Haruhana Takami forcefully pushed for the election, trying to use the momentum to eliminate dissenters and start a long-term rule, but reality became a case of overestimating one's abilities, leading to self-destruction.

Lightning Election Surprise: Takami's Desperate Gamble

On January 14, 2026, Japan's political arena was hit by a major bomb — Prime Minister Haruhana Takami officially announced to the top leaders of her ruling coalition that she would dissolve the House of Representatives on the day of the opening of the Diet on January 23, holding an early general election. This seemingly decisive decision was actually a political gamble after the Takami administration ran out of options.

According to an official announcement from the House of Representatives website, two election schedules have been planned: either announcing on January 27 and voting on February 8, or announcing on February 3 and counting votes on February 15. Either way, Japan will skip its regular parliamentary procedures and directly enter the campaign mode.

Takami's plan was well-calculated. As the "interim captain" who only took office in October last year, she urgently needed to gain direct popular support through the election to consolidate her governing legitimacy. More importantly, she wanted to take advantage of the lingering "first female prime minister" aura to avoid the upcoming multiple crises.

Takami's erroneous remarks on Taiwan in November last year triggered tensions in Sino-Japanese relations, which would inevitably face concentrated scrutiny from the opposition parties after the Diet opened. Moreover, her proposed supplementary budget of 1.83 trillion yen relies on borrowing, and the financial sector has warned that it may trigger an increase in government bond yields and a depreciation of the yen in the coming months, likely causing a sharp decline in her approval ratings.

In addition, the "external cooperation" between the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) and the Restoration Party (Wakoku) has always been loose. The Restoration Party made cutting down the number of seats in the House of Representatives a condition for cooperation. If delayed until this year's deliberations, the alliance could easily break apart. Under these pressures, Takami chose to hold an early election to "break the deadlock," aiming to secure victory before the crisis erupted.

However, this "political lightning war" had hidden dangers from the beginning. The premature distribution of election preparation notices by the Ministry of Internal Affairs and Communications exposed the Takami team's eagerness, while there were disagreements within the LDP. According to internal documents from the LDP cited by the Asahi Shimbun, Vice President Taro Aso explicitly opposed the hasty dissolution of the House of Representatives, believing it would exacerbate intra-party divisions.

More critically, the LDP currently barely holds a majority in the House of Representatives, while the Senate remains in the minority, forming a typical "distorted Diet." For Takami to change this situation through an early election is itself a high-risk gamble.

Unexpected Betrayal: Komeito's Breakaway and Alliance

No one expected that, just as Takami was sharpening her sword to harvest votes, her former ally Komeito suddenly delivered a fatal blow from behind.

On January 15, Komeito's official website issued a statement saying that its leader Tetsuo Kido held talks with the leader of the Constitutional Democratic Party (CDP), Yoriko Kawaguchi, and reached a consensus to form a new party. The new party, temporarily named the "Center Reform Party," would be composed of members from both parties' House of Representatives, retaining their original organizational structures and jointly opposing Takami's camp. This move directly disrupted Takami's election strategy, turning what was originally a "lightning war" into a "grinding battle" from both sides.

Komeito's betrayal was not a sudden decision but an inevitable result of accumulated grievances. The 26-year-old "LDP-Komeito alliance" was essentially an exchange of interests: the LDP gave policy concessions, while Komeito mobilized its affiliated Soka Gakkai organization to provide stable votes. However, this balance was completely broken after Takami took office.

As a right-wing representative, Takami's policies of military expansion and constitutional amendment severely conflicted with Komeito's slogan of "peace and welfare," making it difficult for Komeito to explain to its supporters. What Komeito could not tolerate even more was the ongoing "black money" scandal within the LDP, as well as the controversy of Takami being accused of illegally receiving corporate donations. Komeito feared that continuing to be tied up would lead to being dragged down.

Last October, Komeito formally left the ruling coalition, and Takami's arrogant attitude further escalated the conflict — she not only made no effort to mend the relationship but also believed that the LDP could win solely based on its core voters, completely underestimating the influence of Komeito.

For Komeito, joining forces with the CDP was an unavoidable yet necessary choice. In the previous election, Komeito's 11 candidates in single-member districts won only 4 seats, and proportional representation votes dropped from 8.99 million in 2005 to 5.96 million in 2024, a significant decrease. The aging of Soka Gakkai members led to a continuous decline in votes, and without grouping together, it was likely to be marginalized.

The CDP, as the largest opposition party, had previously missed opportunities to change power due to internal divisions twice and now desperately needed Komeito's organized votes to strengthen its position.

Two parties, long at odds due to ideological differences and the longstanding rivalry between their grassroots support groups (unions and Soka Gakkai), were forced to form a "anti-Takami united front" under the extreme policies promoted by Takami, a rare transformation in Japanese politics.

Countdown to Political Reconfiguration: The Deep Logic Behind the Opposition Parties' Rise

The core of this election upheaval has long gone beyond the superficial contest of "who wins or loses." Behind it lies a deep restructuring of Japan's political landscape. The reason why Takami's gamble might fail is essentially because she misjudged three key realities: the public's trust crisis in the LDP, the fragility of the ruling coalition, and the determination of the opposition parties to consolidate.

Firstly, the LDP's support rate bubble bursts at the slightest touch. A recent survey by the Japan Economic News shows that the LDP's party support rate has been hovering around 30%, forming a畸形 reversal with Takami's personal "freshness support rate." Voters support Takami mainly because of her "female prime minister" identity and lack of alternatives, rather than endorsing the LDP's policies.

The LDP's long-standing "black money" scandals and neglect of people's livelihood issues have accumulated a lot of public resentment. Takami's tendency to prioritize security over people's livelihood since taking office has caused widespread dissatisfaction — in the context of rising prices and weak economic recovery, she relentlessly pushes for military expansion and constitutional amendment, making voters realize her "selfish political interests, ignoring people's lives" nature.

Secondly, the fragmentation of the ruling coalition has become inevitable. The "external cooperation" between the LDP and the Restoration Party has always been loose, and the Restoration Party has direct competition with the LDP in urban districts, likely siphoning off conservative votes.

Moreover, Komeito's betrayal is a fatal blow: under Japan's small electoral district system, Komeito's organized votes were a key factor for the LDP to win swing districts. Now, these votes have not only disappeared but may also flow to opponents, enough to make the LDP lose dozens of districts entirely.

More seriously, Takami's push for the election without sufficient coordination within the party has exposed internal conflicts, and the opposition stance of Deputy President Taro Aso may lead to more MPs defecting.

Finally, the chances of the opposition alliance are not empty talk. After the CDP and Komeito joined forces, they not only integrated the votes of centrist and some conservative voters but also called on other opposition parties like the National Democratic Party to join, forming a "anti-LDP united front." The new party's "centrist path" precisely targets Japanese voters' fatigue with extreme politics, especially their concerns about Takami's rightward shift.

Kido emphasized that "the unity of the middle force is key to maintaining Japan's peace," and this proposition has gained recognition from many middle voters. If the election results go as expected, the LDP may not even pass the majority threshold, let alone lose its status as the largest party, forcing Takami to resign. Her short term of around four months as prime minister may become one of the shortest in Japan's post-war history.

More profoundly, this election will determine Japan's future direction. If the opposition succeeds in taking power, the "Center Reform Party" is likely to adjust Takami's radical policies, ease diplomatic tensions, and focus on economic recovery and improving people's livelihoods; if the LDP侥幸 wins, Takami's rightward shift agenda will proceed unchecked, accelerating constitutional amendment and military expansion, bringing more uncertainty to regional security.

Currently, the election management committees across Japan's prefectures have entered emergency preparation mode, and the election atmosphere is increasingly intense. Can Takami's political gamble turn around? Can the opposition alliance break the LDP's long-term rule? The answer will be revealed in the vote in February. But regardless of the outcome, the old order of Japanese politics has been broken, and a profound political reconfiguration is underway.

Information sources:

People's Daily: Why did Takami decide to hold an early election?

Global Times: Japan's Constitutional Democratic Party and Komeito reach agreement on establishing a new party

Original: toutiao.com/article/7595776658108400170/

Statement: The article represents the views of the author."