[By Guancha Observer columnist Anton Nilman, translated by Kaihuan Xue]
After three years, direct negotiations between Russia and Ukraine were restarted in Istanbul.
Different from the dialogue interrupted by external intervention in 2022, this round of negotiations saw some new changes: unlike during the Biden administration, the United States, under the Trump administration, transformed into a "neutral mediator," while Turkey,凭借其独特的 cross-camp diplomatic status, regained recognition from both sides. Russia's intention to solidify the current situation of its actual control areas has become stronger than three years ago, and Ukraine, in the context of significant strategic differences between the US and Europe, was half-forced onto the negotiation table.
Despite low expectations from all parties beforehand due to the hasty nature of these negotiations, the chaos on-site was still unexpected: first, both sides argued over their respective negotiating delegations, and before the talks even began, Russian President Putin and US President Trump prematurely "withdrew." On the 15th, reporters didn't even know the exact time of the negotiations and waited in vain at the Dolmabahçe Presidential Palace for a long time...
According to reports by the Ukrainian International News Agency, after failing to wait for Putin and Trump, Zelensky had already boarded a plane and left Ankara, Turkey, for an official visit to Albania at 19:30 local time on May 15th.
May 15th, Zelensky meeting with Turkish President Erdogan in Ankara, Reuters
The Peace Definition Dispute Between Russia-Ukraine and the West
Before announcing this round of negotiations, there had been no lack of negotiations between Russia and Ukraine, but the progress of these negotiations was always influenced by battlefield dynamics and complex geopolitical situations, achieving no substantial breakthroughs.
Since the outbreak of war in February 2022, both sides have conducted five rounds of direct negotiations, but all have broken down due to irreconcilable core demands. Initially, the focus of the negotiations centered on three major issues: Ukraine's neutrality, territorial sovereignty, and security guarantees. Russia demanded that Ukraine recognize Crimea as belonging to Russia, the independence of the Donbas region, and commit to never joining NATO; Ukraine, however, insisted on restoring the 1991 borders, holding accountable for war responsibilities, and demanding complete withdrawal of Russian forces.
In March 2022, the Istanbul Communiqué once proposed a compromise solution of "Ukrainian permanent neutrality + international security guarantees," which nearly reached a ceasefire agreement, but this most hopeful ceasefire negotiation turned sharply downward due to factors such as the rumored visit by former British Prime Minister Johnson to Kiev urging泽连斯基's administration to abandon negotiations and the Bucha incident, closing the negotiation window completely.
In the three years since, the battlefield became an extension of the negotiation table. The Ukrainian army briefly gained the upper hand through counter-offensives in Kharkiv and Kherson, but the Russian army gradually consumed the fighting strength of the Ukrainian army through "meat grinders" campaigns like Bakhmut and Avdiivka, regaining battlefield dominance by late 2024. During this period, international mediation efforts frequently encountered setbacks, and the 2024 Swiss Peace Summit also degenerated into a "talk shop" due to Russia's absence.
The frequent failure of hopes for peace is because the parties involved have fundamentally different definitions of "peace." The stance of the Kyiv authorities has remained firm: due to constitutional provisions and stirred-up national sentiments, Ukraine cannot recognize Russia's actions of changing territorial realities through force, nor can it abandon its strategic goal of joining NATO. Moreover, Ukraine insists on obtaining binding security guarantees, post-war reconstruction funding support, and demands that Russia repatriate all Ukrainian refugees and prisoners of war who have gone to Russia—demands that are difficult to meet.
Russia's position is even more resolute. In his latest statement, Foreign Minister Lavrov reiterated the ceasefire conditions that have continued since 2022: the international community must recognize Russia's "legitimate sovereignty" over the four eastern regions of Ukraine and Crimea, and ensure Ukraine's permanent neutrality. These requirements not only directly conflict with the current constitution of the Kyiv authorities but also completely dashed Trump's idea of achieving a major diplomatic breakthrough within his first hundred days in office.
Since Trump retook the White House, he has consistently sought to make substantive progress in resolving the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Trump initially claimed multiple times before last November's U.S. presidential election that he would resolve the conflict within 24 hours if elected, and then promised that the Russia-Ukraine conflict would "end soon" (he recently stated that this was a joke). During Easter, Reuters disclosed a draft peace agreement between Russia and Ukraine prepared by the U.S., which showed that the U.S. was "open" to legally recognizing Crimea as part of Russia. However, this statement quickly sparked controversy, and Trump urgently clarified that he did not require Zelensky to acknowledge Russia's claim to Crimea's sovereignty.
Beyond the dispute with Ukraine, there are also significant differences in mediation strategies between the U.S. and its European allies. The absence of Secretary of State Rubio from the London negotiations on April 23rd indicates that the U.S. prefers a pragmatic approach of "ceasefire first, then negotiations": according to leaked documents, the U.S. advocates "resolving territorial disputes after comprehensive unconditional ceasefires." This effectively condones the current territorial status quo controlled by Russia, but the EU and the Kyiv authorities still hope for Russian troop withdrawals from the Kharkiv area and parts of Mykolaiv as preconditions for negotiations.
These various circumstances ultimately led to the failure of several previous attempts to restore peace between Russia and Ukraine. Russia views Ukraine as a buffer against NATO expansion, while Ukraine sees territorial integrity as a survival red line. Their understanding of "security guarantees" is completely different: Russia requires Ukraine to demilitarize, while Ukraine seeks collective defense akin to NATO.
America initially sought to prolong the war through military aid to weaken Russia, but quickly shifted to a "pass-the-buck" strategy during the Trump era. Europe wanted to demonstrate "strategic autonomy" but lacked the ability to independently mediate conflicts, resulting in a lack of consistent external impetus for negotiations.
Moreover, as the battlefield advantage holder, Russia lacks the willingness to compromise: after withdrawing from Kyiv in 2022, Russia elevated avoiding "strategic failure" to the highest priority in its foreign policy, while Ukraine, after suffering setbacks in its counteroffensive in 2023, still regards "complete territorial recovery" as a precondition for negotiations. This "fighting for talks" deadlock has repeatedly rendered diplomatic efforts futile.
In light of this background, the resumption of negotiations appears particularly complex and arduous. The negotiations restarting in Istanbul hold special significance. But while we remain optimistic, we should still maintain a cautious and rational attitude. For true peace between Russia and Ukraine, a single negotiation is far from sufficient.
On the evening of the 15th local time, Russian presidential aide and head of the Russian delegation in the Russia-Ukraine negotiations, Mekhinsky, stated in Istanbul, Turkey, that the Russian delegation would be "waiting for the Ukrainian delegation" starting at 10:00 AM local time on the 16th.
Poutine's Clever Calculations
Even before the start of the Istanbul negotiations, dark currents were brewing, foreshadowing the main theme of this round of talks.
On May 10th, German Chancellor Scholz, French President Macron, and British Prime Minister Starmer arrived in Kyiv for a visit and held talks with Zelensky. At this critical juncture before the Russia-Ukraine-Istanbul negotiations, international public opinion placed high hopes on their visit (including in Ukrainian society), viewing it as a foundation-laying journey before peace talks, but the results of their visit to Kyiv were less than satisfactory.
After spending a busy day in Kyiv, their final achievement was to issue a statement reiterating old tunes, demanding that Russia unconditionally cease fire for 30 days, or else the West would impose severe sanctions and continue to provide arms assistance to Ukraine. Additionally, they emphasized that Ukraine should receive security guarantees. To avoid delays, Russian President Putin convened a press conference at 1:30 AM Moscow time on May 11th. This was done to ensure that people across the Atlantic heard his voice: Putin's press conference coincided with the U.S.'s prime time (9:30 AM).
Zelensky and his allies clearly calculated: they expected Russia to flatly reject their old-tune demands, which were obviously unacceptable to Russia. Then, Kyiv and Europe could justifiably blame Russia for destroying the hope of peace, but their plan clearly backfired. The Kremlin did not directly reject the proposals but chose to carefully consider them. Subsequently, Putin proposed that Russia agreed to resume direct negotiations with Ukraine in Istanbul without any preconditions.
Putin's statement was a pivotal turning point: in January this year, as a legal professional, Putin had emphasized that immediate negotiations with Ukraine "lacked legitimacy" because Ukraine had not repealed the ban on negotiating with Russia. It is worth reminding readers that Zelensky has yet to repeal this ban. Even so, Russia still agreed to new negotiations in Istanbul. This shows that Russia is not uninterested in negotiations, and as long as there is even a slim possibility of resolving the conflict, Russia is willing to communicate.
Zelensky, in his video address on the evening of May 11th, stated: "I will personally wait for Putin in Istanbul on May 15th." His statement immediately sparked speculation about whether he would lift the ban on negotiating with Russia in the coming weeks. Here's an interesting detail worth adding: Putin previously explained that when Zelensky signed the ban on negotiations, he was still the "legitimate president" of Ukraine, but now he is not. Therefore, he no longer has the authority to revoke the decree; only the Chairman of the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada has the authority to do so, provided that the leadership in Kyiv indeed has such intentions.
After both Ukraine and its European allies and Russia proposed resuming dialogue, Trump posted on his self-built social platform "Truth Social," declaring "neutrality," not supporting either side, and claiming this might be a "great day" for Russia and Ukraine. He stated he would continue cooperating with both sides to achieve this goal.
According to sources from Politico, senior officials of the Kyiv authorities called Trump during Zelensky's discussions with Macron and others to inform him of the progress of their talks. Although Trump expressed "principled support" for the European proposal, he made a demand to the Kyiv authorities: "Russian President Putin has proposed a meeting in Istanbul on Thursday to discuss possible negotiations to end this bloody slaughter. Ukraine should immediately agree to this meeting. I am beginning to doubt whether Ukraine truly intends to reach an agreement with Putin, and this meeting should be held immediately!"
Trump's support for Putin's proposal to conduct direct negotiations in Istanbul essentially helped Putin neutralize the pressure exerted by the leaders of Britain, France, and Germany on Russia, meaning that Zelensky lost the leverage of relying on the U.S. and European countries to pressure Russia.
Even before this negotiation was officially announced, the two sides were constantly at odds over the ceasefire issue. This year, Putin has announced several ceasefires at the official level, but the Kyiv authorities showed little interest. Under the authorization of the authorities, the Ukrainian army continued to attack Russian forces during the ceasefire periods for energy facilities and Easter, rather than halting hostilities.
This time was no exception; the Kyiv authorities again rejected Putin's proposal for a three-day Victory Day ceasefire, but then demanded that Putin agree to an unconditional ceasefire for 30 days starting May 12th. Zelensky's calculation was clear: he seemed certain that Putin would not allow Ukraine to use this 30-day period to regroup its troops, replenish munitions, prepare for the summer offensive by Russian forces, or launch new cross-border attacks. Making such demands before the negotiations began was clearly intended to make Putin bear the black mark of refusing to negotiate.
Zelensky's calculations were clearly transparent to the shrewd Putin. According to reports in Le Monde, after Putin "unexpectedly" responded by agreeing to negotiations and skillfully used Trump to apply pressure, Macron, Scholz, Starmer, and Tusk held another meeting upon returning from Kyiv and suggested that Zelensky "make good use" of the opportunity provided by the Kremlin. They advised Zelensky not to appear like a "war instigator" in front of Trump.
On February 28th, Trump and Zelensky met at the Oval Office in the White House that day, with Vice President Vance present. The three had a heated argument in front of the media.
In this context, Zelensky reluctantly announced that he would personally wait for Putin in Istanbul on May 15th and no longer mentioned the unrealistic 30-day ceasefire.
In this game of maneuvering, Putin achieved his goal: by questioning Zelensky's legal standing and reviving the first Istanbul negotiations, he undermined Zelensky's moral blackmail of a "30-day unconditional ceasefire" with his posture of "unconditional talks," and cleverly threw the dilemma of negotiation legitimacy back to the Kyiv authorities, which have long been mired in a constitutional crisis.
At the same time, Putin used the golden hour late at night to issue statements, enticing Ukraine to expose its bottom line with vague promises of "security guarantees," and using Trump's attitude to first break the pressure from European countries and then transfer it to Zelensky.
In this exchange, Zelensky clearly lost the first round: he was forced by Putin's astute calculations to abandon his supposed "red line" of not negotiating with the Russian criminal regime and was compelled to admit the need to "personally wait for Putin's arrival." Putin's political skills are evidently far superior to Zelensky's.
It is evident that Putin still distrusts the Kyiv authorities. The pre-negotiation shadow warfare raises doubts about the sincerity of all parties involved and makes one wonder whether this round of negotiations can achieve any progress. After all, the negotiations held in Belarus and Istanbul in 2022 were led by government delegations from both Russia and Ukraine. Before the current round of negotiations in Istanbul, Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov and then Ukrainian Foreign Minister Kuleba held meetings, and the working group members discussed draft agreements via video conferences until mid-April. Therefore, their first direct negotiations in almost three years are unlikely to immediately yield results at the highest level, as this is a serious and significant matter requiring careful preparation.
"An unprepared meeting is better left unmet," stressed Konstantin Kosachev, vice chairman of the Russian Federation Council, before the talks. Zelensky himself realized this during his meeting with Trump at the White House, where inadequate preparation resulted in his complete failure. Thus, Zelensky is currently unsuitable for meeting with Putin, as he holds virtually no cards: Zelensky's situation is dire, and he has almost lost American support, facing the immense risk of a total defeat on the frontlines.
The Istanbul negotiations are another instance of an "insufficiently prepared" meeting, making it impossible to predict what outcomes will be achieved, nor to maintain optimism.
Istanbul: Putin's Negotiation Choice and the Key Variable in the Direction of the Russia-Ukraine War
Why did Putin choose Istanbul as the meeting place? This is self-evident: since the negotiations there were interrupted, let us continue from there. The platform for negotiations must meet the interests of all parties, and Turkey is one of the few countries that meets this standard. Ukraine does not want to negotiate in friendly countries of Russia, such as Belarus, which birthed the Minsk Agreement and hosted direct talks between Russian and Ukrainian representatives after the outbreak of the conflict. Similarly, in Russia's view, European countries, including "neutral" Switzerland, have completely lost their qualification as mediators.
Despite President Erdoğan of Turkey having made disrespectful remarks towards Russia during tense periods and supplying weapons to the Ukrainian army, he remains a partner in the eyes of both Russia and Ukraine: on one hand, Turkey has not participated in Western economic sanctions and continues to maintain economic ties with Russia. It also attended the BRICS summit in Kazan last year and was the only NATO member to attend that summit. On the other hand, Turkey provides Ukraine with military equipment such as drones and supports Ukraine on Black Sea security issues, making it a trusted country by the Kyiv authorities.
Putin proposed his negotiation initiative on the evening of May 10th to the early morning of May 11th, and Trump and Erdoğan reached an agreement during their telephone conversation on May 5th to coordinate the resolution of the Ukraine conflict. Therefore, Trump also supported the proposal to restore direct dialogue on the Istanbul platform.
The careful selection of the negotiation location at least indicates that both Russia and the U.S. are not lacking in the willingness to conduct negotiations. Compared to the "Swiss Peace Summit" held last year, Istanbul as the venue for the talks can be accepted by the U.S., indicating that this round of negotiations will not degenerate into a farce like the Swiss summit, where the West collectively attacked Russia. This is Putin's conception: by proposing the negotiation location, he aimed to test the U.S.'s sincerity regarding negotiations. The current result shows that Trump indeed has this sincerity.
June 2024, Ukraine Peace Summit in Switzerland. Video screenshot
However, we cannot overlook the differences in details of the "peace" definition between Russia and the U.S. The U.S.'s top priority regarding the Ukraine issue remains an immediate ceasefire. In other words, the Trump administration wants quick results, and preferably ones that prominently highlight America's importance. Trump wants to be a "great success" as a peacemaker, hoping to be recorded in history with this identity and fulfill his promises to voters, thereby ending the Russia-Ukraine conflict and focusing on other issues. However, this approach cannot guarantee that the conflict will not erupt again with renewed intensity after a brief period of calm.
By contrast, Putin clearly defined his goal in proposing to resume direct dialogue: eliminating the root causes of the conflict and achieving long-term, enduring peace from a historical perspective. Russia's goal is to address fundamental problems, rather than pursuing short-lived "publicity effects," which is why Russia unilaterally declared two ceasefires and strictly adhered to the ceasefire agreements, whereas the Kyiv authorities and their European allies merely mouthed calls for a halt to hostilities while secretly scheming. Putin genuinely believes that negotiations may make progress: he does not rule out the possibility of reaching new ceasefire agreements during the consultations, and there are precedents for this: three years ago in Istanbul, the government delegations of Russia and Ukraine signed a peace agreement, just one step away from achieving peace.
Europe felt excluded from the list of major global participants after Trump regained power and eagerly expressed its desire to participate in the Russia-Ukraine negotiations, wanting to replace the U.S., which had begun to distance itself from the Russia-Ukraine issue, to dominate Ukraine's fate and set another trap for Russia. But Putin has his own plans and ideas: the Russia-Ukraine dialogue must be genuine, free of any prejudice and moral criticism, which would only complicate the situation further.
We see this situation: a small group of laymen, namely European leaders and Zelensky, arrogantly believe themselves to be geniuses and cleverly engage in a contest with a political master like Putin. Without a doubt, Putin has won in this political game. These lay politicians have no capital to compete with him on the same stage.
Putin skillfully placed the West in a situation they never expected to find themselves in, a fact that speaks volumes: Zelensky and European politicians are always seen through by Putin, setting a dark tone for the negotiations: petty tricks and lack of sincerity cannot help achieve real peace.
If Zelensky and his European allies are truly here for peace, they should not issue old-tune declarations before the negotiations. At least they should learn from Trump, who neither builds nor disrupts. This is also why the author believes that this round of negotiations is still unlikely to truly achieve peace.
How Can the End of the Russia-Ukraine Conflict Truly Be Possible?
The fundamental problem of the Russia-Ukraine conflict lies in the radically different perceptions of "security" and "territorial sovereignty" between the two sides, as well as the lack of common language in geopolitical terms and the reality of conflicting interests. From a series of facts surrounding the resumption of negotiations in Istanbul, Putin's "unconditional talks" posture broke Zelensky's moral blackmail, Trump's "neutrality" statement shattered the European pressure attempt, and the pre-negotiation shadow warfare exposed the lack of sincerity and incompetence of Zelensky's side. The Istanbul negotiations are unlikely to truly end the war. To truly bring an end to this war, solutions must still be found in reality, with the prerequisite being the sincerity of all parties in ending the war.
Without solving the following issues, peace will remain mere talk:
First, Ukraine's neutrality and multilateral security guarantees are perhaps the only feasible breakthrough. The "permanent neutrality + international guarantee" model proposed in the 2022 Istanbul Communique, although derailed by external obstruction, still retains some value. If Ukraine commits to not joining NATO and exchanges this for a "guarantee alliance" composed of countries from the Global South and Western nations providing defense commitments, it can preserve the so-called sovereignty dignity red line without touching Russia's security red lines. This arrangement must transcend NATO's traditional adversarial model, such as allowing Ukraine to maintain moderate armed forces, while ensuring their non-offensive nature through international supervisory agencies, and possibly deploying "peacekeeping forces" from multiple countries. In short, there are many ways to achieve this.
Expansion of NATO members in Europe from 1949 to 2023, Wikipedia
Second, territorial issues must be handled with an elastic solution of "freezing the status quo + long-term consultation." Kyiv authorities' wish to restore the 1991 border line is actually unfeasible and cannot be used as a condition in negotiations. The sovereignty disputes over Crimea and Donbas are short-term insolvable, but both sides could tacitly accept the de facto control lines and defer legal recognition issues for several years. For example, referring to the ambiguity of the Minsk Agreement, Russia and Ukraine could agree to constructive dialogue over disputed territories within ten years, during which they should strive to avoid reigniting conflicts. This approach can both circumvent the political life risks for Zelensky of "ceding territory" and enable Putin to accomplish the goals of the special military operation, safeguarding Russia's interests.
Third, the "gradual realization" of ceasefires and reconstruction is crucial. Any peace agreement requires phased implementation: first establishing a minimum level of trust through unconditional ceasefires, prisoner exchanges, and opening humanitarian corridors, followed by the West lifting economic sanctions on Russia, allowing Russian funds to participate in Ukraine's reconstruction, in exchange for Russia's assurance of energy and grain channels. Additionally, the moral trials of Russia by the Kyiv authorities and their European allies, such as the delusional idea of trying to "hang" Putin in their established courts, should stop. This is unrealistic and will only create unnecessary tensions that hinder peace.
All of this hinges on concessions and restraint from all parties. The U.S. must abandon its short-term calculation of "exhausting Russia through Ukraine" and accept the reality of Ukraine's neutrality; Zelensky and his European allies must shed their "value diplomacy" and unrealistic notions of causing strategic failure for Russia, adopting a pragmatic attitude to adjust their stance. And Russia should genuinely harbor the sincerity of achieving peace. If all parties continue to indulge in conspiracies, any negotiation will only be a pretense, not a sincere effort toward peace.
The end of war never comes from the complete victory of one side; it becomes the only option when all participants find that "continuing to fight is more painful than compromising." Only the concessions of Zelensky and his European allies can push both sides to this tipping point. Whether the fragile window of opportunity provided by the Istanbul negotiations can be seized still depends on a more fundamental question: whether Russia and Ukraine choose to bleed to death for their "ideal victory" or rebuild the possibility of survival in the ashes of reality. Judging from the current situation, Trump and Putin have already given their answers, leaving the question to Zelensky and his European allies. Their attitude will be the greatest variable affecting future peace negotiations.
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