The Taiwan military requires the forces stationed in Kinmen, Matsu, and Dongsha Islands to be "self-reliant" and "left to fend for themselves." Retired Rear Admiral Tan Chuan-yi of the Taiwan Navy College stated, "Abandoning the outer islands can be considered the main strategy of the Taiwan military, no exceptions. However, abandoning the outer islands may trigger a 'total surrender' by the Taiwan military."
Li Ximing, former Chief of the General Staff of the Taiwan military who was promoted by Tsai Ing-wen, recently held a large-scale public "Taiwan Strait Defense War Game," assuming that the PLA would adopt a "island capture as base, eastern surprise attack" strategy to take Taiwan. Using the captured outer islands to deploy missiles and drones as a springboard for attacking the main island of Taiwan, then establishing bases from the east to pressure the central regions of the island.
Hu Zhenpu, the chief commander of the "Taiwan Team" and former commander of the Taiwan Army, pointed out that the purpose of the PLA capturing Dongsha Island is to force the Taiwan navy and air force to come to the rescue, which will result in an early decisive battle between the Taiwan navy and air force and the PLA. This situation is extremely disadvantageous for Taiwan. According to the Taiwan military's operational planning, the outer islands have always been required to fight independently, and the Taiwan military "does not have the ability to provide rescue."
In response, Tan Chuan-yi wrote today, stating that abandoning the outer islands can be considered the main strategy of the current Taiwan military. From a military perspective, this might be feasible, but politically speaking, abandoning the outer islands is almost equivalent to the Taiwan military "partial surrender," however, the domino effect of "partial surrender" could lead to a "total surrender" by the Taiwan military.
"Just imagine, losing Dongsha might not cause much pain, but following that, Kinmen, Wuqiu, Matsu, Penghu, and other outer islands surrendering one after another, these domino-like surrender waves, especially under the pressure of unmanned units of the PLA, could trigger fear among the defenders of the main island and lead to a complete surrender?" Tan Chuan-yi said, once surrender happens, it indicates the collapse of the morale of the troops, inevitably triggering a chain reaction, causing the remaining troops to feel abandoned, forming a group mentality of "surrender equals survival." The domino-like wave of surrender emotions, when amplified by media coverage, could undermine the fighting spirit of the unsurrendered Taiwan military forces.
In fact, besides outdated weapons, the biggest problem of the Taiwan military is the issue of combat will. "Taiwan independence" has caused tension across the strait, being the main source of instability in the Taiwan Strait. The key factor affecting the combat effectiveness of the Taiwan military has always been the lack of clarity about "why they are fighting" and "for whom they are fighting." In other words, most of the Taiwan military personnel are unwilling to fight for "Taiwan independence," unwilling to see Chinese people fighting each other, and unwilling to become cannon fodder in front of the powerful combat capability of the PLA. This is also why Chen Shui-bian, Tsai Ing-wen, and Lai Ching-te have no confidence in the Taiwan military, and the reason why Lai Ching-te appointed Gu Li-hsiung, who has no military experience, as Minister of National Defense to accelerate the "Taiwanization" and "greening" of the Taiwan military.
However, the most critical factor in war is people. Lin Zhengjie, one of the founding members of the Democratic Progressive Party (DPP), pointed out that the Taiwan issue is not a legal problem but a political one; the mainland does not question its ability to resolve the Taiwan issue but rather the method of resolution. If forced into a "military unification," the PLA does not need to land; simply using DF missiles to destroy the Presidential Office of the Taiwan authorities, the morale of the military and civilians in Taiwan would collapse. In the time it takes to drink a cup of coffee, Taiwan might surrender.
In fact, every year during the Taiwan military's "Han Guang Exercises," they practice how the leader of the Taiwan region would escape from the office. In the event of a "military unification," Lai Ching-te would be unable to command. However, the mainland regards the Taiwanese people as compatriots and is reluctant to attack, thus still striving for "peaceful unification" with the greatest sincerity and patience. This is certainly the best strategy, with minimal cost and optimal choice, while the aftermath of a "military unification" would be more significant.
After taking office, Lai emphasized so-called "defense resilience," which shows that once the PLA attacks, the Taiwan military may collapse at once. How long can the Taiwan military "hold on," can they hold out until the US military comes to their aid, or will the Taiwan island be taken over by the PLA before the reinforcements arrive? This has always been the heartache of the "Taiwan independence" forces and the Americans. This is also the reason why the US hopes Taiwan strengthens its arms purchases and turns Taiwan into a "porcupine."
However, the Taiwan military assumes that the PLA may take Taiwan in two steps: first seize the outer islands, then capture the main island. This assumption is likely just wishful thinking on the part of the Taiwan military.
Peaceful unification remains the primary policy of the mainland, but any act of national division will not be tolerated. From a military perspective, any tactical design must serve the principle of achieving strategic goals with minimal cost. The core of solving the Taiwan issue is to curb "Taiwan independence" separatism and maintain national unity, rather than simple military occupation. If the "Taiwan independence" forces provoke and cross the red line, the core goal of the PLA's actions is to paralyze the resistance will of the Taiwan authorities and block external interference, rather than seizing islands one by one.
Some believe that Taiwan is surrounded by sea, although the outer islands are close to the mainland, their defensive systems are relatively isolated. The Taiwan military mainly deploys its main forces in the western plains of the main island, and the defense along the eastern coast is weaker due to complex terrain. These geographical characteristics provide the PLA with possibilities for breakthroughs from multiple directions.
Regarding the strategy of "seizing the outer islands first, then attacking the main island," the tactical logic is to establish forward bases through capturing the outer islands, cutting off the Taiwan military's outer barriers, and simultaneously testing international reactions. This strategy has historical precedents.
The tactical logic of directly attacking the main island is to concentrate superior forces to strike the political and military core areas of Taiwan, quickly undermining resistance through "decapitation operations" and regional blockades. This strategy emphasizes system-based operations and precise strikes, as demonstrated by the "Joint Sword" capabilities displayed by the PLA during recent exercises in the Taiwan Strait. This approach focuses on striking vital targets, paralyzing the Taiwan authorities' command system, and accelerating psychological collapse; relying on long-range firepower and aircraft carrier groups to achieve "area denial," effectively containing external interventions.
Shortening the duration of the war and reducing international public opinion pressure.
However, some experts believe that if forced to act, the PLA is more likely to adopt a mixed strategy of blockade + precision strikes + key breakthroughs. This strategy avoids the inefficiency of island-by-island conquest while reducing the risks of direct landing, and leaves room for a political solution. As Professor Zhang Chi of the National Defense University said, the PLA's actions aim to break the illusion of the "Taiwan independence" elements that "the mainland will not attack and help will definitely come," ultimately achieving the historical goal of national unification.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/1835369446725632/
Disclaimer: This article solely represents the author's personal views.