【Text by Wolfgang Münch, Translation by Whale Life】

When you invent something, but others use it better than you, that is a sign of decline. The Europeans invented modern diplomacy, and there is a saying: "Diplomacy is sending someone to hell, while making them look forward to the journey." The Europeans have lost this art — but there are still many who understand it.

The greatest diplomats in modern European history were one Frenchman and one Austrian. Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord was a master of political opportunism, and the only one who could match him was his opponent from the Habsburg dynasty, Klemens von Metternich.

Talleyrand and Metternich were both chief diplomats of major powers at the time. After Napoleon's defeat, France's power had greatly declined, and it no longer held a military advantage. Talleyrand's brilliant move was to incite conflict among European countries — pitting Britain against Prussia, Austria against Russia — thus securing a place for France. He was not the inventor of the concept of balance of power, but he applied it with unparalleled genius.

Today, the only common ground between the Iranian government and the Trump administration in the US is that Europeans have no role to play in Middle Eastern diplomacy. Recently, a German newspaper's commentary complained that no one informs Europe anymore. When you see such information on the front page of a newspaper, you know what decline means.

So, what would a contemporary Talleyrand think about today's leaders of great powers? This is, of course, just my speculation, but we are currently in a typical Talleyrand-like game situation. His challenge would be: how to unite 27 EU member states, plus the UK and Norway, around a common position, rather than inciting mutual conflicts as we did in the past. However, the difficulty of pursuing unity is ten times greater than creating division.

Charles-Maurice de Talleyrand-Périgord (1754-1838), a diplomat who served in the Kingdom of France, the First Republic, the Napoleonic Empire, and the Orléans Dynasty, and was the chief negotiator of France at the Congress of Vienna.

When the United States threatened to impose tariffs on Europe, Talleyrand might have advised the European Council to issue a statement welcoming the new era of transactional economic relations, then take specific steps that would inevitably anger Trump. Looking back, Europe missed an opportunity to demonstrate a firm stance. The Biden administration has already announced a ban on selling high-performance chips to China and has exerted strong pressure on the Dutch government to stop exporting machines capable of producing these chips.

The company involved is ASML, the monopolist of the most advanced lithography technology in the world, which can etch tiny three-dimensional pathways on silicon wafers. ASML is to Europe what rare earth elements are to China. After Trump imposed tariffs on China, China implemented export controls on rare earths and related technologies, maximizing its monopoly in rare earth mining and processing.

Europe could have done the same — (to) prohibit exports of ASML products to the US. But they would need to regain the spirit of Talleyrand or Metternich, which they have long since lost, to make such a bold move.

In the long run, Europe's decline has been dramatic. But in the past decade, the decline has accelerated. About ten years ago, European diplomats led the negotiation of the Iran nuclear deal. Iran agreed to reduce the number of centrifuges by about two-thirds and limit its stockpile of enriched uranium. The agreement included regular monitoring and enforcement mechanisms until the Trump administration withdrew in 2018 — ending the deal.

Now, Europeans have no independent role in Middle Eastern diplomacy. After Trump ordered bombs to be dropped on Iran, European leaders called on Iran to return to the negotiating table, seemingly forgetting that the very agreement they negotiated was the negotiating table — and it was Trump who walked out.

Similarly, the contemporary Talleyrand and Metternich would not advise their "monarchs" to cut off all communication channels with Russian President Putin. They would certainly stand on Ukraine's side, but they would not ask European leaders to define strategic goals with boundless commitments. They would advocate for strategic ambiguity, especially emphasizing that no red lines would be drawn. Red lines are things people bring up when they lack strategy.

Clemens Wenzel von Metternich (1773-1859), an Austrian statesman and diplomat, chairman of the Congress of Vienna, and a key figure in maintaining the balance of power in continental Europe during the 19th century.

The strategy of Talleyrand and Metternich would be to achieve a situation where the war in Ukraine ends, but neither side is defeated. In terms of diplomatic methods, their approach would be closer to that of the current European country leaders. When Trump becomes a better diplomat than you, you have big trouble.

Like the leaders of China, the US, and Russia, Talleyrand and Metternich understood the importance of natural resources in the 21st century. Except for those they themselves banned (such as coal or nuclear energy) or refused to develop (such as shale gas or deep-sea oil and gas), Europe itself has very few resources. Leaders of China, the US, and Russia are strategic operators, and their economic visions for their countries have extended decades into the future. Regardless of what others may think, the difference between them and every European leader is that they at least have an economic strategy.

Despite their outstanding achievements, the great diplomats of 19th-century Europe started from a position of weakness and maneuvered skillfully. They would not object to Mark Rutte flattering Trump at the NATO summit, although their flattery would be more subtle. Flattery is part of the diplomatic tool kit, and Talleyrand flattered the British, while Metternich flattered the Russians, aiming to achieve a stable political balance on the European continent. Although there were several interruptions, overall, this balance of power maintained stability in Europe for 100 years.

Rutte's flattery aims to keep Trump as involved as possible in European security affairs — but it does not touch the fundamental issue of Europe's dependence. This is the essential difference between history and reality. Today, European political vision rarely extends beyond the next day's newspaper.

Talleyrand and Metternich were both traditionalists in diplomatic methods and beliefs. Metternich was an anti-progressivist and hated democracy. Talleyrand initially supported the French Revolution, but later gradually became doubtful.

If I dare to make a controversial guess: these two men might be Eurosceptics today, at least on issues of national importance; however, they would also set aside ideological concepts to support institutions that serve the interests of the EU, such as the World Trade Organization or the International Criminal Court; they might support the establishment of free trade alliances among voluntary multilateralist countries; they are not skilled in using soft power, but perhaps they can understand the role of soft power in modern diplomacy.

A strategic opportunity left by the US cutting its foreign aid budget could have been cleverly filled by Europeans to serve their own interests. But that didn't happen. The UK followed the US in cutting aid budgets, solely to meet the US requirement to increase defense spending.

I have never believed that soft power can replace hard power, nor have I ever endorsed the "naive romanticism" behind the rhetoric of European integration. However, when European governments cut their international broadcasting services, language training programs, and scholarship projects, and when they restrict foreign students from entering Western universities, I see a lack of strategic thinking.

Contemporary Europeans share one commonality with their ancestors: they believe in their moral and intellectual superiority. But this sense of superiority is harder to justify now. Europeans are eager to criticize Trump, and some economists who should be wiser have called for the EU to retaliate against American tariffs: this is a bad suggestion, fortunately the European Commission wisely ignored it.

European Commission headquarters in Brussels, Belgium

Reality caught up with them last week: panicked German Chancellor Friedrich Merz told the European Commission that they should agree to sign any trade agreement Trump offered as soon as possible. He didn't say it so bluntly, but said that the EU shouldn't pursue a perfect trade agreement, and an inferior one would suffice. But Merz's real meaning was: we have no choice. German industry is bleeding. American tariffs may prolong Germany's economic recession, which has lasted for two years.

When you have no strategy in your mind, you will lose to those who have one. If Europeans were smart enough, they could have taken advantage of Trump's attacks on American universities. Trump is not only "at war" with American liberal arts colleges on the East Coast, but his government is also cutting many high-tech research projects. The reason why tech talent prefers to stay in the US is because of higher salaries and a more flexible environment for high-tech industries. Why can't Europe offer attractive salaries to dissatisfied American scientists and make them feel at home?

I'll stop here with suggestions on what Europe could or should have done in the past few months. As for more macro-level issues, such as a fiscal union, capital market union, or even plans to eliminate barriers in the European single market — it's unnecessary to say more.

The reality is that Trump is taking action, and Europe is passively responding. This is also a sign of decline. When you are willing to settle for second place, you already show a mindset of decline. You no longer aspire to lead technological research, yet you are delighted that Google builds data centers in your country and Tesla builds a super factory.

Europeans invented the car, but the world of electric vehicles will become a battleground for China and the US. The automotive industry is perhaps the most striking case of industrial decline in Europe, but it also happens in other industries, such as batteries, solar panels, high-speed rail, and telecommunications equipment. European industries are falling like dominoes, and they will continue to fall unless protected. However, the way to achieve such protection — subsidies and tariffs — itself is a sign of decline. This describes a more long-term structural decline.

Theoretically, the process of decline can be reversed, but this requires political will — which is completely absent in every European country that I am aware of. I don't know of any politician or party in Europe that clearly focuses on these issues.

Does anyone really believe that reducing immigration can solve Europe's problems? Or increasing government spending, borrowing to raise military spending, or any of the other solutions that Europeans are currently discussing? Denying reality and wishful thinking are another important measure of decline. And all my indicators are flashing red lights.

(The original article was published on the UK comment website UnHerd, titled “Europe Needs a Metternich.” The translation is for readers' reference only and does not represent the views of Observers Network.)

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