestically and internationally.
On May 30th, US President Trump (right) and Musk, head of the Department of Government Efficiency, held a press conference at the White House. Photo/VCG
Tariff Policy Changes Reflect Power Struggles
The Trump administration has made tariff issues the focus and main battlefield of its foreign economic policy, launching successive attacks on major trading partners in an attempt to overturn the underlying logic of America's foreign trade and global free trade system. However, its series of policies were poorly designed, jumping back and forth between implementation, deferral, and reinstatement, with a degree of chaos that left people astounded.
For example, on January 26th, citing Colombia's refusal to accept deported immigrants, the US announced a 25% tariff on all imports from Colombia, but this decision was revoked after only a few hours. On February 1st, the US announced a 25% tariff on imports from Canada and Mexico. However, just over 24 hours later, the tax measure was suspended for 30 days. After the 30-day period expired, the US granted one month of tariff exemptions for imports of cars from both countries. On March 11th, the US raised tariffs on Canadian steel and aluminum products to 50% due to retaliation against Canada's increased electricity tariffs for three northern US states, but soon after, the measure was withdrawn. On March 26th, the US announced a 25% tariff on all imported vehicles, but vehicles and parts complying with the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement were exempted from the additional tariff on April 2nd and May 3rd respectively.
On April 2nd, the "reciprocal tariff" plan proposed by the Trump administration became a concentrated manifestation of its policy chaos. That day, Trump announced that the US would impose a "minimum base tariff" of 10% on trading partners and impose higher tariffs on certain trading partners. The plan used the proportion of each country's trade deficit with the US relative to its total exports as the benchmark, crudely determining tariff rates, completely ignoring differences in industrial structures and the complexity of global supply chains.
Even more absurdly, uninhabited islands like Heard Island and McDonald Islands in the Indian Ocean were included in the list of taxed goods, and many countries where the US has a trade surplus were also taxed. This "brainstorming" approach has drawn serious doubts about the professionalism of the Trump administration's policies from the outside world.
In the face of significant downward fluctuations in the global economy and financial markets, Trump suddenly reversed course on April 9th, announcing a 90-day suspension of the "reciprocal tariff" for countries that "had not taken retaliatory actions." This massive reversal did not reduce global concerns about the irrationality of US tariff policies, but rather increased them.
Since February, the US has repeatedly imposed tariffs on Chinese imports under various pretexts and continuously retaliated by increasing rates, with tariff rates on some Chinese goods reaching as high as 145%, and some goods being taxed at cumulative rates approaching 250%. Such outrageous tariff policies clearly did not undergo adequate deliberation. Just after the "reciprocal tariff" on China came into effect on April 11th, Trump signed a memorandum excluding 20 categories of electronic products, including smartphones, laptops, and semiconductor manufacturing equipment, from the list of taxed goods.
Just before the economic teams of China and the US began negotiations in Switzerland on May 10th, Trump administration officials repeatedly hinted that the tariff rates on China would not be significantly reduced. Trump even stated that around 80% was appropriate. However, the US side ultimately agreed to cut the "reciprocal tariff" from 125% to 10%, which caught many by surprise.
The constant flip-flopping of the Trump administration on tariff issues does not appear to be intentional, but rather the inevitable result of strategic vacillation and policy failure. In reality, it is an external manifestation of the power struggles within its economic team. Since the Trump administration took office, there have been two camps within the White House over tariff policies: the moderate camp represented by Treasury Secretary Bessent and National Economic Council Director Hasset, and the hardline camp represented by White House Trade Advisor Navarro, Commerce Secretary Lutnick, and Trade Representative Griller. These two forces openly compete and secretly struggle to vie for Trump's trust and influence over economic and trade decisions.
The moderate camp is more sensitive to market reactions, emphasizing that tariffs should be used as negotiation levers rather than ultimate goals. They advocate imposing tariffs on countries based on the degree of unfairness of their trade behavior according to plans and varying degrees, allowing enterprises and supply chains time to adjust. Bessent, the representative figure of the moderate camp, is also known as a "gradualist tariffist". The hardline camp insists on a comprehensive high-tariff strategy, opposing any form of exemption, even if it may come at an economic cost. They believe that implementing universal high tariffs can reduce America's trade deficit, bring manufacturing back, and Griller, the representative figure of the hardline camp, is considered the theoretical designer of tariff policies.
Billionaire Musk belongs to a "third force" outside the two camps, openly opposing tariff policies, and calling for zero tariffs between the US and Europe. This sparked fierce criticism from Navarro, who called Musk a "car assembler" dependent on imported components. Musk retaliated by calling Navarro "not as smart as a bag of bricks".
US Commerce Secretary Lutnick (left) and Treasury Secretary Bessent. Photo/VCG
Moderates Take the Forefront
From the evolution process of the Trump administration's tariff policies, its internal power struggles among the economic team can be divided into at least three stages.
The first stage is from January 20th to April 2nd. During this period, both camps were in the role adaptation phase after taking office, and their differences had not yet escalated. However, their positions already showed clear distinctions, with the hardline camp aggressively advancing. In addition to tariff policies targeting individual countries and industry sectors, Navarro and Lutnick strongly lobbied Trump to introduce high tariffs on all countries. Moderate figures like Bessent were busy endorsing Trump's various threats of tariffs.
However, just as Trump repeatedly indicated plans to impose "reciprocal tariffs" on April 2nd, Bessent also attempted to issue relatively mild voices, suggesting that different countries' tariff figures varied, and some tariffs might not continue to be levied. This contrasted significantly with the hardline camp's stance of not budging an inch. As Nobel Prize-winning economist Paul Krugman described it, Bessent was like a "firefighter tied up and watching the fire burn."
On the eve of the "reciprocal tariff" plan's release on April 2nd, Trump wavered between general tariffs and reciprocal tariffs before finally choosing a mixed tariff policy combining both. However, the reciprocal tariff rates for most countries and regions around the world were much higher than the general tariff rate of 10%. This indicates that the hardline camp generally had the upper hand.
The second stage is from April 2nd to 9th. After the "reciprocal tariff" policy was introduced, it caused a stir domestically and internationally, especially the severe fluctuations in financial and bond markets, indicating Wall Street's dissatisfaction and even rejection of the policy. As a government official from Wall Street, Bessent felt this important signal immediately. Publicly, he defended the tariff policy, but privately, he quickly acted to try to push for policy adjustments.
On April 6th, Bessent flew to Florida to personally persuade Trump to adjust the policy, shifting the focus to negotiating trade agreements with major trading partners to prevent market collapse. On the 9th, Trump temporarily met with Bessent, Hasset, and Lutnick in the Oval Office. This meeting became a crucial turning point in the power structure of the economic team.
According to multiple US media reports, Bessent won over Lutnick, seized the opportunity to enter the Oval Office, and successfully persuaded Trump to suspend the imposition of some tariffs, issuing related posts on social media on the spot. At that time, Navarro was busy with other matters, and Griller was testifying to the House of Representatives about tariffs. Griller learned of the policy adjustment together with the attending congressmen, and the awkward situation prompted mockery from the congressmen, who said he had "his rug pulled out from under him".
This major shift indicated that Bessent had become a key person capable of calming Wall Street in Trump's eyes. The hardline camp led by Navarro suffered backlash due to overly aggressive tactics and internally split, with Navarro's influence significantly diminished. In this round, the moderates stepped forward, which was not only due to the efforts of Bessent and others but also represented the choice of the market.
The third stage is from April 9th until now. After the "reciprocal tariff" entered a 90-day suspension period, the US rapidly conducted bilateral negotiations with major trading partners. The tariff decision-making pattern of the Trump administration became clearer: Bessent took charge of overall negotiations and focused on Sino-US negotiations, Lutnick was responsible for specific negotiations with other countries, Griller became a negotiation assistant, while Navarro seemed to fade into obscurity, almost becoming a dispensable technical advisor. So far, this power structure has not undergone substantial changes.
Personnel Are Policies
The division within the Trump administration's economic team did not begin with policy disputes but was actually buried in the initial formation of the power structure. Navarro and Lutnick were both steadfast allies of Trump. Navarro was sentenced to four months in prison for contempt of Congress for refusing to cooperate with the investigation into the Capitol riot and was released on the same day. Upon his release, he immediately flew to Milwaukee and took to the stage at the Republican National Convention to campaign for Trump. He shouted to Trump supporters, "They can imprison my body, but they cannot shake my belief." This near-sacrificial loyalty earned him a pass to return to the core power circle and consolidated his symbolic position within the hardline tariff camp.
However, Navarro's biggest problem lies in his self-importance, believing that his tariff theory is flawless and will inevitably make opponents surrender quickly, achieving victory once and for all. However, he underestimated the complexity of the real world and the resilience of countries resisting coercion, undervalued the great self-harm that this tariff strategy inflicted on the US, and ignored the complex mindset of Trump's second term. Simply put, if the US imposes excessively high tariffs, leading to a sharp decline or even complete cessation of foreign trade, then the US gains nothing. This is what Trump does not want to see and why he is willing to return to the negotiating table. But Navarro seems lost in his own world, unable to grasp Trump's pragmatic psychology of "wanting both" and "neither".
In contrast to Navarro's "loyalty for power", Lutnick has had a long friendship with Trump. He appeared on Trump's reality TV show "The Apprentice" and donated nearly $100 million to help Trump join the ranks of senior advisors and loyal followers after his election. As early as during Trump's transition team, Lutnick, as co-chair of the transition team, was very assertive, constantly intervening in personnel arrangements for the new government. On the issue of selecting the treasury secretary, he tried to suppress Bessent's promotion opportunity, constantly attacking Bessent's past connections with the far-left financial tycoon Soros, questioning Bessent's sudden conversion to the "Make America Great Again" (MAGA) economic philosophy, belittling the historical returns of Bessent's hedge fund, attempting to exclude him from the core team.
However, Lutnick's political offensive failed. As Trump expanded the scope of scrutiny of candidates for the treasury secretary position, Lutnick's influence quickly declined, and he was eventually only nominated as commerce secretary. Media outlets reported that Lutnick "wanted to be a mini-Trump but didn't realize that only Trump could be Trump".
Lutnick, who comes from Wall Street, should belong to the traditionally free-trade-oriented group, but he allied with the hardline camp on the tariff issue. This left him in a difficult position, with tariff supporters considering Lutnick less ideologically pure than Navarro and Griller, and Wall Street viewing Lutnick as less professional than Bessent in economic affairs. This identity misalignment made Lutnick's position in the tariff policy struggle awkward. This might explain why although he belongs to the hardline tariff camp along with Navarro, he also joined Bessent in "isolating" Navarro, persuading Trump to adjust tariff policies.
In this round of personnel upheaval, Bessent's rise to power was particularly unique. Among Trump's cabinet members, Bessent was arguably the least MAGA ideology spokesperson. He was once a Democrat, an openly gay person, worked for billionaire George Soros for nearly 20 years, and led the 1990s speculation in British pounds that netted Soros over $1 billion in profits. He also founded his personal hedge fund in 2015 with Soros's support. His political donation records were also quite dramatic; he supported Obama in 2012 and donated to both Trump and Hillary in 2016.
In this context, Bessent's ability to influence Trump hinged on Trump's awareness that he could calm Wall Street sentiment. Bessent's deep connections with Wall Street, his precise understanding of investor psychology and market sentiment, became key cards in influencing policy direction. Bessent also skillfully handled his persuasion strategies, not directly pointing out Trump's mistakes but explaining to him that there were better ways to achieve the goal.
Additionally, Bessent's previous tug-of-war with Musk, head of the Department of Government Efficiency, over IRS personnel appointments highlighted his rising话语权 in government decision-making. Without Bessent's consent, Musk proposed appointing Gary Shapley as acting director of the IRS. Bessent successfully persuaded Trump to revoke this appointment and replaced it with his preferred candidate, Michael Fokund, deputy secretary of the Treasury Department.
Temporary "Victors"
The current power reshuffle in Trump's economic team presents a characteristic of "moderates dominating the stage and hardliners retreating to the background". However, Trump's personal will remains the ultimate variable in determining the internal structure. As former Treasury Department senior official Mark Sobel said, "What Trump says on any given day largely depends on whom he last talked to. Today he listens to Bessent, tomorrow he might listen to Navarro." As long as Trump remains the sole arbiter in this policy game, every increase or withdrawal of tariffs, every rise or fall in the status of key members of the economic team, will still depend more on "his mood today" and "whom he last listened to".
Bessent currently occupies the center stage of tariff policy, but how long this position will last remains uncertain. Essentially, his role does not stem from institutional authorization but is built on an unstable foundation of Trump's "trust" and "needs". This influence is transactional in nature, entirely dependent on Trump's short-term needs: when market volatility intensifies, Bessent can become the "firefighter" to calm Wall Street; when Trump believes that short-term policy risks are manageable and his gambler mentality rises, Bessent's position may quickly be replaced by hardliners like Navarro.
This relationship of dependency also keeps the entire economic team in a state of uncertainty. On one hand, there are already signs of miscommunication between Bessent and Trump. At a congressional hearing in early May, Bessent publicly "undermined" Trump, candidly stating that "there is no ongoing trade negotiation of any kind between the US and China." Previously, Trump had repeatedly released ambiguous signals suggesting that negotiations were ongoing. On the other hand, although hardliners like Navarro have been temporarily marginalized, they have not been completely eliminated and still control key institutions like the Office of the United States Trade Representative. Their loyalty to Trump and influence among some voters may allow them to make a comeback at the right moment.
US media pointed out that asking Navarro, Bessent, Lutnick, and Hasset about tariff negotiations would yield four completely different responses. Trump is well aware of the divisions within his team but has not done much coordination or intervention, letting each side "talk their own language," with him ultimately selecting the optimal solution. Therefore, whether it is Bessent, Navarro, or Lutnick and Griller, they are only temporary "victors" at certain moments. What remains unchanged is Trump's unpredictability.
(Zhang Tengjun is the deputy director and associate researcher of the American Research Institute of the China Institute of International Studies; Nie Weixi is a research intern at the American Research Institute of the China Institute of International Studies.)
Author: Zhang Tengjun, Nie Weixi
Editor: Xu Fangqing
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7512840600912265779/
Disclaimer: This article solely represents the author's views, and you are welcome to express your attitude by clicking the "upvote/downvote" buttons below.