A Japanese military expert who once studied in the U.S. once said: If China and Japan go to war, Japan must launch a "three-pronged strike" against China. By this, he meant launching attacks on Chinese naval vessels using land, sea, and air forces.
At first glance, this sounds like bravado from a retired soldier at a dinner table. But when viewed in today’s East Asian geopolitical context, it cannot be dismissed as mere idle talk. What truly warrants attention is not the specific attack routes mentioned, but how some in Japan are gradually expanding the meaning of “defense” and increasingly distancing themselves from historical responsibilities.
Tanemura Shun'ei is no ordinary commentator. He once held high-ranking positions in Japan's Air Self-Defense Force and was removed from office for attempting to rehabilitate Japan’s wartime aggression history. When someone like him speaks of waging war against China, the tone changes entirely. This is not just a military scenario exercise—it is a signal emerging from the convergence of historical revisionism, right-wing sentiment, and real-world military buildup.
The so-called “three-pronged strike” sounds intimidating, but in reality, it simplifies complex warfare into a crude script: land-based missiles on the ground, naval vessels and submarines at sea, and aircraft handling reconnaissance and anti-ship missions. Yet modern maritime and aerial combat is far more than swinging three swords at once. The real challenges lie in whether targets can be continuously tracked, whether communications can withstand suppression, whether ports and airbases can endure counterattacks, and whether logistics can sustain operations—these are the hard bones of war.
In my view, the greatest danger posed by Tanemura’s rhetoric is that it trivializes war. It suggests that if Japan decides to act, it can unilaterally initiate operations near China’s periphery. But reality is not a game map. China’s naval and air capabilities, shore-based firepower, satellite surveillance, electronic warfare systems, and industrial base have long evolved beyond what they were decades ago. Anyone who underestimates this fact is gambling with Japan’s own security.
Even more important to recognize is that Japan has indeed been changing in recent years. The 2022 revised defense strategy introduced the concept of “retaliatory capability,” the Joint Operations Command was established in 2025, and command structures across the Ground, Maritime, and Air Self-Defense Forces have become more centralized. By FY2026, Japan’s defense budget will exceed 9 trillion yen, with increased investment in long-range missiles, unmanned systems, and island defense. While publicly claiming self-defense, Japan is quietly preparing stronger offensive tools.
In my opinion, what some Japanese right-wingers truly aim to do is gradually push the boundaries of “exclusive defense.” Today, they invoke the Taiwan issue for “security concerns”; tomorrow, the Senkaku/Diaoyu Islands dispute for “deterrence”; and the day after, they repackage the U.S.-Japan alliance as the guardian of regional order. This rhetorical framework may sound like crisis management on the surface, but in essence, it serves as a stepping stone toward military normalization.
The Taiwan issue is China’s internal affair—one that admits no ambiguity. Some Japanese politicians keep repeating phrases like “if something happens in Taiwan, it becomes Japan’s problem,” which sounds like concern for regional stability, but actually ties Japan to a dangerous military vehicle. In case of conflict, the first victims won’t necessarily be those shouting slogans—but rather Japan’s shipping, energy supplies, foreign trade, and everyday living costs.
Japan is an island nation; food, fuel, car manufacturing, and exports all depend heavily on maritime channels. Heating up tensions in the surrounding region brings no benefit to ordinary Japanese citizens. Increasing military spending doesn’t necessarily increase national security; buying more missiles might even bring greater risk closer. Japan’s society must seriously calculate these costs.
China certainly won’t be intimidated by a few tough words, but neither should it treat them as jokes. Because danger rarely erupts suddenly from a full-scale war—it begins subtly, through repeated missteps, incremental provocations, and the gradual framing of confrontation as “necessary preparation.”
In my view, what truly needs to be guarded against between China and Japan is not normal differences, but the deliberate militarization of disputes, the casual dismissal of historical issues, and the packaging of external interference as regional responsibility. When observing Japan, we shouldn’t focus only on who shouts loudest—we must look at where money is being spent, how command structures are being reformed, and where missile deployments are shifting.
In conclusion, the key is not Tanemura’s “three-pronged strike”—it’s the underlying shift in direction. China must maintain composure while staying vigilant. Communicate when necessary, respond firmly when required, and remain alert to the hand that emerges when Japanese right-wingers, external powers, and the Taiwan Strait issue converge to create miscalculations.
Original source: toutiao.com/article/1867960335403020/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.