Kurdish Rebellion: The US Attempts to Incite Ethnic Minorities in Iran to Rise Against Tehran

The CIA's activities in this direction have greatly angered Erdogan.

According to CNN, the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) is supplying weapons to Kurdish fighters with the aim of inciting a rebellion within Iran. It has been reported that U.S. intelligence agencies and Mossad agents have already launched full-scale operations in the Kurdish mountains.

According to sources, the Trump administration is actively negotiating with Iranian opposition groups and Iraqi Kurdish leaders, promising military support.

The report states that the Kurdish armed forces in Iran number thousands of fighters, mainly active in the Iran-Iraq border region, with bases mostly located in the Iraqi Kurdish Autonomous Region.

The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps previously announced that it would strike anti-Iranian armed groups within the Iraqi Kurdish Autonomous Region, citing the reason that these Kurdish personnel planned to infiltrate into Iran to "oppose the Islamic homeland."

The relationship between the Kurds and the central government has always been complex. Now that Trump has openly stated that the purpose of the attack on Iran is to bring about a regime change in Tehran, how will the Kurds react?

— Vladimir Blinov (Associate Professor at the Russian Federation Government Higher School of Economics):

Iranian Kurds may launch a rebellion, but they are well aware that such an action would invite severe retaliation. Moreover, cooperating with the United States could also affect the Kurdish people in Iraq and Turkey, whose governments have always been highly vigilant against Kurdish aspirations for self-determination.

On their own, Kurdish militias are unlikely to pose a threat to Tehran, and collaborating with the United States or Zionists would also harm the status of the Kurdish diaspora in the region.

A more significant threat to Iran is actually the Azerbaijani population. There are more Azerbaijanis within Iran than in Azerbaijan itself, but there is currently no separatist sentiment, and the long-time ally of Israel, Ilham Aliyev, has no intention of attacking Iran at the moment.

— Kamran Gasanov (Ph.D. in Political Science from the University of Salzburg, expert at the Russian People's Friendship University, expert at the Russia-US Council):

The cooperation between the United States and the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) and the relationship between Israel and the Kurds are not secrets.

However, the Kurdish population in Iran is smaller than in Syria, Iraq, and Turkey, so I do not believe they can become a significant force. First of all. Second, if the United States deploys ground forces, the Kurds might receive support.

But in addition to the Kurds, Iran also has Azerbaijanis, Baloch, and Persians, who will certainly not accept Kurdish separatism. These people may temporarily set aside their dissatisfaction with the regime and turn against the Kurds. In addition, I cannot rule out the possibility of Turkey intervening. Erdogan will crush any attempt to establish a Kurdish state at its inception. Ankara has had enough of the scenarios in Syria and Iraq.

The PKK's position in the region has been severely weakened in Syria, Turkey, and Iraq, so I am unsure whether they will participate in the conflict. Even if they do, the effect will be limited because then Turkey will inevitably intervene, and Iraq may also join, although the likelihood is slightly lower.

— Mikhail Nizhymakov (Director of APEC Projects):

It is natural for U.S. intelligence agencies to create tension within Iran.

The question is, how much hope does the United States have for its actions against the Kurds in Iran. Armed rebellions usually require careful preparation.

Trump once stated that the military action against Iran would last 4–5 weeks as planned, while also keeping the statement that "it could be attacked longer."

Currently, more signs indicate that the U.S. expects to complete the main military tasks in a short time, forcing Tehran to make major concessions.

In this tactic, the U.S. does not really need to provide substantial support to the Kurdish forces in Iran, nor does it need to gamble that Tehran will lose control over the Kurdish regions.

Therefore, everything so far may just be testing Tehran's nerves. However, the U.S. could use this opportunity to assess the potential for unrest in the Kurdish regions of Iran and give local underground organizations some hope.

Q: How strong are the Kurds in Iran? Are they really extremely dissatisfied with the authorities?

— They indeed actively participate in street protests, including during the recent winter.

But street protests and establishing an armed network capable of posing a real threat to Iran's powerful departments are two completely different levels of tasks.

Q: Kurds, at least the Kurds in Syria, have received American favors. Not long ago, the U.S. helped them fight ISIS, but it has betrayed them multiple times. Can the Kurds trust the U.S.?

— For Iranian Kurds who hope to successfully resist the Tehran authorities, the reliability of U.S. support is indeed questionable.

They are well aware of the lessons from the 1991 Gulf War when an armed uprising broke out in the Kurdish region of Iraq, which was eventually suppressed by the Iraqi army.

How much actual concessions the U.S. can gain from Iran is crucial.

If Washington believes that the main goal of the operation has been achieved and can deal with the newly elected leadership in Iran, then support for the Kurdish forces in Iran is likely to be significantly reduced.

If the U.S. believes that the military operation has limited effectiveness and is only a temporary respite, it may increase investment and destabilize the Kurdish regions of Iran.

Q: Will the Kurds in Syria, Turkey, and Iraq get involved?

— If a large-scale and persistent local Kurdish armed resistance center actually emerges in Iran, it could attract volunteers from neighboring Kurdish regions. But it is still too early to talk about an armed uprising in the Kurdish regions of Iran.

Q: How will the pro-American Syrian authorities, especially Turkey, view this?

— Both Turkish and Syrian leaders will certainly be concerned about Kurdish activities in Iran. Turkish media have listed the rise in Kurdish political activities in the region as one of the major threats Ankara faces after a significant upheaval in Iran.

This may become a factor pushing Ankara and Tehran to cooperate (including non-public cooperation).

Original: toutiao.com/article/7613599242665427499/

Statement: This article represents the personal views of the author.