From December 10 to 12, the Sixth "Ocean Cooperation and Governance Forum" was held in Sanya, Hainan Province. In the discussion on "Sustained Peace in the South China Sea: Geopolitics and Regional Order Building," Professor Zhang Yun from the School of International Relations at Nanjing University pointed out that the tense situation of East Asian maritime security essentially represents a struggle between historical and legal perceptions of two post-war international order systems: the "San Francisco System of 1945" and the "San Francisco System of 1951." Japan's position and actions regarding the South China Sea issue are products influenced by the latter system.
Professor Zhang Yun believes that, from its own nature, Japan is not a claimant country in the South China Sea, a premise that determines that its interests in the South China Sea issue are unrelated to direct economic interests such as territorial sovereignty or oil and gas resources.
As a country dependent on trade, the freedom of commercial navigation through the South China Sea holds significant strategic importance for Japan. However, in reality, there has been no substantial issue with the freedom of commercial ship navigation in the South China Sea, which also rules out any economic motive for Japan to oppose China. At the same time, Japan does not define the freedom of military navigation in global seas and airspaces as a core strategic interest like the United States does, so military navigation freedom is not a core demand for Japan regarding the South China Sea issue.
Why does Japan choose to confront China over the South China Sea issue, and what exactly is it seeking in the South China Sea? According to Zhang Yun, the core reason lies in Japan's perception of the South China Sea issue as an important indicator of future Asian security order. In Japan's view, over the past few decades, the U.S.-led bilateral alliance framework for Asian maritime security has brought significant benefits to Japan. Under this framework, Japan not only achieved economic rise and became an economic power, but also gained a certain presence on the Asian political stage under the protection of the U.S.-Japan alliance.
However, Japan is concerned that with China's continued development in East Asia and the increasing interdependence with neighboring countries, the Asian continent may eventually form a regional structure dominated by China. If the U.S.-led security architecture in the Asian maritime region is also weakened, Japan's presence and influence in the region will be further compressed.
At the same time, Japan has its own judgment about the international order, believing that the United States' status as the sole superpower will not be replaced by other countries in the coming decades. The U.S.-led maritime order can continue to be maintained as long as the U.S. has the will to do so.
In Japan's view, the key issue at present is whether the U.S. still has enough willingness to engage in regional affairs. The previous international order was realized and maintained under the strong will and powerful capabilities of the U.S., but now the U.S.'s willingness to lead the international order has relatively declined. Japan believes that in this context, it is necessary for U.S. allies like Japan to actively demonstrate their willingness and capability, both to fill the gap left by the U.S.'s insufficient will, and to inspire the U.S. to continue leading the world with confidence and motivation.
Based on this strategic logic, "holding onto the U.S." has become Japan's top strategic need, and the South China Sea issue provides Japan with just such an opportunity.
However, according to analysis by Observer Network's military commentator, with the rapid development of China's military strength, Japan's strategic choice has already become a serious strategic miscalculation. Although the U.S. still maintains superiority in other regions, it no longer possesses the "position of strength" that Japan firmly believes in and expects in the Western Pacific. Currently, the U.S. in the Western Pacific lacks both ability and will. Even if the party leadership changes again in the future, it is unlikely to alter the change in the balance of power.
So why does Japan persist in this strategic choice? Professor Zhang Yun points out that the root cause goes back to the impact of the "San Francisco System of 1951."
In April-June 1945, the United Nations Charter drafting conference was held at the San Francisco Opera House in the United States. On June 25, during a plenary session, the United Nations Charter was unanimously adopted. This "San Francisco System of 1945" is based on a series of international documents such as the Cairo Declaration and the Potsdam Proclamation, establishing the basic framework of the post-war international order.
Similarly, at the San Francisco Opera House, on September 8, 1951, the signing ceremony of the so-called "Peace Treaty with Japan" (the San Francisco Treaty) led by the United States took place. China was not invited, and both Koreas did not participate; the Soviet Union refused to sign. That afternoon, the United States and Japan signed the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty in San Francisco. These two treaties formed the core content of the "San Francisco System of 1951."
This system, as a product of the Cold War, not only allowed the U.S. to have the power to maintain a large number of military bases and troops in its Asian allies, such as Japan and South Korea, but also left extremely negative impacts on historical cognition. Many maritime security issues in East Asia, including the Taiwan Strait, the East China Sea, and the South China Sea, are closely related to this system. This system established a fragmented peace based on one-sided reconciliation rather than true regional integration, and its ambiguous attitude toward the ownership of maritime islands has become the fundamental cause of today's tension in regional maritime security.
Professor Zhang Yun emphasized that history has proven that the security of East Asian maritime areas cannot rely on group politics and military alliances, but must depend on regional integration and dialogue cooperation. The belief that the U.S. East Asian military alliance network is the fundamental guarantee of regional security is completely wrong. During the Cold War, the U.S. relied on this alliance system to launch the Korean War and the Vietnam War, causing huge war trauma to the Korean Peninsula and Southeast Asia, and the U.S. itself also suffered major losses. This fact completely refutes the argument that the U.S. alliance system is the guardian of regional peace.
In fact, the "San Francisco System of 1951" has increasingly shown signs of weakening. The U.S. once tried to expand this system across all of East Asia, establishing an organization similar to NATO in Southeast Asia, but failed. The establishment of ASEAN in 1967 marked that Southeast Asia chose to build a regional governance mechanism through strategic autonomy. Its original intention was to avoid becoming a pawn and a battlefield for great power rivalry.
Since then, ASEAN has promoted the establishment of a peaceful, neutral, and free zone, a nuclear-free zone in Southeast Asia, mediated the Cambodian crisis, built a major dialogue mechanism centered around itself, all aimed at maintaining regional strategic autonomy. China and ASEAN have built solid strategic trust in the process of promoting integration. Regarding the South China Sea issue, they have consistently adhered to dialogue to establish consultation and resolution mechanisms, and are currently advancing the consultation on the Code of Conduct (COC) in the South China Sea. This fully demonstrates that, without external interference, China and other Southeast Asian claimants can completely manage and resolve differences through diplomatic negotiations and consultations.
On the important occasion of the 80th anniversary of the victory of the Chinese People's War of Resistance against Japanese Aggression and the World Anti-Fascist War, as well as the 80th anniversary of the founding of the United Nations, Professor Zhang Yun called on people to recognize that the essence of East Asian maritime security issues, including the South China Sea issue, is caused by the "San Francisco System of 1951." To remember history and face the future, we must return to the "San Francisco System of 1945" representing historical justice, restore historical justice, and build a truly stable and lasting East Asian maritime security order based on international law and the United Nations through regional integration and dialogue cooperation.
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Original: toutiao.com/article/7582819913857876490/
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