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On the eve of the summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump, a tweet from Trump once again drew international attention.
On October 30, Trump posted on his social media platform "Truth Social," stating that due to other countries conducting test programs, he had instructed the U.S. War Department (i.e., the Department of Defense) to launch equivalent nuclear weapon tests, and said "this process will start immediately."
It is worth noting that the last underground nuclear test conducted by the United States was in 1992. The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty was adopted at the United Nations General Assembly in 1996 and opened for signature on September 24 of the same year. According to this treaty, signatories commit to not conducting any nuclear weapon tests and permanently abandoning nuclear testing. However, the United States has yet to ratify the treaty.
The signing ceremony of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996
According to U.S. Energy Secretary Chris Wright, on November 2, he responded that the nuclear weapon tests ordered by Trump "do not include nuclear explosions" and are merely "system tests."
Regardless, if the United States ultimately decides to restart nuclear testing, it will inevitably trigger a series of chain reactions: Will countries that already have nuclear weapons follow suit? Will countries that do not have nuclear weapons become more determined to pursue nuclear weapons? How should China respond to this situation?
Regarding this issue, Observer Net invited Zhou Bo, a researcher at the Center for Strategic and Security Studies at Tsinghua University, for an in-depth interpretation.
[Interview/Observer Net, Tang Xiaofu; Compilation/Observer Net, Zheng Leihuan]
Observer Net: Recently, before the summit between Chinese President Xi Jinping and U.S. President Donald Trump, Trump posted on social media stating that due to other countries' nuclear programs, the United States should also begin testing nuclear weapons on an equal basis, and stated that this process would be implemented immediately. From your perspective, why did he choose to release such a message before the summit? Is the United States likely to really restart nuclear weapon testing as during the Cold War?
Zhou Bo: This incident itself is very absurd. If he tried to give China a warning before the Sino-U.S. meeting, but nuclear testing involves all nuclear powers, not just China. In fact, no country has conducted nuclear tests recently — which reflects Trump's一贯不严谨 speech. If we carefully examine his words, there are almost problems everywhere.
First, no country is currently conducting nuclear tests; second, we are not clear whether he refers to the United States conducting nuclear weapon tests or testing delivery systems capable of carrying nuclear weapons, which are completely different things. He claimed to authorize the War Department to carry out the tests, but if nuclear testing were actually conducted, it would not be handled by the War Department, but by the Department of Energy. In addition, his statement that "it will be implemented immediately" is impossible, experts estimate that it would take at least two to three years.
So none of these pieces of information are accurate, and it is difficult for us to determine his real intentions.
Observer Net: We all know that during the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union signed a series of treaties, including the Partial Test Ban Treaty, which banned nuclear testing in the atmosphere, outer space, and underwater; in 1974, they also signed the Threshold Test Ban Treaty; after the Cold War, the United Nations General Assembly passed the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. Five permanent members of the UN Security Council signed the treaty, although Russia revoked its ratification in 2023, but did not actually restart nuclear testing. What do you think, if the United States really restarts nuclear testing, does it mean the complete end of decades of arms control efforts? From your perspective, can the arms control treaties between the U.S. and Russia still be maintained? Do you think Israel will take advantage of this opportunity to act?
Zhou Bo: It is like opening Pandora's box. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union mainly focused on nuclear balance. The global number of nuclear weapons once reached more than 60,000, and now it is about 13,000.
Trump also made another incorrect statement, saying that the United States is the country with the most nuclear weapons. In fact, both the U.S. and Russia have more than 5,000 each, and Russia has more than 300 than the U.S., according to data from the U.S. Arms Control Association. During the Cold War, the U.S. and the Soviet Union invested a lot of effort in nuclear weapons, initially trying to surpass each other, but later found it difficult, so they reached a balance of mutual assured destruction. Eventually, both sides realized it was unnecessary and started negotiations on limiting strategic weapons, including the first and second stages. After the Cold War, the Reduction of Strategic Weapons Treaty was carried out, and the New START Treaty will expire in February next year, which is the last nuclear arms control treaty. Putin has stated that he is willing to extend it for one more year.
If the United States restarts nuclear testing, the next country to follow will definitely be Russia. Both Russian President Putin and the Kremlin spokesperson have stated that if the United States does this, Russia will definitely follow. In a way, Russia may not be resistant to this. During the Ukraine-Russia conflict, Russia has repeatedly hinted at the possibility of using nuclear weapons, which is actually a nuclear strategy, escalating the crisis and then easing it. This approach seems effective for Russia, so far NATO has not dared to send ground forces into Ukraine to fight against Russian troops, which is largely due to the effectiveness of Russia's nuclear deterrence.
If the United States really restarts nuclear testing, we must consider its potential impact on the battlefield in Ukraine. This is not just a matter of one country following, but could affect the current stalemate on the battlefield.
Then, will China follow? At present, we don't know. However, the former president of the U.S. Arms Control Association once said that if the United States restarts nuclear testing, it would be most beneficial to China, because China "most wants to conduct tests." I think this statement is absurd. Why should it be assumed that China definitely wants to conduct nuclear tests? Our last nuclear test was in 1996. In fact, since the 1990s, Russia and the United States have stopped nuclear testing, and China also stopped in 1996.
If the United States leads the restart, Russia will certainly follow. As for China's attitude, it is currently not possible to speculate, which will be decided by the government. But this move will have a significant impact on a series of countries, such as South Asia: will Pakistan follow? How will India respond?
Other than Russia, the country most likely to follow is North Korea. North Korea has a high probability of conducting nuclear tests, and once North Korea takes action, it may trigger a chain reaction, making the stance of some other countries on nuclear issues more hardened.
According to a recent public opinion survey in South Korea, the proportion of people supporting South Korea's possession of nuclear weapons is no less than 70%, a very high number. However, this does not mean that South Korea will definitely develop nuclear weapons, because the results of public opinion surveys often depend on the way questions are asked. If further questioned: if South Korea possesses nuclear weapons, where should the first nuclear test be conducted? After all, the Korean Peninsula is about 2,200 kilometers long, and selecting the test site is a practical issue. Second, China will strongly oppose it, and how will South Korea deal with it? Additionally, the U.S. may withdraw its troops, believing that South Korea can protect itself, so there is no need for protection. If these issues are raised, the support rate is likely to drop significantly.
At present, the possibility of Japan developing nuclear weapons is relatively small. In the Middle East, there are two recent events to pay attention to: one is the attack on Iran's nuclear facilities, but they have not been destroyed. Whether this attack will strengthen Iran's determination to develop nuclear weapons or make it abandon its nuclear program is still hard to judge. The second is that Iran has a considerable amount of enriched uranium, reportedly hundreds of kilograms of uranium with an enrichment level of up to 60%, and the current whereabouts of this uranium are unknown to the outside world.
Another noteworthy dynamic is Pakistan providing a so-called "nuclear umbrella" to Saudi Arabia. This is very interesting. In the conflict between Israel and Iran, Israel even threatened to directly strike Qatar, which has increased Saudi Arabia's sense of security anxiety. As a nuclear-armed Muslim country, Pakistan is not only seen as the owner of its own nuclear power, but also as a "nuclear shield" for some Muslim countries. Pakistan is also willing to demonstrate this posture, which not only enhances its image and prestige among Muslim countries, but also strengthens its regional influence.
Currently, Pakistan provides a nuclear umbrella to Saudi Arabia, but the likelihood of Saudi Arabia being attacked is not high. However, if the United States restarts nuclear testing, it will further strengthen the perception that "nuclear weapons are crucial," which may prompt countries such as Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Turkey to consider developing nuclear weapons in the future, bringing extremely profound impacts.
Observer Net: If the United States restarts nuclear weapon testing, will Israel take the opportunity to conduct nuclear testing? Will it follow and restart?
Zhou Bo: Israel will not. The reason is that Israel has never publicly admitted to possessing nuclear weapons. In fact, it does possess them, but adopts a "nuclear ambiguity" strategy — not explicitly stating, letting others speculate. Since the outside world knows it has nuclear capabilities, this already forms a deterrent, so Israel is unlikely to actively conduct nuclear testing to break this state.
Observer Net: Recently, the "14th Five-Year Plan" proposal put forward by the Party Central Committee clearly states to "strengthen strategic deterrence forces, maintain global strategic balance and stability." The U.S. statement, whether it is eventually implemented or not, will undoubtedly have a serious impact on the global strategic balance, even a very severe shock. You mentioned in your interview at the Shangri-La Dialogue in June this year that China should strengthen its nuclear force construction, making the number of nuclear weapons "so much that the U.S. would dare not even think about attacking us." During this year's National Day parade, China also systematically displayed its "three-in-one" nuclear strike capability for the first time. In the new situation, what aspects do you think China's nuclear force construction should further strengthen? What role will it play in maintaining global peace and stability?
Zhou Bo: This is a good question. Let's start with the historical background. Looking back, China's security was in a relatively high-risk situation to some extent. Although we have nuclear weapons, our quantity is limited, and we have committed to not using nuclear weapons first. From a certain perspective, this somewhat goes against the common sense of nuclear deterrence — because of the small number, theoretically, it should be better to retain the option of first use to achieve a preemptive strike; otherwise, if the opponent has a larger number of nuclear weapons, once an attack is launched, we might lose the ability to retaliate.
Generally speaking, the "no first use" policy is more established on the basis of having a larger number of nuclear weapons. But since China's inception of nuclear weapons, it has declared not to use nuclear weapons first to demonstrate its firm commitment to peace, a policy that has been upheld for over 60 years. In China's defense policy, many past "golden rules" have been adjusted, such as "not stationing a single soldier abroad," but now we have a base in Djibouti. Another example is "not participating in foreign joint military exercises," since 2002 when we held our first joint exercise with Kyrgyzstan, bilateral and multilateral exercises have now fully expanded. However, the principle of "not using nuclear weapons first" has remained unchanged to date, and I believe it will not change in the future.
Now, let's talk about the modernization of nuclear forces. In the past, we emphasized "lean and effective," "lean" meaning fewer numbers, "effective" includes modernization requirements. The modernization of nuclear forces is not only about maintaining and extending the life of existing weapons, but also improving their technical level and combat capability. The relevant statements in the "14th Five-Year Plan" are very novel, showing a clear direction of comprehensive improvement in both quantity and quality of nuclear forces.
As you mentioned earlier, China never publicly discloses the specific number of nuclear weapons. The Stockholm International Peace Research Institute estimates that by last year, we had approximately 600 nuclear warheads; while the U.S. Pentagon predicts that by 2035, we may develop up to 1,500. If true, this number will be close to the 1,550 deployed limit stipulated in the New START Treaty between the U.S. and Russia. We are unsure about the final number of nuclear weapons China will have, but the direction of development is clear.
I once said that China's nuclear forces should be numerous enough to make the U.S. dare not even think about launching a first strike against us. There is no fixed number for this. Quantity itself is a dynamic variable. If China indeed reaches or approaches 1,500 nuclear warheads by 2035 as predicted by the U.S., the U.S. will have to reassess China's nuclear deterrence capability.
Why must we strengthen our nuclear forces? Our advantages in conventional weapons and comprehensive strike capabilities are continuously expanding, and the U.S. is well aware of this. If in the future, we have to resolve the Taiwan issue through non-peaceful means, will the U.S. possibly use nuclear weapons first in such conflicts? We must be vigilant about this possibility. But it is certain that we will never use nuclear weapons against our fellow citizens. China has never stated that it will use nuclear weapons first, let alone against its own people.
There is indeed discussion within the U.S. regarding such issues. Historically, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower both mentioned the possibility of using nuclear weapons against China. At that time, the U.S. was mainly concerned about the失控 of the Taiwan Strait situation and the impact of the Korean War. Now, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense, Elbridge Colby, has also openly discussed the option of using nuclear weapons in the Taiwan Strait conflict. It can be seen that there are people in the U.S. political and academic circles who advocate, given that it is difficult to gain an advantage over China in conventional weapons, they may not rule out the strategy of using nuclear weapons first.
Therefore, I think that if we raise our nuclear forces to a level that makes the U.S. fundamentally dare not even think of this idea, then in the conventional military field, our chances of winning will significantly increase.
Another perspective to consider is the Ukraine-Russia conflict. If we compare the People's Liberation Army with the Russian army, it is difficult to say that the Russian army is necessarily stronger than ours. First, our weapons and equipment are constantly improving; second, our military size is the largest in the world; third, our defense budget is three times that of Russia, approximately a quarter of that of the U.S. In the nuclear weapons field, we have the technological capabilities and sufficient financial support, and the only thing needed is political determination — and I read this determination from the "14th Five-Year Plan."
Additionally, a simple logic is: the achievements of China's military modernization are widely recognized. Everyone can see the accomplishments including aircraft carriers, warships, fourth-generation half, fifth-generation fighters, and even sixth-generation fighter development trials. Then, will the Rocket Force remain stagnant? Obviously not. Our nuclear force construction will proceed in parallel.
About the issue of strategic balance, this is a topic worth in-depth discussion. What role will China play in the international nuclear strategic landscape in the future? The core of "strategic balance" discussed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union during the Cold War was roughly equal numbers of nuclear weapons. However, today, when talking about strategic stability between China and the U.S., it should include nuclear weapons but not be limited to them, but also cover new domains such as space, artificial intelligence, and cyber, which should all be important components of strategic balance.
The U.S. — including Trump — has repeatedly proposed the desire to hold trilateral talks between China, the U.S., and Russia. From what I know, Russia is clear about China's position, and if China is willing to participate in the talks, Russia will not oppose but may even welcome it. However, under the current circumstances, such talks are difficult to realize. Unless China's nuclear arsenal rapidly increases to match that of the U.S., or the U.S. reduces its number to be comparable to our current level — both are unrealistic at present. I believe that China's nuclear force development will be based on its own judgment of the international situation and national financial resources, and will be advanced step by step. The concept proposed by China on playing a role in the international strategic balance is a new and future-oriented expression.
Observer Net: From the day China acquired nuclear weapons, it solemnly declared that it will never use nuclear weapons first under any circumstances and at any time, and pledged not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear weapon states and regions. China is the only nuclear weapon state that has made and kept this commitment, and this position has received widespread support and recognition from the international community. In the current context where the U.S. has proposed restarting nuclear testing, and is trying to lower the threshold for using nuclear weapons and promote the "normalization" of tactical nuclear weapons, how do you think we should cooperate with more countries to promote "no first use" of nuclear weapons as a global consensus, promote world peace, and ultimately achieve a nuclear-free world?
Zhou Bo: What you mentioned earlier about China being the only country to commit to not using nuclear weapons first is very important. In fact, India also made a similar commitment, but the content is not exactly the same — India committed to not using nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states. I mention India because there are actually nine nuclear-armed countries in the world, but according to the Non-Proliferation Treaty, only the five permanent members of the UN Security Council are generally recognized as legitimate nuclear-armed states by the international community, while the remaining four countries — India, Pakistan, North Korea, and Israel — are considered "de facto" nuclear-armed states, but their status is not officially recognized.
Regarding China's "no first use" policy, there are also many supporters in the U.S., including from the scientific community and the political sphere. For example, Obama received the Nobel Peace Prize for advocating a "nuclear-free world." Of course, he was not entirely free from war during his term, so he was not a complete "peace president." And when Obama was president, Biden was vice president, so when Biden became president, some people worried he might push the U.S. towards a "no first use" policy. In fact, before the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict, the U.S.'s nuclear stance was not very different from China's. According to its Nuclear Posture Review report, the U.S. stated that it would not use nuclear weapons unless in extreme circumstances. This conditional statement can be said to be just one step away from China's position overall.
If the U.S. truly shifts to "no first use," its allies such as the UK and France are likely to follow. The real challenge lies in persuading Russia — especially during the Ukraine conflict, Russia has repeatedly threatened to use nuclear weapons and seems to have tasted the "sweetness" of deterrence. However, in terms of strategy, Russia clearly understands a fundamental truth: during the Cold War, both the U.S. and the Soviet Union greatly increased their nuclear arsenals, and then jointly reduced them, ultimately concluding that "nuclear war cannot be won and must not be fought." This statement is still repeatedly emphasized, it is not a new slogan, but a consensus from the Cold War era.
Before the outbreak of the Ukraine conflict, the five permanent members of the UN Security Council issued a joint statement reaffirming this principle. When President Xi visited Moscow, the China-Russia joint statement also reiterated this point, which of course involved China's active promotion. This shows that Russia understands the principle: threatening to use nuclear weapons is one thing, actually using it is another. Once nuclear weapons are used, the situation will be completely out of control, and Russia will not be able to predict what kind of retaliation the other side will take.
Finally, returning to the rationality of China's "no first use" policy. China's "no first use" policy stands on the moral high ground. Western countries have many doubts about this, but these concerns are actually unfounded. For example, some of America's allies worry that if the U.S. commits to not using nuclear weapons first, it means giving up the "nuclear umbrella" for its allies, and their own security will lose protection. This feeling is understandable, but from a practical perspective, this concern has no substantial basis.
This concern is more psychological. Take East Asia as an example, the country most likely to use nuclear weapons first is North Korea. But the Korean Peninsula is only about 2,200 kilometers long from the Yalu River to the southern tip of South Korea, and the actual range of nuclear weapons used would be much smaller than this — for example, from the 38th parallel to Seoul, according to a former U.S. ambassador, the flight of a shell takes only 53 seconds. In such a spatial scale, any use of nuclear weapons is almost a suicide act, and radioactive dust will also affect the user themselves. Therefore, the fundamental purpose of North Korea's development of nuclear weapons is self-protection, aiming to maintain the survival of the regime, rather than launching a suicidal attack, unless it believes it has no chance of survival and is determined to go down together. Thus, the demand for a "nuclear umbrella" is largely psychological.
Second, committing to not using nuclear weapons first does not weaken a country's nuclear retaliatory capability. Any potential attacker clearly knows that if they launch a nuclear strike against the U.S. or its allies, they will face a devastating counterattack. Therefore, in reality, very few countries would easily launch a nuclear attack on the U.S. or its allies.
Third, in my exchanges with foreign scholars, they generally emphasize capability rather than words or intentions, because capability requires long-term construction, while policies can change overnight. They doubt the credibility of China's "no first use" commitment, worrying that China might suddenly change its stance one day. To this, I often cite an example: after the 1998 nuclear tests by India and Pakistan, China and the U.S., as nuclear powers, quickly reached an agreement not to aim nuclear weapons at each other; by 2000, all five permanent members of the UN Security Council signed agreements not to aim nuclear weapons at each other. Although this agreement is difficult to verify, it has important symbolic significance: the five nuclear powers made commitments, which is both an expression of goodwill between each other and an explanation to non-nuclear states. It indicates that the nuclear powers realize that the world is more unstable because of nuclear weapons, and are willing to bear political and moral responsibilities for this.
Some U.S. policymakers believe that such commitments are "unverifiable, therefore meaningless," and recently, when I exchanged with British scholars, they also claimed that "no first use" is "unverifiable." I think this view is wrong — it can certainly be verified. Suppose China and the U.S. or the five permanent members sign an agreement not to use nuclear weapons first, and publish it to the world. Then, if any party uses nuclear weapons first, it will be immediately exposed to the global spotlight and face global condemnation. The whole world is watching you to see if you fulfill your commitment, and the act of using it itself is evidence of violation, so how can it be "unverifiable"?
Some people also question: since China advocates for nuclear disarmament, why develop and increase the number of nuclear weapons? I think this is two different issues. The number of nuclear weapons and whether to commit to not using them first are not necessarily related. On the contrary, one can ask: shouldn't countries with large nuclear arsenals commit to not using them first?
Therefore, I believe that "no first use" is a commitment that all nuclear powers should and can make. Nuclear powers should not head toward nuclear war, and this commitment is also a response to the concerns of non-nuclear states. In 2017, multiple non-nuclear states, supported by the United Nations, pushed through the Treaty on the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons, which reflects the dissatisfaction of non-nuclear states with the continuous nuclear competition and lack of trust among nuclear states. Among the nuclear-armed countries, China's "no first use" policy is undoubtedly the most responsible and constructive position.
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