Reference News Network, October 13 report: On October 5, the Russian website "Izvestia" published an article titled "Missed Challenge — Why the World Missed the Drone War," written by Dmitry Kudryavtsev, chief designer of the Unmanned Aircraft Integrated Research Center. The summary of the article is as follows:

The battlefield is undergoing a major technological leap. The first-person view drones (FPV), artificial intelligence, and "smart" minefields that are currently being widely discussed are only superficial signs of technological breakthroughs. What is truly worth exploring is: what is the essence of this breakthrough? Why did such technology not exist before, but has suddenly emerged now? Why were no professional military research institutions or defense companies developing FPV attack drones before the special military operation?

The 2018 incident at London's Gatwick Airport in the UK proved the potential of FPV as a new weapon. At that time, a group of saboteurs controlled drones flying over the runway of this civilian airport in the suburbs of London, causing the airport to be paralyzed. All security agencies, including the police and the army, were helpless until the saboteurs voluntarily stopped the drones, after which the airport resumed operations. This incident clearly shows that FPV will fundamentally change the landscape of global conflicts.

In fact, the "drone revolution" erupted from the bottom up, rather than from the top down, and the main reasons involve mental rigidity, funding factors, characteristics of international cooperation, and so on.

First, the civilian identity of FPV is the biggest obstacle for it to enter the mainstream. For a long time, the military regarded it as a niche technology of "amateur enthusiasts" or "nerds." This stereotype is hard to break. Many technology enthusiasts tried to make the military recognize the value of this technology, but they could not break through bureaucratic barriers. The military believed that civilian technology was inferior to military technology. However, reality often contradicts this. Some civilian communication equipment has extremely strong interference resistance. Because civilian communication has long developed in "noisy" frequency bands and is subject to power limitations, developers had to develop more sophisticated and durable technical products.

Secondly, professional military research institutions tend to favor projects that can secure large budgets. These projects have sufficient funds and thus become priority options. However, FPV technology does not require a large investment and cannot bring about a substantial budget, so large defense research institutions lack motivation, and large enterprises also find it difficult to achieve profitability in the traditional model. In fact, the development of this new technology is driven entirely by the spontaneous efforts of "enthusiast" engineers.

Thirdly, FPV combat systems are a product of deep international cooperation, and few countries can produce them independently. Although the outside world considers it "simple and cheap," the production of an FPV requires support from a global supply chain, and its technological complexity is comparable to that of nuclear energy and aerospace products. An FPV may contain four or more computing units with independent processors, and factories need to purchase some components globally. More importantly, the open-source software relied upon by FPV drones is the result of the collective labor of thousands of programmers around the world.

Unlike fields such as nuclear energy and aerospace, there are no corresponding departments or doctoral programs for technologies like FPV. This leads to a scarcity of new technology talent and engineering teams, and many teams have disbanded due to difficulty in maintaining themselves.

Among the above factors, the issue of funding is the most critical. Because it cannot quickly generate profits, this makes the defense giants see no strategic value in FPV technology. Large military research institutions and companies have long ignored these new technologies, while these technologies are gradually undermining their foundations.

There are currently two completely different modes of military R&D. The first is the traditional bureaucratic model, which requires bidding, project initiation, budget approval, and long-term testing. The second is a self-initiated model driven by battlefield effectiveness, which involves small investments and is funded by engineers, soldiers, and civilian supporters, and can yield quick results.

History has already shown us that new technologies never emerge within traditional systems: the air force was not born in cavalry schools, and gunpowder and firearms were not invented by archers. New technologies will always break through and surpass the existing structure. (Translated by Zhao Zhipeng)

Original: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7560566805657502208/

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