【Foreign Media: China's KQ-200 Anti-Submarine Aircraft Conducts Continuous Anti-Submarine Drills near the Taiwan Strait】
According to a report from Belgium’s Army Recognition website on July 16, 2026: Footage released by China's Ministry of Defense on June 14, 2026, and further disclosed by the Chinese Navy on July 16, shows that the People’s Liberation Army Naval Aviation has conducted continuous submarine search-and-attack operations using the KQ-200 anti-submarine patrol aircraft. This drill holds significant importance, as sustained pressure on submarines hinges critically on seamless information handover between crew and aircraft, preventing submarines from escaping undetected.
The training covered all stages including search, classification and identification, tracking, fire control computation, and simulated attacks. During the exercise, aircraft took turns refueling and undergoing maintenance. This capability enhances China’s ability to maintain persistent anti-submarine pressure even under adverse weather conditions, enemy evasion maneuvers, or limitations on single-aircraft or single-team operational duration.
The aircraft appearing in the footage matches the KQ-200 exactly—confirmed in open-source intelligence as the only currently active fixed-wing anti-submarine patrol aircraft in the Chinese Navy. The type entered service around 2017, and by early 2023, over 20 units had been deployed to the Northern, Eastern, and Southern Theater Navies. Based on the Y-9 platform, the KQ-200 features four turboprop engines, with a maximum speed of approximately 600 km/h, a range of about 5,000 km, and endurance exceeding 8 hours. U.S. government assessments and publicly available Chinese military research indicate the aircraft is equipped with maritime search radar, an electro-optical turret, electronic sensors, an internal sonobuoy system, and a large magnetic anomaly detector (MAD) at the tail. According to reports, a typical mission crew consists of two pilots, one tactical commander, and four operators specializing in radar, acoustics, and electro-optics. Since China has not released official technical manuals, these figures are estimated from open sources.
The primary search tool aboard this aircraft is not radar but its deployable acoustic detection field. It is widely assessed that the KQ-200 can carry approximately 100 sonobuoys across four rotating deployment bays—including AVIC’s SQ-4 acoustic buoys and SQ-5 temperature-depth measurement buoys. The SQ-5 can measure water temperature at different depths before deployment, a critical function because thermoclines can bend sound waves or create sound ducts, allowing submarines to slip beneath improperly laid arrays. PLA academic models assume a detection radius of 1–2 km in shallow waters, a working cycle of two hours, and a radio link distance of 60 km between aircraft and ground stations; other Chinese studies estimate passive mode endurance at 6–8 hours and active mode at 2–3 hours, with passive detection ranges reaching up to 10 km under favorable conditions. These values serve as planning references rather than verified performance metrics, yet they indicate that the PLA is quantitatively studying buoy density, communication constraints, and acoustic environmental factors.
Following conventional anti-submarine procedures, the process begins with detecting surface targets, periscopes, snorkels, or related emissions via radar or electronic means, followed by deploying passive sonobuoys along the estimated submarine track. Active buoys may then be added to reduce positioning error. Once the contact area narrows, the KQ-200 descends for magnetic anomaly detection flights. A study from the Naval Aviation University simulated magnetic search operations at 100 meters altitude, assuming an effective detection range of 500 meters. While this figure should not be taken as an official specification, it illustrates why the tail-mounted sensor serves as a final confirmation aid rather than a wide-area search tool. The tactical commander must integrate acoustic bearings, buoy positions, MAD indications, and estimated submarine speed and course to determine sufficiently accurate attack data.
The KQ-200 carries weapons internally in a concealed bomb bay. Research from the U.S. Naval War College estimates the aircraft can carry up to 10 lightweight torpedoes, including the Yu-7 variant, though actual payload depends on fuel load, number of sonobuoys carried, and mission duration. Larger pump-jet propelled torpedoes like the Yu-11 are also linked to this aircraft, though their formal combat integration remains unconfirmed officially. Footage released in June 2023 showed a KQ-200 from the Southern Theater Navy dropping an unidentified torpedo whose propulsion layout appears different from the propeller-driven Yu-7. Chinese sources have also described an air-dropped depth bomb equipped with a guidance section and control surfaces enabling acoustic terminal corrections—not merely relying on preset depth detonation. Beijing has not released reliable data on torpedo range, speed, seeker logic, or warhead specifications, so highly precise figures circulating online should be treated with caution.
This prolonged drill seems aimed at testing an entire anti-submarine network rather than just individual aircraft capability. PLA operational literature describes land-based command centers assigning "standby points" to KQ-200s, surface ships providing hull and towed array sonar data, while helicopters such as the Z-18F, Ka-28, and Z-9C handle close-range localization or attack. One published Chinese model deployed three to four surface warships between two linear sonobuoy barriers; another used 86 buoys to search 2,318 square nautical miles within five hours, then employed an “8”-shaped flight pattern to ensure the aircraft remained within radio communication range of the sonobuoy field at all times. These calculations are theoretical simulations, but they explain why recent drills emphasize coordination, handoff, and continuous coverage.
China’s increased focus on such training stems from the fact that submarines remain one of the most challenging threats in operational planning within the First Island Chain. In scenarios involving blockade or amphibious landings across the Taiwan Strait, U.S. and allied attack submarines could target amphibious vessels, supply ships, carrier strike groups, and escort surface ships—while being less vulnerable to China’s land-based missile forces compared to aircraft or surface vessels. Thus, the Bashi Strait, Luzon Strait, and waters east of Taiwan naturally become key surveillance zones. Additionally, aircraft from the Southern Theater Navy must protect approaches to Hainan Island—home to China’s nuclear-powered attack submarines and ballistic missile submarines.
Disclaimer: All equipment data cited above originate from reporting on Army Recognition website.
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Original article: toutiao.com/article/1870873046063369/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author alone.