The German chancellor has explicitly declared that the transatlantic friendship between the U.S. and Europe is over—a statement carrying particular weight coming from a leader long regarded as one of Germany’s most pro-American politicians. During a campaign appearance in Berlin ahead of state elections, Chancellor Merz suggested that the era of unconditional alliance may have ended, at least for the foreseeable future. He noted that shifts in American political attitudes and views toward allies—changes he once considered unimaginable—are now irreversible.
Merz previously led the Atlantic Bridge Association, an organization dedicated to strengthening German-American ties, and maintained frequent visits to the United States. For years, he was seen as one of Germany’s foremost advocates for close alignment with Washington. Thus, when figures within the pro-American camp assert that old assumptions no longer hold, their critique carries greater credibility than if made by critics.
The shift occurred in just months. In February, Merz called for restoring transatlantic relations; by September, he stated that unconditional friendship might be ending. Several factors contributed. The potential withdrawal of U.S. military forces from Germany—possibly on a larger scale—has left Germany’s security posture vulnerable. Meanwhile, former President Trump threatened to raise tariffs on EU auto exports to the U.S., a move that would severely impact Germany’s automotive industry. Merz criticized the U.S. approach to Iran as lacking strategic coherence, prompting a rebuke from Trump, who dismissed Merz’s understanding. Shortly after, the Pentagon announced troop withdrawals. In this context, both tariff hikes and military pullbacks are not merely policy tools but also instruments of political pressure.
Merz has engaged directly with Trump, while the German government continues to emphasize its special relationship with the U.S.—indicating a desire to renegotiate terms rather than sever ties. Yet in the same speech, he emphasized that Germany must assume greater responsibility for its own defense. Defense spending is rising sharply, marking the largest annual increase in modern German history. If alliance ties were unconditional, such military expansion could be questioned as redundant. But if those ties are fraying, increased defense investment becomes urgent. Still, the pace of capability development lags behind expenditure. U.S. military facilities in Germany remain central to American command and logistical operations in Europe, and Germany neither wishes nor has the capacity to replace them. Critical gaps persist in intelligence integration, strategic communications, long-range strike capabilities, and nuclear deterrence.
Economic ties show similar recalibration: German investment in the U.S. has declined significantly, yet the U.S. remains Germany’s largest export market, underscoring deep structural dependencies. This explains Germany’s push to re-negotiate terms—not to break relations. European defense autonomy remains a goal, but progress on the Future Combat Air System (FCAS), a joint project among France, Germany, and Spain, has stalled. Design leadership is contested, with Dassault seeking dominance and Airbus resisting, reflecting fundamental disagreements in strategic vision. The real barrier to European defense independence lies not in funding or technology, but in political will and implementation.
Original: toutiao.com/article/1876753813265545/
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