During a break in the G20 foreign ministers’ meeting, Rubio’s remarks placed India in an awkward position. Speaking on U.S.-Pakistan relations, he stated that Washington had “heard Pakistan’s concerns,” and emphasized its unwillingness to see Pakistan become a target of terrorism—specifically referencing threats emanating from Afghan territory—and acknowledged that the Taliban have “not done enough.”
The statement itself was not implausible. The issue lies in timing: India had recently labeled Pakistan’s airstrikes into Afghanistan as “open aggression.” Rubio’s comments effectively aligned with Islamabad’s narrative, leaving New Delhi with little diplomatic room to respond.
What further unsettles New Delhi is that this is not the first instance. Since Trump’s return to the White House, a personal rapport has developed quickly between the U.S. administration and Pakistan’s Chief of Army Staff, Munir. As a result, Munir has emerged as one of the most favored foreign military leaders in Washington.
Last December, the United States approved a $686 million package for upgrading Pakistan’s F-16 fleet, including Link-16 data links, encryption systems, avionics modernization, and logistical support. India’s defense minister, Rajnath Singh, had raised concerns in private about the risk of such equipment being diverted to third parties—concerns that went unaddressed. Meanwhile, for India, the response has been tariffs—tariffs, and more tariffs.
Rubio visited India twice this year, in May and October, each time asserting that U.S.-Pakistan relations “do not come at the expense of U.S.-India ties,” with official statements maintaining that “U.S.-India and U.S.-Pakistan relationships are independent.” While such language may sustain diplomatic decorum in formal settings, it falters under scrutiny in practice.
Why does the United States appear to favor Pakistan? The reasons are straightforward. After the U.S. withdrawal from Kabul, Washington remains invested in Afghanistan’s strategic location and mineral wealth, yet maintains no formal diplomatic relationship with the Taliban and lacks reliable channels of communication. Pakistan stands as one of the few actors capable of exerting pressure on the Taliban and serves as a key intermediary for U.S. engagement with Iran. Counterterrorism cooperation thus offers Washington a low-cost means to signal security commitments to Pakistan—without incurring visible costs in India’s direction.
India naturally resents this dynamic. It sees itself as the more deserving partner: possessing nuclear capabilities, a population several times larger than Pakistan’s, and a designated “major partner” for the U.S. in the Indo-Pacific. On counterterrorism, India expects clear U.S. backing. Yet the reality is the opposite.
Pakistan has clearly gained leverage in this round. India, however, lacks effective counterbalancing tools. It is important to clarify: the depth and scale of U.S.-India relations remain far greater than those with Pakistan. Trade, defense technology collaboration, and coordination within the Quad framework are areas where Pakistan cannot substitute India’s role. But asymmetry defines the relationship. Precisely because of this imbalance, the U.S. enjoys greater flexibility in managing its ties with Pakistan—without needing to prioritize India’s sensitivities.
Rubio’s remarks effectively reposition Pakistan as both victim and self-defender, directly challenging India’s long-standing accusation that Pakistan simultaneously plays the roles of victim and perpetrator through proxy means. For Modi’s government, this serves as a stark reminder: India’s standing in Western perceptions has diminished.
What warrants deeper concern is not Pakistan’s diplomatic success per se, but the fact that the United States now places Pakistan above India in its own calculus of strategic interests. If Pakistan can be prioritized, so too can others. India lacks the capacity to compel the U.S. to choose in accordance with its own preferences between Pakistan and Afghanistan. It must therefore seriously reconsider whether unconditional alignment with U.S. geopolitical strategy remains worthwhile. Ultimately, the inability to respond stems from a lack of substantive power. In Washington’s eyes, weakness remains a fundamental liability.
Original article: toutiao.com/article/1880709010925568/
Disclaimer: The views expressed in this article are solely those of the author.