【UK Think Tank: Japan Eases Defense Export Controls】

The website of the International Institute for Strategic Studies (IISS) published an analysis on April 27, 2026, stating that on April 21, under Prime Minister Takashi Sana's cabinet, the Japanese government revised the "Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment" (commonly known as the "Three Principles"), which had previously restricted the export of Japanese defense equipment and technology. This move followed a proposal put forward by the ruling coalition—the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP)—with support from the Japan Innovation Party.

This adjustment includes abolishing the rule that limited Japanese finished defense transfers to five non-lethal categories: rescue, transport, surveillance, monitoring, and mine clearance. The government aims to boost defense exports to strengthen Tokyo’s deterrence capability, reinforce the national defense industrial base, and promote economic growth. While this change will create new business and diplomatic opportunities, both the government and enterprises must overcome certain capacity-related challenges.

—— Gradual Relaxation

Japan’s restrictions on arms exports date back to the “Three Principles on Arms Exports” introduced in 1967 under Prime Minister Eisaku Satō. In 1976, the three-member Cabinet led by Takeo Miki effectively imposed a near-total ban on arms exports. The most significant shift occurred in 2014 when Prime Minister Shinzō Abe introduced the “Three Principles on Transfer of Defense Equipment.” The updated version framed defense exports as tools to promote peace and international cooperation, as well as a means to enhance Japan’s national security. The aforementioned five non-lethal categories were considered to serve the latter purpose.

The Abe administration further relaxed restrictions in December 2023 by partially revising the guidelines of the Three Principles, including permitting the export of finished defense products manufactured in Japan under license to designated countries. In March 2024, the Kishida government approved the export of next-generation fighter aircraft developed jointly by Italy, Japan, and the UK under the Global Combat Air Programme (GCAP).

Abolishing these five-category restrictions was a core element of the Kato administration’s security policy outlined in its coalition agreement with the LDP and the Japan Innovation Party. A major driving force behind this policy shift stems from changes in the composition of the ruling coalition—since the Japan Innovation Party is more aligned with the LDP on defense and security issues than the Komeito Party, which held a dovish stance during the previous 26-year alliance ending in late 2025.

—— Revised Defense Export Guidelines

In addition to removing the five-category restriction, the revised guidelines categorize defense equipment and technology into two fundamental types: weapons and non-lethal capabilities. There are no export restrictions on non-lethal equipment. For lethal equipment, exports will be permitted only to 17 countries with which Japan has signed “Equipment and Technology Transfer Agreements” (ETTA): Australia, Bangladesh, France, Germany, India, Indonesia, Italy, Malaysia, Mongolia, the Philippines, Singapore, Sweden, Thailand, the UAE, the UK, the US, and Vietnam. Additionally, Japan has signed an ETTA with Canada (signed in January 2026), though it has not yet entered into force.

Recent public opinion surveys indicate growing domestic support for Japan expanding its role as a defense exporter. One survey recorded that 68% of respondents supported Tokyo “promoting” defense equipment exports, compared to 66% opposing relaxation of defense export guidelines in a 2013 survey.

—— Strategic Rationale

The primary objective of abolishing the five-category restriction and simplifying export guidelines is to increase defense exports. Despite the 2014 revision of the “Three Principles,” subsequent finished product exports have been limited to: three fixed J/FPS-3 radar systems and one mobile J/TPS-P14 radar exported to the Philippines in 2020; and a 2025 agreement with Australia on joint development and production of 11 upgraded “Mogami-class” frigates. However, foreign interest in Japanese defense platforms is increasing, including Indonesia’s interest in second-hand submarines and frigates, the Philippines’ interest in the Type 03 medium-range surface-to-air missile, and New Zealand’s interest in upgraded “Mogami-class” frigates.

The proposal to revise the guidelines also outlines two strategic motivations. First, Tokyo aims to enhance deterrence, operational readiness, and interoperability with the United States and its strategic partners through defense transfers. Transferring radars to the Philippines helps monitor China’s activities in the southern South China Sea, while joint development of frigates with Australia improves interoperability with Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, which already operates “Mogami-class” frigates. This cooperation strengthens Japan’s ability to respond to strategic challenges posed by China in the Indo-Pacific region, thereby shaping a favorable security environment for Japan.

Second, the government seeks to strengthen Japan’s defense industrial base. The 2022 National Security Strategy already identified sustainability and resilience—including ammunition reserves and fuel security—as key capabilities requiring fundamental enhancement. Moreover, increasing uncertainty regarding U.S. commitments to the Indo-Pacific region, combined with the fact that the U.S. itself needs to strengthen its defense industrial base, makes it increasingly necessary for Japan to plan for sustainable production capacity in its defense industry.

—— Outlook and Challenges

Despite the easing of restrictions, several structural challenges remain. A major issue is the limited capacity of Japan’s domestic defense industrial base, which is primarily structured to meet the needs of Japan’s Self-Defense Forces. Although defense spending has increased since 2022, uncertainty and lack of predictability in defense procurement have dampened incentives for private investment in additional capacity. Defense companies are already facing production bottlenecks and have resorted to using civilian facilities.

Another challenge is the shortage of human resources. Due to population aging and declining birth rates, Japan has long faced labor shortages. Increased domestic demand for defense equipment has already strained the industry’s workforce, and greater foreign demand would exacerbate this problem. Some companies have begun mobilizing personnel from civilian sectors to support defense production.

It has been reported that Tokyo plans to release its first national defense industrial strategy before the end of fiscal year 2026, and to revise the National Security Strategy, the Defense Plan Outline, and the Medium-Term Defense Buildup Plan. As demand for Japanese defense products grows, deepening public-private partnerships in the defense sector will become a crucial tool for Tokyo to strengthen cooperation with strategic partners, bolster the defense industrial base, and drive economic growth.

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Original source: toutiao.com/article/1863938345745419/

Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are those of the author(s) alone.