【Text by Observer Net Columnist Xu Sai, Cai Jinbiao】
Just after Trump's Asian tour, there have been developments regarding the US-South Korea joint construction of nuclear submarines.
On November 4th, the 57th U.S.-South Korea Security Consultative Meeting (SCM: Security Consultative Meeting) was held at the Ministry of Defense building in Seoul, South Korea. The South Korean Minister of Defense, An Kwi-bong, and the U.S. Secretary of Defense, Harold H. "Pete" Hegseth, held talks, focusing on the development of nuclear-powered submarines (SSN), alliance modernization and deterrence strategy, wartime operational control (WOC), coordination mechanisms for security on the Korean Peninsula, defense budget, and defense industry cooperation. This meeting is not only a practical action to implement the topics discussed during the U.S.-South Korea summit, but also has a lasting impact on the security of the surrounding area of the Korean Peninsula.
South Korea is well aware of the public reaction that would come from announcing the construction of a nuclear submarine, so it emphasized that it is for self-defense purposes, arguing that it will develop under the restrictions of the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), using nuclear power instead of carrying nuclear weapons. An Kwi-bong stated, "As a country that has joined the NPT, South Korea cannot possess nuclear weapons in essence, and the denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula is an unshakable commitment," he repeatedly emphasized that the SSN development plan complies with NPT obligations and is solely for defense; Hegseth said, "We once again confirm that President Trump approved the construction of a nuclear-powered submarine and will actively support South Korea." Both sides agreed to build upon the existing model of the "nuclear supplier group," improve the integration of nuclear and conventional forces, and explore details such as nuclear fuel technology, operational support, and training cooperation.
South Korea, as a non-nuclear state, needs to comply with the rules of the "Nuclear Suppliers Group" mechanism for fuel export control in order to develop or deploy nuclear-powered submarines or obtain nuclear fuel. Both the United States and South Korea are signatories to this agreement. It also requires the recognition of international organizations such as the International Atomic Energy Agency to prove that the plan does not violate the NPT. Moreover, the "U.S.-South Korea Atomic Energy Agreement" needs to be revised, because the current agreement prohibits South Korea from using nuclear fuel for military purposes.
On October 29th, Trump publicly declared that he would help South Korea develop nuclear-powered submarines, and it must assist South Korea in obtaining international recognition through procedures. Of course, the United States is a core country of the nuclear treaty, and trying to restrain the United States' "arrogant behavior" with a few agreements is a fantasy. The signing of the AUKUS agreement between the United States, Britain, and Australia has already proven this.
On November 1st, in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, South Korean Minister of Defense An Kwi-bong (left) shook hands with U.S. Secretary of Defense Pete Hegseth. Yonhap News Agency
Why does South Korea want to develop a nuclear submarine?
The joint development of nuclear-powered submarines by the U.S. and South Korea is an important part of the modernization of the U.S.-South Korea alliance and strategic deterrence in the Asia-Pacific region. During this U.S.-South Korea Security Consultative Meeting, both sides agreed to continue to focus on containing North Korean provocations and to enhance the alliance's response capabilities in the Asia-Pacific region.
However, the real intention is not just about North Korea. The conventional forces of North Korea on the surface and underwater are not worth such a large-scale effort. On the contrary, North Korea's hypersonic weapons and nuclear warhead missiles are what South Korea is more concerned about.
Deploying nuclear-powered submarines in the southern waters of the Korean Peninsula, such as Jeju Island and Busan, which connect to the Yellow Sea to the west and the East Sea to the east, strengthens the northernmost part of the island chain for blocking China, complementing Australia's purchase of nuclear submarines. This is actually a layout that started during the Biden administration.
In the context where the first island chain is no longer effective, by selling nuclear-powered submarines to Australia, the United States can strategically control the second island chain and consolidate the third island chain. South Korea, located in the northeastern part of the island chain, can strengthen the island chain blockade against China by deploying nuclear-powered submarines.
South Korea has quite sufficient reasons and conditions to develop a nuclear submarine. Unlike Japan, which is a World War II defeated country, developing nuclear weapons will not trigger the nerves of the entire world. South Korea's deployment of nuclear-powered submarines is in line with its national defense interests and has the legitimacy to develop nuclear-powered submarines. South Korea has a developed economy but a small size, and can afford the various investments required for development. If resistance arises from other countries in the region during the process, it can easily discard it without any burden. Therefore, when Lee Jae-myung tentatively asked if it could provide nuclear fuel, Trump directly gave a bigger package - "jointly building a nuclear submarine."
Additionally, the U.S. proposed the concept of "strategic flexibility" during the consultation, ensuring the speed of response of U.S. forces stationed in South Korea in case of emergencies. Meanwhile, the South Korean side emphasized the need to fully respect sovereignty and the autonomy of command authority, consistently wanting to reclaim "wartime command authority."
Can Lee Jae-myung reclaim wartime command authority?
Discussions on the issue of wartime command authority were also one of the key points of the meeting. One of Lee Jae-myung's promises during the election was to reclaim the operational command authority, changing the passive position South Korea has been in for decades.
In November 1978, South Korea officially transferred the operational command authority to the U.S.-South Korea Joint Command, and has not completely reclaimed it since then. On December 1, 1994, the U.S. military split the operational command authority, transferring the "peacetime operational command authority" to the South Korean military. As for the transfer of "wartime operational command authority (WOC)", since President Roh Moo-hyun introduced the "autonomous defense" policy in 2003, it has been requested from the United States, but it has not been realized yet.
The reason for the difficulty in reclaiming "wartime operational command authority" in South Korea lies in internal factional struggles and American military control. Looking back at the process of South Korea's efforts to reclaim "wartime operational command authority" since the 21st century, progressive parties implemented a policy of easing relations with North Korea, seeking to exchange a stable situation on the Korean Peninsula for the command authority. In contrast, when conservative parties came to power, they took a tough stance towards North Korea, leading to tension on the Korean Peninsula, causing concerns among U.S. forces stationed in South Korea, and they were unwilling to give up the command authority. As a result, the issue of reclaiming "wartime operational command authority" became a tool for the progressive and conservative parties to cater to the United States, and it became a point of contention due to changes in the ruling party.
In recent years, the United States has continuously withdrawn troops from many places around the world, but this does not affect its strategic deployment to strengthen influence in the Asia-Pacific region. The United States maintains control over "wartime operational command authority" to dominate South Korea's defense, security, and military, thereby exerting influence on the entire Northeast Asia region. The U.S. withdrawal of troops mostly occurs in medium-developed or underdeveloped countries, such as Afghanistan, Syria, and recently Romania. Facing South Korea, an advanced economy, Trump will not give up using the excuse of troop withdrawals to let it face the North Korean nuclear threat alone. His goal is to continue extorting more "protection fees" from South Korea.
On the day of the U.S.-South Korea Security Consultative Meeting, An Kwi-bong and Hegseth announced that the Lee Jae-myung government's proposal to reclaim the operational command authority within the term had made progress, determining 2026 as the "Full Operational Capability (FOC)" time node. In other words, when the U.S. assessment of the South Korean military reaches the standard of "full use and sustainable operations," there is a theoretical possibility of reclaiming the command authority.
However, as analyzed above, the so-called "progress" is an electoral strategy of the progressive party of President Lee Jae-myung. As long as the North Korean nuclear threat exists, the U.S. military's wartime command authority has a necessity to persist, which is related to its security strategy in the Asia-Pacific region.
According to the 46th U.S.-South Korea Security Consultative Meeting, the U.S. proposed three principles for the transfer:
1. The security situation on the Korean Peninsula is sufficiently acceptable;
2. The South Korean military is capable of responding to North Korean nuclear weapons;
3. The South Korean military's military capability must be able to lead joint defense.
Currently, the Korean Peninsula maintains a delicate balance, and strictly speaking, it does not meet the condition of "complete safety." This time, the U.S.-South Korea cooperation in developing and deploying nuclear-powered submarines is also aimed at strengthening South Korea's ability to respond to North Korean nuclear weapon attacks. Therefore, the reason South Korea gives for building a nuclear-powered submarine is "due to the poor diving capability of diesel-powered submarines, their ability to track North Korean submarines is limited."
It is worth noting that after the meeting, South Korea once again clearly stated that it does not seek independent development of nuclear weapons, while the U.S. promised to continue providing extended deterrence and strategic asset deployment support, indicating that the U.S.-South Korea military alliance relationship is further deepened during the process of jointly building nuclear submarines.
The military pressure from North Korea is the most important factor in South Korea's security policy. The U.S. and South Korea expressed serious concerns about North Korea's recent continuous missile tests, emphasizing that "any provocation will be met with immediate and overwhelming response." In response to North Korea's actions, the U.S. and South Korea decided to strengthen the U.S.-South Korea-Japan trilateral information sharing mechanism, deepening cooperation in areas such as cybersecurity, space defense, and missile defense systems.
Additionally, both sides discussed defense budgets and defense industry cooperation, affirmed the South Korean government's plan to increase the defense budget, and agreed to expand defense industry cooperation, including ship maintenance, missile defense equipment, and unmanned systems. The U.S. particularly commended the role of South Korean companies in joint production and supply chains, and decided to establish a "Defense Industry Cooperation Working Group" to institutionalize future collaboration.
The U.S. Navy Virginia-class nuclear submarine "Missouri" (SSN-780) is docked in Busan Harbor. JoongAng Daily
Among them, Hanwha Group has attracted attention. The group has a wide range of layouts in the United States, covering clean energy, defense industry, and shipbuilding. Through the acquisition of local companies and the establishment of subsidiaries, it achieves deep localization. In the 1.5 trillion dollar special investment in ships for the U.S., it played a key role.
Data shows that last year, Hanwha Group invested 100 million dollars to acquire the Philadelphia Shipyard (where the U.S.-South Korea joint SSN is built); in July of this year, Hanwha Group invested 5 billion dollars to upgrade and renovate the shipyard, aiming to solve the aging problems and capacity bottlenecks of the U.S. shipbuilding industry.
Due to years of insufficient investment, weak supply chains, and labor shortages, the current annual capacity of the Philadelphia Shipyard is only 1-1.5 regular ships, and it does not have the dry docks required for building nuclear submarines. This means that to build an SSN in the U.S., the existing dry docks need to be renovated and built first. According to Wen Geun-jik, a former naval reserve officer, "just building the infrastructure will take 3-5 years"; a former presidential policy advisor privately stated, "Trump's promise to help South Korea build a nuclear submarine will take at least 5-10 years."
In summary, the United States has achieved a "threefold benefit" through this.
First, the 1.5 trillion dollars is part of the "3.5 trillion dollars investment in the U.S." project's ship funding. Trump uses others' money to upgrade his own shipbuilding industry, using South Korea's technology, investment, and labor force to achieve the goal of MAGA industrialization, trying to reverse the situation of losing influence in the shipbuilding industry in the U.S.;
Secondly, the U.S.-South Korea joint construction of nuclear-powered submarines not only enhances South Korea's own defense capabilities but also alleviates the deployment pressure the U.S. faces in the Asia-Pacific region. Cultivating South Korea's crisis response capability is a way to reduce its own pressure;
Furthermore, although nuclear-powered submarines are not nuclear weapons, if the U.S. provides high-enriched uranium with a concentration of up to 93% as nuclear fuel to South Korea, it may involve the risk of nuclear proliferation in the region.
Australia is next, followed by South Korea, and then maybe New Zealand and the Philippines. The U.S.-South Korea joint construction of nuclear-powered submarines is undoubtedly inserting a soft pin targeting our country and North Korea into the Northeast Asia region, and the possible impact on regional peace and stability is difficult to estimate.
This article is exclusive to Observer Net. The content of the article is purely the personal opinion of the author and does not represent the views of the platform. Without authorization, it is not allowed to reproduce it, otherwise legal responsibility will be pursued. Follow the WeChat account of Observer Net (guanchacn) to read interesting articles every day.
Original article: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7570176130641117739/
Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author. Please express your attitude by clicking on the [top/beat] button below.