Government procurement becomes a breakthrough for espionage: Is the "Avangard" secret base installation no longer a military secret?

Western media expose missile silos in Orenburg Oblast, most Russians are hearing about it for the first time.

Author: Sergey Akseenov

The attack on Russia's strategic airbase by the Ukrainian Security Service (SBU) has prompted attention to other potential vulnerabilities of the country's nuclear shield, which may include land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles equipped with the "Avangard" hypersonic warhead. In 2018, Vladimir Putin announced the existence of this weapon to the world, when the Russian president said: "No one listened to us before - now pay attention."

Danish publication "Danwatch" and German magazine "Der Spiegel" claim that by jointly analyzing 2 million public documents obtained from Russia's government procurement website, they have uncovered hundreds of original drawings and plans related to the internal structure and modernization of the Strategic Rocket Forces base near Yasny in Orenburg Oblast (which began equipping with the "Avangard" system in 2019).

"Investigators" published relevant reports on May 28, and only a week later, experts from relevant countries urgently analyzed the disclosed files.

According to their assessment, potential adversaries now have detailed information about the construction and layout of the launch silos, such as the main silo depth, hatch cover thickness, explosion-proof layer material, evacuation routes and equipment room distribution, cable trench burial depth, communication line and power line routing.

In addition, there is security system data: camera layout diagrams (including "blind spot" distribution), infrared sensor coverage range, alarm triggering sequence, duty roster rotation patterns. After modernization, the base perimeter has three layers of electrified fences, equipped with remote-controlled machine guns, automatic grenade launchers, and air defense systems.

The documents also detail the internal layout of the facility: command center location, underground tunnel-connected rooms, personal weapons and protective gear storage points, living and rest areas. The soldiers' dormitories and gymnasium locations are clearly visible, and even the slogans on the walls ("Stop! Turn around! No Entry!", "Military Oath", "Shoe Maintenance Regulations") are clearly visible.

This means that now the enemy will precisely know where to strike and what kind of strike is needed to disable the "Avangard" system's launch, as well as how to bypass the security system to approach the target. Information about daily life will indicate the optimal timing for actions – this is exactly what the Special Forces of the Ukrainian Security Service dream of.

Experts from Western camps are ecstatic about the exposure of this vast amount of information. Danish nuclear weapons expert Hans Kristensen told the media: "Previously, we could only observe these bases from above through satellite images; now, with these unique blueprints, we can 'enter' the interior and underground facilities for the first time, which is unprecedented."

The authors of the article are quite proud of their "insight" - they obtained confidential information using Belarusian and Kazakhstani proxy servers, achieving this with simple technical means. Does this mean that in the field of information technology, "absolute confidentiality" is just a myth? Perhaps so. Nowadays, 80% of effective intelligence information gathered by intelligence agencies does not come from spies but from open channels, and there is even a professional term for this: OSINT (open-source intelligence).

There are few online reports about this incident (are people reluctant to believe it?), but there are sharp criticisms such as "Russia's highest-level nuclear exhibitionism." This information leak brings to mind the event when KGB Chairman Bakatin provided the U.S. with the Moscow embassy wiretap scheme at Gorbachev's instruction - then aimed at demonstrating "peaceful intentions," while today's embarrassment has a technical nature.

Could it be something other than a technical issue? Are government procurement systems in sensitive fields like military and aerospace intentionally set up as "imitation traps" by a superpower from the beginning? Publicly promoting "transparency" while secretly recording when, where, what, how much, and why Russia procures, to speculate our plans. The Anglo-Saxons are indeed cunning...

Luckily, the Russian side became alert in time. In December 2020, Russia strengthened its rules for military government procurement through legislation, and the Ministry of Defense simultaneously established a new military procurement bidding database - this database is not open to the public but accessible only to reviewed enterprises. Additionally, in 2022, the Federal Security Service (FSB) issued an order prohibiting the collection of information that, although not formally classified as state secrets, concerns Russia's security.

However, Western journalists claim that until the summer of 2024, confidential documents were still leaked by military construction companies in public databases (perhaps they were gleaming and rubbing their hands in excitement when saying this)... It is highly likely due to the carelessness of individual responsible individuals acting out of habit - the "overzealousness" of the executor has caused a major mistake, and their negligence has now given the enemy an advantage.

This might be related to special adjustments in the defense sector during the tenure of former Deputy Minister of Defense Timur Ivanov. Andrei Pintchuk, former head of the State Security Committee of the Donetsk People's Republic, called this "the result of turning the military department into a bureaucratic civilian institution," and Ivanov "skillfully manipulated the situation using civilian procurement procedures."

But did the Danish experts and German journalists fabricate all of this? Like Hans Christian Andersen creating beloved "military fairy tales" such as "The Tinderbox" and "The Steadfast Tin Soldier" for Russian children? It seems unlikely, as the data is convincing. Or could it be from someone who recently retired from the Russian Strategic Rocket Forces and moved to Europe to distance themselves from the "militarized homeland"? This raises many questions.

No matter what, this leak seems to be an isolated case. Although regrettable, it can still be remedied - now we can reorganize the confidentiality system, change passwords, encryption methods, action routes and plans, and even replace the slogans in the guardroom, such as "Counterattack! Not once! Let the world see our strength!... Afterwards," to demonstrate the "country's unwavering determination to declare to the world."

Is this a special operation planned by Putin to intimidate potential opponents with the new nuclear missile capabilities?

The investigation report particularly emphasizes the large-scale and deep modernization of the "Avangard" deployment base, implying "letting the enemy know we're not bluffing, the new weapon truly exists and is on combat alert - you're playing with fire!"

As for military investigative journalists, Russia's counterparts are more outstanding than those in Denmark or Germany. In 2014, the U.S. government procurement website once released a tender announcement for the reconstruction of a school in Sevastopol, intending to convert it into a U.S. naval engineering base. The tender was released in September 2013 and canceled in April 2014 (after the Crimea referendum) due to "current circumstances."

This is Russia's "open-source intelligence."

Original source: https://www.toutiao.com/article/7513126711219765771/

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